





The impact of mandatory adoption of International Financial 
Reporting Standards on accounting quality, analysts’ 










A thesis submitted to 
the University of Birmingham, UK 





Department of Finance 
Birmingham Business School 

















This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third 
parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect 
of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or 
as modified by any successor legislation.   
 
Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in 
accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged.  Further 
distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission 








This thesis is structured upon three studies. The first study investigates whether 
mandatory IFRS adoption improves accounting quality in Latin America. The findings 
show that in the post-adoption period: accrual earnings management practices are 
reduced, value relevance of accounting increases, and the delay in recognising bad news 
reduces. However, these improvements cannot be found in firms with high bankruptcy 
possibility and poorly performing firms. The second study focuses on whether the 
analysts’ information environment has improved since the IFRS adoption. The results 
show that the mandatory adoption of IFRS improves analysts’ information environment, 
even after controlling for the firm-level reporting incentives. The third study focuses on 
whether IFRS has affected the cost of equity and debt in Latin America. The findings 
show that the cost of equity and debt decreased significantly in the post-IFRS period. 
Overall, the results found can be attributed to IFRS as the institutional environment has 
not changed significantly around the years of the mandatory adoption of IFRS. Thus, 
IFRS can contribute to enhance the accounting quality of Latin American firms, and may 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis contains 7 Chapters that are based on three studies. Overall, this thesis 
investigates whether the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) in Latin America has impacted accounting quality, analysts’ 
information environment and the cost of capital (e.g. higher accounting quality, enhanced 
information environment and lower cost of capital).  
The IFRS has been mandatory in Europe since 2005 according to regulation 
1606/2002 that required the government to ensure its compliance. The main aim of this 
regulation is to improve transparency, comparability, and the efficiency of capital 
markets. It seeks to enhance the protection of investors and increase international foreign 
direct investments over the globe (ICAEW, 2015). It is worth noting that the governments 
of more than 140 countries have adopted IFRS as the official accounting standards over 
recent years. However, emerging markets, in particular Latin American countries, have 
only started the process of adopting IFRS since 2008. The governments from these 
emerging markets took an effort to enhance the quality of accounting information and 
increase the comparability of financial statements in order to attract more investments 
and develop the capital markets (SVS, 2006; CNBV, 2008; CVM, 2008; CNV, 2009; 
CONASEV, 2010). Despite the importance of IFRS and the changes that it brings to a 
country, the literature on Latin American markets is very limited. 
The impact of IFRS on the accounting quality, analysts’ information environment 
and cost of capital has several implications for the users of the financial information, such 
as international regulators, governments, analysts, investors and lenders. For instance, 
international regulators discuss whether IFRS can provide greater accounting quality and 
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improve economic development, and these outcomes are expected by local governments 
and regulators (SVS, 2006; CNBV, 2008; CVM, 2008; CNV, 2009; CONASEV, 2010). 
In addition, greater accounting quality can influence analysts who can more accurately 
assess their risks and provide more accurate forecasts. Consequently, the quality of 
forecasts can influence other accounting information users, such as investors or 
shareholders, which in turn, take decisions to buy, sell or hold investments in shares. For 
instance, this situation might help to boost investments as investors would perceive higher 
accounting quality, which can help to reduce information asymmetry and hence the risk 
of investing in these countries. Likewise, lenders could perceive higher quality stemming 
from financial statements, which in turn would be helpful in lowering the required rates 
of return in debt contracting.  
 
1.2 Motivations  
Despite the implications of the adoption of IFRS to several users of accounting, 
investors, analysts, governments and international regulators, there are several reasons to 
study the effect of IFRS in Latin America. Firstly, Latin American countries have two 
economic trading blocs, the Mercado Comum do Sul (MERCOSUL)1 and Pacific 
Alliance2 in order to promote free trade amongst its participants. They export several 
types of commodities to developed countries, and influence the worldwide economy. 
Moreover, they attract foreign direct investment, in particular, from the U.S. and China 
(Trevino and Mixon Jr., 2004; Tuman and Emmert, 2004; Trevino, Thomas and Cullen, 
2008; BBC, 2015; IMF, 2016). Thus, following the adoption of IFRS, these changes in 
accounting standards can affect how foreign investors make their investment decisions. 
                                                 
1 Mercado Comum do Sul (MERCOSUL) is composed of five full members (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, 
Uruguay and Venezuela), five associated countries (Chile, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru) and two 
observer countries (New Zealand and Mexico). Its website is http://www.mercosul.gov.br/.  
2 Pacific Alliance is composed of five member states: Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Costa Rica.  
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This is a significant step taken by the governments of these countries, to develop their 
capital market, that brings implications for the quality and reliability of the standards, 
which in turn affects investors, analysts, lenders, and other users of accounting (SVS, 
2006; CNBV, 2008; CVM, 2008; CNV, 2009; CONASEV, 2010).  
Secondly, unlike other BRICS countries (China, India, Russia and South Africa), 
the adoption of IFRS was required in unconsolidated financial statements as well as in 
consolidated financial statements. This helps to identify more clearly the changes from 
domestic generally accepted accounting principles to IFRS.  
Thirdly, the combination of national institutional structures and economic growth 
in Latin American markets may also affect accounting quality, which can provide new 
inferences for literature; as such, it is important to investigate how these factors affect the 
adoption of IFRS. It is worth noting that the gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate 
started to decline after 2012 reaching levels between 2% and 2.5%, which is lower than 
those of other emerging markets and those of the G7 countries3. Additionally, corporate 
debts have increased in the past six years and surge up to US$109 billion plus $47 billion 
in local currencies in 2014, which is about 21% of the GDP on average (Turner, 2015; 
IMF, 2015; Tett, 2015). These economic factors have affected Latin American firms’ 
financial position and performance, and may affect manager’s incentives to adopt IFRS.  
Fourthly, studying Latin American markets also exploits the different national 
institutional structures (enforcement of accounting standards, investor protection 
mechanisms as well as less developed capital markets) when investigating the 
determinants and effects of these factors on accounting quality (Ball, 2016). Previous 
literature, which is mainly focused on developed countries, has demonstrated that 
accounting quality is not determined only by the adoption of high-quality accounting 
                                                 




standards, but it varies according to the level of legal enforcement, investors’ protection 
and managers’ incentives (Ball, Robin and Wu, 2003; Barth, Landsman and Lang, 2008; 
Daske, Hail, Leuz and Verdi, 2008; Li, 2010; Houqe, Zijl, Dunstan and Karim, 2012; 
Doukakis, 2014; Christensen, Hail and Leuz, 2013). The enforcement and investor 
protection mechanisms of these countries are weak (Brown, Preiato and Tarca, 2014; La 
Porta, Lopez-De-Sinales, Shleifer, Vishny, 1998), which in turn could help this thesis to 
identify more clearly the impact of the IFRS adoption. Thus, investigating the Latin 
American case can contribute to the international literature. 
Overall, investigating these countries provides a unique framework, and also 
answer the call of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) for research on 
the impact of adopting IFRS in emerging markets. This thesis examines firms from five 
Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, México and Peru). The other 
countries could not be included as they either adopted IFRS after 2014 or their empirical 
data was not available. 
The next section illustrates the research objectives of the four studies contained in 
this thesis.  
   
1.3 Research objectives 
This section reports the research objectives according to each major study of this 
thesis. The first study examines the impact of IFRS adoption on the accounting quality of 
Latin American firms. In particular, the objectives of this study are as follows: (i) to 
investigate the strength and changes of the enforcement of accounting standards, 
legislation and investor protection mechanisms; (ii) to investigate whether IFRS adoption 
improves Latin American firms accounting quality (based on earnings management, 
timely recognition of losses and value relevance); (iii) to investigate whether financial 
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health, operating performance, and the status of listing on the U.S. stock exchanges affects 
the manager’s implementation of IFRS; and (iv) to investigate whether managers 
implement IFRS due to official requirements, according to the auditors’ reports. 
The second study examines whether the adoption of IFRS improves analysts’ 
information environment measured in terms of earnings’ forecast accuracy and 
dispersion, analysts’ target price forecast dispersion, as well as the number of analysts 
following firms. Secondly, this study investigates whether firm-level reporting incentives 
affect analysts’ information environment. Thirdly, this study re-examines the impact of 
mandatory adoption of IFRS on analysts’ information environment after controlling for 
firm-level reporting incentives. Fourthly, this study also investigates whether mandatory 
adoption of IFRS improves the precision of public, private and consensus information 
based on the work of Barron, Kim, Lim and Stevens (1998) and Byard, Li and Yu (2011). 
The third study investigates the impact of the IFRS adoption on the cost of equity 
and debt. This study also examines whether IFRS can still be beneficial in reducing the 
cost of equity, after controlling for firm-level reporting incentives.  
The next section focuses on an overview of the theoretical framework, as well as 
the methodology employed to achieve the objectives of the four studies contained in this 
thesis. 
 
1.4 Synopsis of theory and methodology 
This section summarizes the theoretical framework and research methodology that 
supports this research. The theoretical framework and the event-study approach are 




1.4.1 Theoretical framework 
 The theoretical framework of this research is based on the theory of agency 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976), the positive accounting theory (Watts and Zimmerman, 
1986), the works of Ball et al. (2003) and Nobes (2006) as well as the equity valuation 
theory. The theory of agency argues that managers have incentives to act on behalf of 
their best interests, which may conflict with the best interests of the companies’ 
shareholders. The positive accounting theory links the implications of the theory of 
agency (the conflict of interests between managers and shareholders) to possible 
accounting choices and outcomes, which can impact on the accounting quality. Moreover, 
Ball et al. (2003) argue that institutional settings such as market and political factors can 
affect the preparers’ incentives in presenting financial reports, which in turn can affect 
accounting quality. Additionally, Nobes (2006) argue that the institutional setting as well 
as the properties of the standards where the firm is operating may affect the quality of 
accounting; in particular, enforcement of accounting standards and investor protection 
mechanisms. That is, if the institutional setting is not strong, the firm may not adopt the 
accounting standards properly. Considering that the enforcement of accounting standards 
and investor protection mechanisms are weak in Latin America (Brown et al., 2014; La 
Porta et al., 1998), these factors can affect the adoption of IFRS and the accounting quality 
in these countries as well as the managers’ incentives to prepare financial statements. As 
Latin American countries recently adopted IFRS, and this represents a major change in 
the accounting standards of these countries and on their quality, these factors suggested 
by previous literature and theories are fundamental to the development of this thesis. The 
analyses on value relevance as well as on the cost of equity are supported by the equity 
valuation theory. Various models were developed to identify the value relevance of 
accounting numbers as well as to calculate the cost of equity (Ohlson, 1995; Claus and 
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Thomas, 2001; Gebdhardt, Lee and Swaminathan, 2001; Gode and Mohanram, 2003; 
Easton, 2004; Barth et al., 2008). These studies also offer a theoretical foundation to 
investigate these issues in Latin America.  
 
1.4.2 Event-Study approach 
The key issue of this section is to illustrate how to measure the target effects of 
the investigated event based on the research design of standard event studies. This is 
important because this thesis adopts the method of event-study. This methodology was 
initially employed by Ball and Brown (1968) and Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969). 
Ball and Brown (1968) investigated the effect of net income on share prices by 
pinpointing the earnings announcement date through the Wall Street Journal. The authors 
argue that their methodology has several limitations regarding the impact of the net 
income on security prices. This is because security prices are affected by macroeconomic 
changes, industry effects and are volatile to speculations from the market. Nevertheless, 
the authors were able to identify that the net income is indeed useful for valuation 
purposes. Another key event-study is Fama et al. (1969) that accurately investigated the 
dates on which firms split their shares. It is likely this event occurs to show that directors 
are confident on the firm’s performance. Therefore, the market perceives this, and as a 
result this information is reflected in the share prices. Thus, by investigating the split 
dates, the authors argue that the market is efficient. Considering the approach of these 
studies, Brown and Warner (1980) argue that one of the challenges of event-study 
methodology is to identify clearly the effect of the event. The key concern is that 
researchers need to identify accurately the event date in order to measure its effect, and 
to control for possible factors that may surround its effect. Thus, this thesis considers 
firms’ incentives, the effect of the institutional environment as well as firm-level factors 
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in order to measure accurately the effect of the IFRS adoption. The methodology of each 
study is discussed next. 
 
1.4.3 Research methodology of the first study 
In the first study, this thesis investigates the enforcement of accounting standards 
and investor protection mechanisms through an updated code of enforcement based on 
the methodology of Brown et al. (2014), La Porta et al. (1998), Hope (2003) and the 
World Bank (2008) that aims to investigate the changes in the institutional environment 
during the adoption period. The results are helpful in controlling the changes in the 
institutional settings and further concentrate on the effect of the mandatory adoption of 
IFRS in the following research work. Secondly, the empirical work with regard to 
accounting quality is investigated based on the informational content of metrics of 
earnings management, value relevance, and timely loss recognition (Dechow, Sloan and 
Sweeney, 1995; Basu, 1997; Barth et al., 2008; Ahmed, Neel and Wang, 2013b). 
Additionally, this study expands the value relevance model and Basu’s (1997) model by 
introducing lagged independent variables in order to capture firms’ reporting behaviour 
in a timely manner. This is because previous published studies examine the accounting 
quality based on data of a single time point, t only, but ignore firms’ behaviour in delaying 
the recognition of bad news, or smoothing earnings in bad times and good times. This 
study also analyses the issues of accounting quality in three sets of subsamples with 
regard to firm-level factors: operating performance, bankruptcy possibility, and the status 
of listing on U.S. stock exchanges. Furthermore, this study investigates the external 
auditors’ reports in order to evaluate if the managers are following IFRS, as they still can 
use their discretion when enforcement and investors’ protection is weak. The target 
population of this research includes all publicly listed companies excluding banks and 
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financial institutions in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Chile and Peru. This study adopts 
quarterly accounting and market data in order to track firms’ behaviour in a timelier 
manner.  
The sample is based on 309 industrial firms with quarterly data from 2003 to the 
fourth quarter of 2014 from Economática database. The data is analysed in a time span of 
eight quarters prior to IFRS adoption and after. This approach is adopted to ensure that 
there is a similar amount of data available for both periods. 
 
1.4.4 Research methodology of the second study 
The second study focuses on the impact of IFRS adoption on the analysts’ 
information environment in Latin America. The metrics for the analysts’ information 
environment are based on Byard et al. (2011) and Panaretou, Shackleton, and Taylor 
(2013): current-year analysts’ forecast accuracy and dispersion of earnings as well as the 
number of analysts following firms. Moreover, this study extends the metrics and includes 
analysts’ forecast error and dispersion of one-year-ahead forecasts as well as analysts’ 
forecast dispersion of target price. Previous studies focus mostly on earnings forecasts 
but do not rely on the fact that analysts are responsible for issuing other types of forecasts 
(Beyer, Cohen, Lys and Walther, 2010). Thus, this study also investigates target price 
forecasts. Following previous literature, this study includes several controls for firm size, 
time between the analysts issuing the forecasts and the earnings announcement date, 
previous stock returns, changes in earnings per share and log of the number of analysts 
following the firm. This study also investigates whether firm-level reporting incentives 
affect the information environment. Following Byard et al. (2011) and previous literature, 
this study includes variables in the model that represents firms’ incentives (greater return 
on assets, firms audited by big 4 auditors, highly leveraged firms, firms that list on foreign 
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stock exchanges and firms with greater growth opportunities). Afterwards, the effect of 
IFRS is investigated jointly after controlling for firms’ incentives. The precision of public, 
private and consensus information is investigated following the method of Barron, Kim, 
Lim and Stevens (1998). 
The data of this study is from the I/B/E/S detail and summary file. There are 97 
firms with data available for this analysis from the detail file and 285 firms from the 
summary file.4  
  
1.4.5 Research methodology of the third study 
The third study focuses on the impact of IFRS adoption on the cost of equity and 
debt in Latin America. The average of four methods proposed by Claus and Thomas 
(2001), Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan (2001), Gode and Mohanram (2003), and Easton 
(2004) is adopted in order to calculate the cost of equity. However, the clean surplus 
accounting assumption that Claus and Thomas (2001) and Gebhardt et al. (2001) rely 
upon may not hold for the pre-adoption period. Thus, this thesis relies on the average of 
models of Gode and Mohanram (2003) and Easton (2004) because these models do not 
rely on clean surplus accounting. Additionally, this study estimates the cost of equity 
using only forecasts available by the analysts, as well as it produces another set of results 
by forecasting the three-year ahead through five-year ahead forecasts, using the long-term 
growth rate, if these forecasts are missing. Using the estimated cost of equity as a 
dependent variable, this thesis regresses it on several control variables adopted by 
previous literature: size, variability of stock returns, leverage, one-year-ahead inflation, 
risk-free rates, as well as industry and country effects (Hail and Leuz, 2006; Li, 2010). 
                                                 
4 The number of firms for each analysis (e.g. precision, forecast accuracy, forecast dispersion) varies. Please 
refer to Chapter 5 for the detailed number of firms in each analysis, which is available at the bottom of each 
table that contains the results. 
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This research also controls for firms’ incentives that could affect the cost of equity: return 
on assets, whether a firm lists on foreign stock exchanges, and whether it is audited by 
the Big 4 auditors.  
To investigate the cost of debt, this thesis follows the approach of Moscariello et 
al. (2014). This is because the cost of debt is perceived in the contracts, and it can be 
obtained as the interest paid over the outstanding bearing debt. Multivariate analyses are 
employed using several control variables: expected inflation, risk-free rates, deviation of 
net income, size of the firm, the book to market value ratio, the log of sales, tangibility, 
the ratio of current assets over current liabilities, interest coverage as well as country, 
industry and year effects. 
The data to evaluate the cost of equity is from the I/B/E/S detail file. There are 89 
firms for which a meaningful cost of equity can be calculated for at least one year in the 
period of 4 years before and 4 years after the mandatory IFRS adoption and the other 
variables are available.5 The data to evaluate the cost of debt is from DataStream and 
WorldScope. There are 279 firms with data available to achieve the research objectives 
in the period of 4 years before and 4 years after the mandatory IFRS adoption.  
The next section illustrates the main findings of this thesis. 
1.5 Main Findings 
From the first study (Chapter 4), the main findings are as follows. Firstly, earnings 
management practices measured via the accrual aggressiveness models reduces in the 
post-adoption period. Secondly, the value relevance of accounting figures improved in 
the post-IFRS period. Thirdly, firms still delay the recognition of bad news; however, this 
delay is reduced during the post-adoption period. Hence, an overall improvement is 
                                                 
5 Although the study of the cost of equity is based on the I/B/E/S detail file, the data available for the 
analysis of the cost of equity is lower than the data available to investigate the analysts’ information 
environment. This is because the cost of equity for some firms is not a real root or is greater than 1.  
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perceived. Moreover, firm-level factors affect managers’ behaviour in adopting IFRS. 
Poor performance and high bankruptcy possibility may constrain managers’ willingness 
in adopting IFRS. According to this, the results illustrate that there are no accounting 
quality improvements for these firms. The results also indicate that there is still room for 
managers’ discretion upon the standards, which is confirmed by the investigation of the 
auditors’ reports for these firms as there are companies that do not fully follow IFRS.  
With respect to the analysts’ information environment analysis (Chapter 5), the 
main findings are as follows. The findings show that there is an overall improvement in 
analysts’ information environment, as analysts issue more accurate and less dispersed 
forecasts. Additionally, the number of analysts following Latin American firms in the 
post-IFRS adoption period doubles. The dispersion of target price reduces in the post-
adoption period, which illustrates that the improvement in analysts’ information 
environment is not only due to increased accuracy and reduced dispersion concerning 
earnings forecasts, but is also related to target price forecasts. The results also show that 
the improvement in analysts’ information environment brought by mandatory adoption 
of IFRS is reflected in the precision of public and consensus information.  
With regard to the analysis on the cost of equity (Chapter 6), the main findings are 
as follows. This thesis finds that there is a reduction on the cost of equity, and this is 
associated with the adoption of IFRS in Latin America. Thus, investors require a lower 
premium for investing in these firms in the post-IFRS period, as they perceive higher 
quality stemming from their financial statements and a lower risk. Regarding the analysis 
on the cost of debt, this thesis shows that despite the political and economic uncertainty 
experienced in recent years, there is a reduction on the cost of debt in the post-IFRS 
period.  




1.6 Contributions  
This thesis contributes to the literature for the following reasons. Firstly, this study 
contributes to the international literature in investigating the impact of IFRS adoption in 
a unique setting of Latin American countries. Christensen et al. (2013) argue that the 
findings of previous literature are constrained due to confounding effects of a bundle of 
factors. They argue that the changes in the level of legal enforcement and investor 
protection mechanisms, firms’ incentives as well as the mandatory adoption of IFRS 
could be related to the findings of an improvement in the accounting quality of previous 
studies. Preiato, Brown and Tarca (2015) also argue that if effective enforcement proxies 
are taken into consideration, the effects of improvement in accounting quality and 
analysts’ information environment could disappear. Therefore, they urge researchers to 
control for this. This study addresses the concerns of Christensen et al. (2013) and Preiato 
et al. (2015) by firstly investigating whether there were any changes in the enforcement 
of accounting standards and investor protection mechanisms around the mandatory IFRS 
adoption dates (between 4 and 6 years depending on the date of adoption of IFRS by each 
country). In order to achieve this, a questionnaire containing several questions (further 
detailed on Chapter 3) was sent to the securities and market regulators, academics and 
Institute of Federal accountants and auditors of each country. The results found that there 
were no concurrent significant changes in the enforcement of accounting standards and 
investor protection mechanisms around the date of IFRS adoption. This framework allows 
for more accurate investigation of the impact of IFRS and avoids the confounding effects 
of institutional settings from previous research. Secondly, to the best of my knowledge, 
this thesis is the first study to examine six measures of accounting quality and economic 
consequences (earnings management, accounting conservatism, value relevance, 
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analysts’ information environment, cost of equity and cost of debt) of the IFRS adoption 
in Latin America based on quarterly and annual data.  
From the first study, the contributions are as follows: this study utilizes quarterly 
data to track the firms’ behaviour in a timely manner, where the methods of value 
relevance (Barth et al., 2008) as well as timely recognition of losses (Basu, 1997) are 
extended. Due to this research design, this study shows that is necessary to investigate the 
lagged behaviour of Latin American firms, as their situation is different from developed 
nations, and provides new insights to the literature. Due to the current economic climate, 
this study also shows how different firm-level factors affect the adoption of IFRS in 
emerging economies, which is an additional factor that affects managers’ discretion. This 
thesis argues that firm-level factors are another force affecting the accounting quality and 
managers’ incentives, which contributes directly to the theoretical framework provided 
by Ball et al. (2003). This study also contributes to the literature in assessing the 
compliance to the standards according to the external auditors’ reports. This analysis 
brings insights to the literature by showing which types of irregularities firms are caught 
by, and in turn help the securities and market regulators to focus more on investigating 
why these firms do not comply with the standards. Additionally, this evidence may help 
regulators in strengthening the penalties for these irregularities, which in turn could 
discourage firms’ non-compliance behaviour. Finally, this study contributes to the 
literature by showing that IFRS can enhance the accounting quality of Latin American 
firms. 
With respect to the analysts’ information environment analysis, this thesis 
contributes to the literature in at least three ways. Firstly, this study investigates the long-
term effect of the IFRS adoption in contrast to previous studies in developed nations that 
investigate the short-term effects. Secondly, this study expands the measures of analysts’ 
15 
 
information environment by examining the accuracy and dispersion of one-year-ahead 
earnings forecasts (previous studies investigate current-year earnings forecasts), as well 
as examining the dispersion of target price forecasts. Thirdly, as there is an improvement 
in analysts’ information environment, investors may realise the benefits of making 
investment decisions based on analysts’ forecasts, and in return capital market efficiency 
may improve. 
Regarding the analysis on the cost of equity, this research improves the 
understanding of the economic consequences of accounting standards harmonization via 
IFRS in developing countries as Beyer et al. (2010) urge researchers to examine the 
relation between accounting quality and cost of capital. Secondly, this study examines the 
long-term effect of IFRS, as previous literature focuses mostly on short-term effects. 
Thirdly, the metrics of cost of equity are derived based only on the forecasts provided by 
the analysts, in contrast to previous literature which estimated the forecasts when they 
were missing (Claus and Thomas, 2001; Li, 2010). This helps to investigate more 
accurately the IFRS effect because there is a measurement error involved when the 
researcher forecasts the missing data. With regard to the analysis on the cost of debt, given 
the unclearness on the effect of IFRS on debt contracting (Florou and Kosi, 2015), this 
research improves the understanding of the economic consequences of the adoption of 
IFRS with regard to the cost of debt where the literature is limited. This study is not 
constrained by concurrent institutional factors, which overcome the limitations of 
previous research (Florou and Kosi, 2015; Persakis and Iatridis, 2017). The adoption 
implies higher accounting quality, which in turn helps to lower the interest rates on the 
cost of debt. 
Overall, as this was a major change in the accounting system of each country, the 
quality of financial information is one of the essential ways to attract overseas investments 
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in order to maintain investors’ confidence and stimulate the development of capital 
markets. Therefore, this study contributes to understand the impact of the adoption of 
IFRS on the quality of accounting in Latin America. Thus, it contributes to the worldwide 
discussion, whether the goal of enhancing accounting quality is being achieved by IFRS 
in developing countries. It is worth noting that these countries were treated as control 
groups by past studies, and as such, the research evidence is very limited. This is helpful 
for the IASB, the Latin American governments and investors. In addition, for financial 
analysts and investors, this study contributes to comprehend the formation of share prices 
in the stock market, and the informational role of accounting in the current market 
scenario of convergence to IFRS in developing countries. Furthermore, this study 
contributes to the knowledge about convergence to international accounting standards, 
quality of accounting information and its implications to investors and market regulators. 
Finally, based on the findings that accounting information quality has improved, and the 
characteristics of emerging markets; this entails implications for policy makers. For 
instance, it can encourage other regulators in other emerging markets to adopt IFRS in 
the coming future. Colombia has just adopted IFRS and as such, their regulators can 
compare whether the benefits of IFRS with the other Latin American countries 
investigated in this thesis. For Latin American policy makers, it illustrates that their 
countries have improved their accounting quality in comparison to previous domestic 
accounting standards, which highlights opportunities for attracting foreign investment. It 
is worth noting though, that this thesis highlights the need to increase enforcement of 
accounting standards and investor protection mechanisms, as this would likely contribute 
to enhance the benefits flowing from IFRS, help to attract foreign investments, and it is 




1.7 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses the theoretical framework 
of this thesis. Chapter 3 presents the background and institutional settings of Latin 
American countries surrounding the IFRS adoption, as well as it presents the 
questionnaire issued to investigate any significant changes in the enforcement of 
accounting standards and investor protection mechanisms surrounding the IFRS adoption 
date in Latin America. Chapter 4 presents the empirical analysis of the first study that 
investigates the impact of mandatory adoption of IFRS on accounting quality in Latin 
America. This chapter presents the literature review of the mandatory IFRS adoption, 
present the research opportunities, the research methodology, which examines the impact 
of IFRS on the accounting quality (earnings management, accounting conservatism, value 
relevance) of Latin American firms. Finally, this Chapter reports the findings of the first 
study which is with regard to the impact of IFRS on the accounting quality of Latin 
American firms.  
 The second study that investigates the impact of mandatory IFRS adoption on 
analysts’ information environment in Latin America is presented in Chapter 5. This 
Chapter reviews the literature with regard to the impact of IFRS adoption on analysts’ 
information environment; it also presents the research opportunities, the research 
methodology employed to investigate the analysts’ information environment, as well as 
the findings of the second major study. 
 The third study that investigates the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on the cost 
of equity and debt in Latin America is presented in Chapter 6. This chapter reviews the 
literature and presents the research opportunities as well as it discusses the methods 
employed to investigate the research objectives and discusses the results. 
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Finally, Chapter 7 provides a summary of the main findings and concluding 
remarks. The implications, limitations and recommendations for future research are 
presented as well. In order to better illustrate how this thesis is structured, please rely on 
the next figure.6 
Figure 1. Thesis's structure 
 
 Additionally, there are four appendices in this thesis. The first appendix illustrates 
the questionnaire adopted to investigate the strength and changes in the institutional 
settings. Appendix 2 presents the detailed results of the questionnaire. Besides presenting 
the literature review of the chapters, this thesis also presents the summary of the literature 
review (empirical studies) on Appendix 3, which is divided into three sections according 
to each study (each Chapter) for easiness of exposition. Thus, sections 1, 2, 3 of Appendix 
                                                 
6 The titles of the Chapters in Figure 1 were adapted for the sake of easiness of exposition. That is, the 
title of each Chapter may be different than the title adopted in Figure 1.  
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3 present the empirical studies related to the adoption of IFRS that are quoted in Chapter 
4, 5 and 6 respectively. Finally, Appendix 4 contains three sections that present a 
summary of the detail of the variables according to each study, which follows the same 























Chapter 2: Theoretical framework 
 
2.1 Introduction  
This section explains the meaning of accounting quality and the reasons that 
explain its importance. Additionally, this thesis discusses IASB’s reasons to promote 
IFRS, and the drivers of accounting quality according to Ball et al. (2003) and Nobes 
(2006). The institutional setting, the properties of IFRS, and the theory of agency and 
positive accounting theory are examined indicating how they can affect accounting 
quality. Finally, this section discusses the institutional setting of emerging markets that 
could affect the adoption of IFRS. 
The structure of this Chapter is as follows. Section 2.2 addresses the meaning of 
accounting quality. Section 2.3 argues why accounting quality is important. Section 2.4 
discusses IASB’s reasons to promote IFRS to the world. Section 2.5 presents the 
development of theories as to how institutional factors and manager’s incentives affect 
accounting quality, which relates to the positive accounting theory, theory of agency and 
the equity valuation theory. Section 2.5.1 discusses the effect of market and political 
forces as well as the preparer’s incentives on accounting quality. Section 2.5.2 discusses 
the effects of institutional factors that affect the implementation of IFRS. Section 2.5.3 
discusses the interaction of market forces, political forces, preparer’s incentives, the 
theory of agency, the positive accounting theory and the equity valuation theory that 
supports this research. Section 2.6 illustrates the distinguished legal and institutional 




2.2 What is accounting quality?  
Penman (2014) defines accounting quality based on five aspects. That is, generally 
accepted accounting principles (GAAP) quality, audit quality, GAAP application quality, 
transaction-timing quality and disclosure quality. Regarding GAAP quality, it is 
fundamental that the GAAP covers key aspects of the business; otherwise, this could 
mislead users in their valuations and forecasts. Audit quality is important in order to 
prevent fraud of financial statements, which would compromise all users of information. 
Moreover, it ensures the correct application of the GAAP and confirms the reliability of 
the statements to external users. Regarding GAAP application quality, the manager needs 
to apply standards reasonably in order to provide reliable information to external users. 
That is, standards often allow several choices to recognise firm’s transactions. However, 
the manager needs to adopt choices that faithfully report the economic situation of the 
firm. Furthermore, there are operational timing choices that may compromise earnings 
quality. That is, managers can use their discretion in choosing a time to recognise 
accounting transactions. For example, in the case of transactions related to revenue and 
expenditure, the decision about when to recognise these transactions may affect 
accounting quality. The manager can postpone the expenditure of research and 
development (R&D) to the next year, which in turn would increase the net income of the 
current year (Penman, 2014). Therefore, these operational choices can mislead the users 
of financial information by indicating that the net income of a company is higher than it 
actually is. Finally, there is a concern regarding disclosure quality. That is, the manager 
may decide not to disclose key aspects of the business in the footnotes. The GAAP may 
not require the mandatory disclosure of these aspects, but they would be helpful for users 
in order to understand firms’ financial situation. In addition, Penman (2014) argues that 
accounting quality is a matter of establishing the integrity of the accounting for 
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forecasting purposes. Alongside the five aspects mentioned, earnings quality is another 
indicator of accounting quality. 
 
2.2.1 Earnings quality 
The majority of empirical studies focuses on the concept of earnings quality. 
Although there is a consensus regarding the definition of accounting quality, Dichev, 
Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2013) argue that there is not a consensus about the 
definition of earnings quality. According to Dichev et al. (2013, p.2), earnings quality is 
a combination of factors such as:  
‘earnings persistence, predictability, asymmetric loss recognition, various forms 
of benchmark beating, smooth earnings, magnitude of accruals, income 
increasing accruals, absolute value of discretionary or abnormal accruals, and 
the extent to which accruals map into cash flows’.  
Schipper and Vincent (2003) discuss earnings quality as the extent to which 
reported earnings faithfully represent the economic events that it measures. They base 
their definition on the degree that accounting information is useful for decision-making. 
This is the same criterion as the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) presents 
in the Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts n° 1 (SFAC 1) that the purpose of the 
financial statements is to produce useful information for decision-making (FASB, 2008). 
This is also consistent with the view of the IASB (2008). The authors outline four 
concepts of earnings quality as follows: ‘(1) the time-series properties of earnings; (2) 
selected qualitative characteristics in the Conceptual Framework of the Financial 
accounting standards board (FASB); (3) the relations amongst income, cash, and accruals; 
and (4) implementation decisions’. Firstly, the time-series properties of earnings include 
persistence, predictive ability and variability. These aspects are proxies for accounting 
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quality; as such, high-persistent earnings, high predictive ability, and less variability are 
consistent with higher earnings quality.  
Secondly, FASB’s Conceptual Framework as well as IASB’s Conceptual 
Framework focuses on the degree to which the information is useful, measured in terms 
of relevance, reliability, and comparability (IASB, 2008). According to this framework, 
accounting quality is of higher quality if it is reliable, comparable, relevant and useful to 
its users. Thirdly, because the recognition of cash and income is asymmetric due to the 
accruals regime, this creates an opportunity for earnings management endeavours. 
Therefore, if earnings do not represent the economic situation of the firm faithfully, this 
will affect earnings quality. Fourthly, earnings quality depends on the implementation 
decisions of preparers and auditors’ incentives. Thus, subjective judgement, estimation, 
and forecasting of accounting numbers are likely to impact earnings quality negatively. 
The authors argue that earnings management behaviour could increase in these situations.  
Dechow, Ge and Schrand (2010) propose a classification for the approaches to 
investigate earnings quality as follows: i) property of earnings; ii) reaction of investors to 
earnings announcements; iii) external indicators of distortion on the earnings figures. The 
first category covers earnings persistence and accruals, metrics related to earnings 
management such as earnings smoothness and managing earnings towards a target, and 
metrics related to accounting conservatism such as asymmetric timeliness and timely loss 
recognition. The second category focuses on how earnings announcements affect share 
prices through event study methodology. The third category relies on internal controls 
and third parties that audit financial statements. For instance, third parties such as the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) of the U.S. government can indicate 
companies with non-compliant financial statements.  
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Following the approach of investigating accounting quality through earnings 
quality, modern accounting research investigates earnings quality through three concepts. 
These concepts are earnings management (Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995; Barth et al., 
2008; Dechow, Hutton, Kim and Sloan, 2012), accounting conservatism and timeliness 
(Basu, 1997; Khan and Watts, 2009), and value relevance (Barth et al., 2008; Tsalavoutas, 
André and Evans, 2012). Moreover, it addresses its economic consequences on the cost 
of capital and analysts’ information environment (Liang and Riedl, 2014; Preiato et al., 
2015). This study discusses these concepts throughout the thesis.  
 
2.3 Why is accounting quality important? 
The importance of accounting quality is related to the degree of its usefulness to 
external users. In order to illustrate this, take for example the relationship between 
accounting quality and capital markets. Kothari (2001) argues that from 1970 to 2000, 
there was an increase of published studies focusing on capital markets. This is evidence 
about the importance of capital markets’ research and the demand of users of financial 
information such as shareholders, investors, and lenders. Kothari (2001, p.4) states that 
there are at least four types of demands in capital markets research:  
‘(i) fundamental analysis and valuation; (ii) tests of capital market efficiency; (iii) 
role of accounting in contracts and in the political process; and (iv) disclosure 
regulation.’  
The accounting information has an interplay with all these demands. Fundamental 
analysis and valuation heavily rely on accounting information from current and past 
financial statements. Thus, accounting information can affect valuation in an efficient 
market, which relates to the second demand. Regarding the third demand, unfaithful 
accounting information can mislead investors and other external users. Lastly, the 
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disclosure regulation is the GAAP itself, and involves several rules and principles that 
define accounting reporting standards. As a result, the accounting quality affects several 
issues involving investors, regulators and the capital market. In particular, referring to the 
change of local standards to IFRS, Kothari (2001, p. 8) presents a number of questions 
that capital market research can shed some light on regarding the adoption of a new 
accounting standard:  
‘do financial statement numbers prepared according to a new standard convey 
new information to the capital markets? Are financial statement numbers 
prepared according to a new standard more highly associated with 
contemporaneous stock returns and prices? What are the economic consequences 
of the issuance of a new disclosure standard?’  
These questions indicate the importance of accounting quality. For instance, a 
change in the standards may have implications on the financial statements, which are used 
by investors and analysts for investment decisions. This also can infer whether the 
changes in the standards were helpful or not for the market. In addition, applying new 
standards could affect debt holders or shareholders. For instance, if the standards require 
a higher degree of disclosure on debt contracting, this could increase accounting quality, 
which could affect the perception of risk of the company to its debt holders and 
shareholders. Additionally, the informational content of earnings and its capacity to 
predict future earnings and cash flows are relevant for investment decisions, and thus for 
its users. Hence, the changes in accounting quality due to the adoption of a new standard 




Following on the reasons why accounting quality is important, the next section 
discusses the IASB’s reasons to create a new set of international standards (IFRS) and to 
promote them. 
 
2.4 IASB’s reasons to promote IFRS to the world 
The IASB has focused on promoting the IFRS largely on countries over the globe. 
This set of standards aims to increase disclosure of financial statements and to provide 
higher comparability to accounting standards. Nowadays, 140 countries adopt the IFRS 
(IASB, 2015). Nevertheless, their aim is that every country will have its companies’ 
financial statements in the same GAAP. It is worth noting that one of the key issues of 
IFRS is that it must be useful for investment decisions. Therefore, the IASB expects 
companies to provide higher accounting quality to market participants in order to promote 
the flow of investment decisions. According to this view, enhanced disclosure increases 
the transparency of the firm, which in turn lower the effort of the investor to get key 
information about the company and may lower the cost of equity. Thus, the IASB believes 
that IFRS will help the development of capital markets and increase the flow of 
investments over the world. Moreover, increased comparability, reliability and 
consistency of the financial statements may increase earnings quality, which in turn can 
facilitate investment decisions. 
 
2.5 Theoretical foundation 
This section discusses the effect of market and political forces as well as 
preparers’ incentives on accounting quality according to the work of Ball et al. (2003). 
Afterwards, it discusses the effect of institutional factors and the properties of IFRS that 
can cause international variations in the adoption of the standards. Afterwards, a 
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discussion of the interlink among the positive accounting theory, theory of agency, the 
effect of political and market forces, preparer’s incentives as well as the equity valuation 
theory is provided.  
 
2.5.1 Effect of market forces, political forces and preparers’ incentives on 
accounting quality 
Ball et al. (2003) argue that much emphasis had previously been given to 
accounting standards in order to measure financial reporting quality. The authors argue 
that other factors influence this topic such as the effect of market forces, political forces 
and the legal system on preparers’ incentives, which are discussed next.  
Ball et al. (2003) investigating firms from Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and 
Hong Kong argue that managers have incentives to prepare financial statements 
according to their needs and their institutional environment (Ball et al., 2003). Thus, there 
are three different market forces that can affect the managers’ incentives: the size of the 
market in relation to equity and debt, family business, and easiness of access to banks’ 
funds. Companies with low financing needs from debt and capital markets may not be 
motivated to improve accounting quality. The same situation may occur with family 
businesses, provided that they do not require financial support from these markets. 
Moreover, firms that have private contracts with banks instead of public contracts with 
capital and debt markets may not have incentives to enhance their accounting quality. In 
this case, conflicts are resolved through insider communication between the manager and 
a representative from the bank. These issues enhance asymmetry information problems 
and affect firms’ intention to disclose transparent and relevant information to the market. 
The rationale is that asymmetric information will increase if there are fewer users of 
accounting statements providing financial support and demanding information from 
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firms. For instance, if a company does not have external financial needs, it will not have 
incentives to attract capital and hereby to disclose relevant information. 
Political forces can also affect accounting quality and are summarised into three 
aspects as follows: the government’s ability and intention to enforce and regulate 
standards, the effect of the legal system, and the tax role on the volatility of statements 
(large profits and losses). Firstly, the key issue is the enforcement of accounting 
standards. Subsequent studies show that it seems unlikely to expect higher accounting 
quality even with the best GAAP when the enforcement is compromised (Hope, 2003; 
Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki, 2003; Nobes, 2006; Burgstahler, Hail and Leuz, 2006; 
Jeanjean and Stolowy, 2008; Holthausen, 2009). Secondly, the legal system affects 
enforcement and preparer’s incentives; that is, apart from the government, shareholders, 
debt holders and market analysts help to enforce the standards in common-law countries. 
In these countries (such as Australia, Canada, U.K. and U.S.) the incentives are demanded 
from the market, instead; in code-law countries, these incentives are demanded by 
governments or debt holders (Ball et al., 2003). Moreover, in common-law countries, 
shareholders have exclusive corporate governance rights (Ball et al., 2003). Generally, in 
these countries, capital and debt markets have more shareholders and bondholders in 
comparison with code-law countries. Therefore, there is a higher demand for high-quality 
accounting information and disclosure (Ball et al. 2003). Instead, code-law countries have 
more information asymmetry problems because the market is less developed, and the 
government is the main agent responsible for demanding accounting quality (Ball et al., 
2003). Finally, political forces may influence tax regulations, which may affect earnings 
management behaviour. For instance, companies may smooth earnings and recognise 
larger expenses, due to tax incentives.  
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Apart from market and political forces, the institutional environment and the 
properties of IFRS may impact how the standards are adopted, which in turn can affect 
the accounting quality. This is discussed in the next section. 
 
2.5.2 Institutional factors and the properties of IFRS 
Nobes (2006) argues that the interdependence between accounting standards and 
a country’s legal and institutional environment may affect the quality of accounting. 
Nobes (2006) points to several topics that constrain the use of the same accounting 
standard over the globe as follows: different versions of IFRS, different translations of 
IFRS, unresolved accounting procedures in IFRS, vague criteria and interpretations in 
IFRS, measurement estimations in IFRS, transitional or first-time issues in IFRS, 
imperfect enforcement of IFRS, and overt and covert options. Firstly, distinct versions of 
IFRS have arisen because different nations have adopted the standards according to their 
culture and situation (Nobes, 2006). Although distinct nations adopt the same set of 
standards, various nations adopt some specific accounting procedures differently. 
Secondly, IFRS has gaps in the implementation of standards, for instance; the accounting 
standards are not clear regarding the recognition of insurance contracts. This gap in the 
standard is likely to derive differences in accounting over the world. Thirdly, some 
standards, for example fair value, requires the manager to estimate the value of assets and 
liabilities. However, this creates room for manipulation, and several countries will have 
different estimation methodologies. Fourthly, some countries (for example, Brazil) have 
set up a transitional period to convert local standards to IFRS. However, when the 
standards are not properly enforced, inconsistencies in the adoption of the standards 
during the first time can continue for a long period. For instance, Nobes (2006) quotes 
the example of the goodwill in Germany and in the U.K. where differences in its 
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recognition could last for 20 years in the financial statements. Fifthly, different nations 
have distinct legal systems and different enforcement mechanisms. Therefore, it is likely 
that some companies adopt IFRS as a label when enforcement is compromised 
(Christensen et al., 2013). This issue is a key reason to justify that differences in the 
implementation of international standards across countries will exist for a long time. This 
is consistent with the view of Ball et al. (2003) who argue that these differences arise 
because of the interaction of legal system, institutional factors, and market and political 
forces surrounding reporting quality. Finally, Nobes (2006) discusses that overt and 
covert options may cause differences in international standards, for instance; IAS 2 
permits two choices for determining the inventories’ cost: first in first out (FIFO) or the 
weighted average method. The author argues that U.K. groups will continue to use FIFO 
whereas German groups will use weighted average because it is common under previous 
national accounting standard. Therefore, these options within the international standards 
may generate many differences on reporting quality. 
There is an extensive discussion about whether only one set of standards will be 
suitable to every country. Leuz (2006) argues that there will inevitably be differences on 
accounting quality, even if enforcement, ownership structure, home-country market 
forces, and varying incentives are held constant. Holthausen (2009) argues that even 
though the GAAP is the same, there is still a doubt whether the standards are uniform, 
also referred as “de jure convergence”, and whether this is feasible to be reached. This is 
because as long discretion exists in financial reporting, there will always be differences 
in reporting quality (Holthausen, 2009). Moreover, the author states that it is difficult to 
overcome all the discretion in a reporting system. Peng and Bewley (2010) contribute to 
the topic stating that even if uniformity in the adoption of standards could be achieved, 
this would not lead to uniform accounting practices in reality (de facto convergence). 
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Therefore, it is a challenge whether IFRS will fit all countries. Recent evidence has 
confirmed this view. Kvaal and Nobes (2012) provide evidence that companies from 
different countries have adopted different choices for specific accounting standards. 
Therefore, although the accounting standards are the same, differences are likely to persist 
among companies from different countries. Consistent with this view, Haller and 
Wehrfritz (2013) provide evidence that accounting policy choices changed little after the 
adoption of IFRS in the U.K. and in Germany. Thus, they are likely to remain the same, 
as those required under national rules, which point out that differences across countries 
are likely to persist. Thus, the IASB faces a new challenge regarding this panorama. 
 The next section illustrates the interaction amongst the studies of Ball et al. (2003), 
Nobes (2006) and the theories that this thesis relies on; that is, the theory of agency, the 
positive accounting theory and the equity valuation theory. 
 
2.5.3 The interaction amongst institutional factors, market forces, political forces 
and theories on accounting quality 
Ball et al.’s (2003) argument about manager’s incentives affecting accounting 
quality is supported by the theory of agency. The theory of agency has its support on the 
initial arguments about the contract theory proposed by Coase (1937). In the contract 
theory, a set of contracts forms a firm. Jensen and Meckling (1976) developed the theory 
of agency based on the contract theory, specifically on the contract between the owner of 
the firm and the manager. The owner of the firm hires the manager in order to act in his 
behalf to manage the firm and maximize the firm’s profits and value. However, a conflict 
of interest may arise as the managers may try to maximize their utility instead of working 
towards the best interest of the company and its shareholders. Thus, this issue may 
promote a conflict of interest between the agent and the shareholders, which affects the 
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accounting quality. Watts and Zimmerman (1986) linked the positive accounting theory 
with the theory of agency proposed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) which supports the 
quality of accounting research. That is, while the theory of agency explains potential 
conflicts that may arise amongst shareholders and managers, the positive accounting 
theory links this fact with possible accounting choices and its outcomes. The concern of 
the positive accounting theory is that accounting information must be useful for its users, 
which is in line with the aims of international setters. This concern gains momentum 
because of conflicts of agency and related incentives that managers have, in order to act 
on their behalf. The managers’ incentives may also be affected by firm-level factors, such 
as operating performance, bankruptcy possibility, and the international reporting 
environment. That is, in the situation of bankruptcy possibility and bad operating 
performance, managers may inflate earnings or write off losses. Managers may adopt 
these procedures in order to hide the actual situation of the firm. Therefore, accounting 
numbers may mislead debt holders and shareholders. In order to attract capital, managers 
may try to adopt high accounting quality procedures in order to highlight these for foreign 
investors. This is in line with the bonding hypothesis, as managers try to “bond” the 
quality of their equity with the quality of accounting and institutional features of other 
developed countries such as the U.S. (Stulz, 1999; Coffee, 1999; Coffee, 2002). 
Therefore, these sources of financing may affect managers’ incentives, and consequently 







Figure 2. Summary of theoretical support 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the interaction amongst market forces, political forces, 
manager’s incentive and firm-level factors that affects IFRS adoption. Thus, the impact 
of the adoption may vary depending on these factors as illustrated before. It is worth 
noting that the theory of agency and the positive accounting theory help to explain the 
managers’ incentives in adopting IFRS. 
This thesis also has theoretical support from the equity valuation theory, which is 
the basis to investigate value relevance and cost of equity. Equity valuation theory relies 
on models that provide a link between accounting numbers and market values. The 
methods to investigate these concepts are presented in Chapter 4 and 6, which deals with 
the effect of IFRS on value relevance and the cost of equity, respectively.  
In conclusion, the factors presented by Ball et al. (2003) and Nobes (2006) need 
to be considered when investigating the impact of IFRS on accounting quality. The next 




2.6 Institutional factors in emerging markets and the adoption of IFRS 
It is worth noting that the effect of the IFRS adoption in emerging markets may 
be different due to the joint effect of distinct legal and institutional factors as follows: 
code law system, weak enforcement, weak investor protection, less-developed capital 
market, high ownership concentration and high information asymmetry (La Porta et al., 
1998; Brown et al., 2014). As previously discussed by Ball et al. (2003) and Nobes 
(2006), these factors affect the accounting quality. However, the combination of these 
factors indicates that there are reasons for the accounting quality among firms to be 
different. These factors affect managers’ incentives in how they adopt IFRS. That is, in 
emerging markets, firms with better financial health are willing to signal that they follow 
and adopt high-quality standards in order to attract investments. However, due to weak 
enforcement and investor protection, managers of poor financial situation firms may use 
their discretion to attend the expectations of market participants to reduce pressure arising 
from these participants and avoid the termination of their employment contract with the 
firm. The less-developed capital market contributes to this because there are fewer 
shareholders and debt holders pressuring managers for reliable financial information. 
Moreover, shareholders’ high ownership concentration increases the information 
asymmetry problem between managers and the other shareholders. In this situation, 
managers are often the major shareholders, and thus they do not have incentives to 
disclose timely and relevant information to the market, which increases the information 
asymmetry problem. Therefore, overall, the effect of the IFRS adoption on accounting 
quality may be different from that in developed countries.  




 This chapter discusses the theoretical framework of this thesis. In summary, after 
discussing the theoretical background of this research, this study argues that it is 
necessary to consider the institutional setting that Latin American countries are inserted 























Chapter 3: The institutional settings of Latin American countries 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In order to understand the impact of IFRS in Latin America on accounting quality, 
it is necessary to examine the institutional background of these countries as well as other 
factors that could affect the adoption of IFRS. This is important to distinguish the effects 
of the mandatory adoption of IFRS on the changes in accounting quality from the bundle 
effect of the improvements in enforcement of accounting standards and investor 
protection or other institutional factors (Christensen et al., 2013). Thus, in this chapter, I 
review the institutional background of Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Mexico and Peru) and investigate whether there were any changes in these factors 
surrounding the date of the mandatory adoption of IFRS. The other Latin American 
countries are not investigated because they adopted IFRS after 2014, or there was no data 
available to conduct the empirical analysis of the following chapters.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 3.2 describes the background 
of the adoption of IFRS in Latin American countries and its motivations. Section 3.2.1 to 
section 3.2.5 presents the background of each country, respectively Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Mexico and Peru. Section 3.3 presents the research objective of investigating the 
changes in enforcement of accounting standards, investor protection and legislation in 
Latin American countries around the date of the mandatory adoption of IFRS. Section 3.4 
discusses the research design, which presents the implementation of a questionnaire 
survey issued to the five Latin American countries. Section 3.5 reports the results of the 




3.2 Latin America background and motivation to adopt IFRS 
The transition from local GAAP to IFRS is a challenge for both governments and 
for firms. There has been a lot of discussion and concern regarding how to convert local 
GAAP to IFRS in Latin America. For instance, in Brazil, the convergence occurred in 
two phases (2008 and 2010) in order to allow firms to adopt IFRS gradually, and for 
academics to discuss the convergence and translation of the standards to the Brazilian 
setting. The same issue occurred in Chile, where the government delayed the mandatory 
adoption date from 2009 to 2010 for major listed firms that presented technical difficulties 
to adopt the standards. Firms have faced several difficulties as follows: the cost of change, 
the doubt of benefits, the long period involved, insufficient experience, and pressure from 
the capital markets (Iatridis and Rouvolis, 2010; Moura and Coelho, 2016). 
There are three reasons for the governments of Latin America countries to adopt 
IFRS. For several years, investors have faced the challenge of supporting their investment 
decisions in different companies that have reported their financial numbers in distinct 
accounting standards. Therefore, one of the greatest motivations for government bodies 
in emerging markets to adopt IFRS is to enhance the comparability, transparency and 
accounting quality via adopting high-quality financial reporting standards, such as IFRS 
in order to benefit the users of financial information (SVS, 2006; CNBV, 2008; CNV, 
2009). It is noteworthy that internal pressures arising from economic development and 
external pressures to increase international trade motivated this transition. Thus, 
government bodies expect to contribute to the development of the capital markets and 
attract overseas investment. Companies and investors will benefit from this new reporting 
environment for two reasons. Firstly, as financial reporting standards in emerging markets 
are more comparable with those from developed markets, it will be easier to support 
investment decisions in these markets. Secondly, regulators expect that transaction costs 
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will be reduced due to increased comparability and transparency (SVS, 2006; CNBV, 
2008; CNV, 2009). Consistent with this view, from 2015, China, U.S. and Germany 
increased their investments in Latin American companies and overall infrastructure 
projects in these countries, contributing to the economic development (BBC, 2015; IMF, 
2016).  
The next section discusses the process of adoption of IFRS for each country that 
has data available to conduct the tests of accounting quality, analysts’ information 
environment and cost of capital. Other Latin American countries are not discussed 
because there was no data available to conduct the empirical analyses. 
 
3.2.1 Argentina  
The government of Argentina started the process of adopting IFRS in December 
2009 through the announcement of regulation N. 562. The Federación Argentina de 
Consejos Profesionales de Ciencias Económicas (FACPCE, which is the Argentine 
Federation of professionals of economics), and the Comisión Nacional de Valores (CNV, 
the national securities commission, which is an agency of the Argentine ministry of 
economics and public finance) issued a recommendation for all companies, apart from 
financial and insurance companies, that have securities publicly traded on a stock market 
and that are regulated by the CNV to prepare their financial statements according to IFRS. 
This is required for all statements beginning on or after 1st January 2012 (IFRS, 2015a). 
It is worth noting that the resolution N.562/09 allowed early IFRS adoption from 1st 
January 2011. Instead, financial institutions and insurance companies are only required 
to adopt IFRS from 1st January 2018. The CNV argued that the adoption of IFRS was a 
fundamental step to promote investment opportunities in Argentina (CNV, 2009). Thus, 
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the regulator expects that the information will be more comparable, reliable and relevant 
for investors (CNV, 2009).  
 
3.2.2 Brazil 
In Brazil, IFRS has been introduced since the enactment of the law n. 11.638/07, 
which started the process of convergence of standards. Since this regulation was enacted, 
the Comissão de Pronunciamentos Contábeis (CPC, which is the Accounting 
Pronouncements Committee) has issued 48 technical pronouncements, 20 interpretations 
and 8 guidelines referring to the process of adapting Brazilian standards to IFRS. It is 
worth highlighting that some of these regulations were issued in the first phase of 
transition, which took place in 2008, and others in the second phase completed in 2010. 
Thus, all documents issued by the CPC are fully converged to IFRS. The Comissão de 
Valores Mobiliários (CVM, which is the securities and exchange commission of Brazil) 
has been responsible for the enforcement of these standards. According to Ernst & Young 
Terco (2011), in general, the degree of detail required by these standards is much higher 
than the previous Brazilian accounting standards in force. Previously in Brazil, 
accounting standards and practices were essentially conservative, derived especially from 
the tax regime instituted. Therefore, the government expects that the information 
disclosed to external users will be more relevant after the adoption of IFRS. In summary, 
as the original purposes of Brazilian generally accepted accounting principles (BRGAAP) 
and IFRS were distinct, regulators expect that the accounting quality will be different. 
Thus, the main reason for adopting IFRS relies upon the assumption of higher reliability 
of the reported financial information. This will help the development of the Brazilian 
capital market by attracting more investments. In addition, the Brazilian government aims 
to reduce preparers’ costs in adopting IFRS (CVM, 2008). As a result, it may decrease 
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the level of uncertainty and may result in lower cost of capital for Brazilian companies. 
It is worth noting that apart from the problems surrounding the adoption of these 
standards, researchers have found evidence that firms’ compliances were very low 
(Santos and Calixto, 2010). This evidence raises a concern on the enforcement of these 
standards in Brazil. Therefore, it highlights that the government should develop a plan to 
enhance the enforcement. 
 
3.2.3 Chile 
The government of Chile started officially the process of adopting IFRS on 16th 
October 2006 through the announcement N. 368/06. Conversely, the mandatory adoption 
took place only on 31st December 2009 when the regulator required major publicly traded 
companies to adopt IFRS. However, there were major listed companies that claimed not 
to be ready to adopt IFRS due to technical reasons. These firms were given a deferral 
until 2010, provided that they presented additional disclosure notes. The government 
required all publicly traded firms, apart from insurance companies, to adopt IFRS from 
31st December 2010. Insurance companies were only required to adopt IFRS from 31st 
December 2012 (IFRS, 2013). The government aimed to increase the globalisation of 
markets by providing more comparable, transparent and comprehensible information 
after the IFRS adoption (SVS, 2006). However, one criticism of the literature is the 
compliance and enforcement of these standards. Even under the mandatory adoption 
period, Herrera, Sepúlveda and Gutiérrez (2011) showed that Chilean firms did not 
disclose information required by IFRS in 2010. Thus, this evidence highlights the same 





In Mexico, the Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores (CNBV, which is the 
National Banking and Securities Commission of Mexico) was responsible for issuing the 
standards for listed companies other than financial institutions and insurance companies. 
Mandatory adoption was required for financial statements beginning on or after 1st 
January 2012 while early adoption was allowed from 2008 (IFRS, 2014a). The CNBV 
announced that the main reason for adopting IFRS was to increase comparability of 
financial information, reducing preparers’ cost and increasing the size of the Mexican 
market (CNBV, 2008). 
  
3.2.5 Peru 
In Peru, the process started earlier than in the other countries on 20th March 2006. 
The Peruvian Congress enacted the Law n. 28708/06 (General Law for the National 
Accounting System). The Peruvian government created the Consejo Normativo de 
Contabilidad (Accounting Standards Council, or CNC) to endorse accounting standards 
for private companies and to improve enforcement. According to IFRS (2014b), the CNC 
endorses IFRS after its translation into Spanish. The IFRS adoption is a joint effort of the 
Superintendencia del Mercado de Valores (SMV, which is the Peruvian securities market 
regulator) and the Peruvian Congress. On 14th October 2010, the Comisión Nacional 
Supervisora de Empresas y Valores (CONASEV, which is the government body 
responsible for supervising Peruvian companies) issued regulation Nº 102-2010-
EF/94.01.1 requiring all publicly listed companies other than financial institutions (banks, 
insurance companies, and pension funds) to prepare and report their financial statements 
in conformity with IFRS. It is CONASEV’s responsibility to enforce the standards in Peru 
(CONASEV, 2010). On 25th June 2011, the Peruvian Congress enacted Law n. 29720/11 
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(a law that promotes the issuance of securities and strengthens the Peruvian stock market). 
This law requires all private companies to prepare financial statements in conformity with 
IFRS from 2012. Other major non-listed companies were required to adopt IFRS in 2013 
while smaller private companies only were required in 2014 and 2015 according to 
resolution n. 005-94-EF/93.01 (IFRS, 2014b). The main motivation to adopt IFRS is to 
provide external users and investors reliable and transparent information (CONASEV, 
2010). It is worth noting that the adoption process was not smooth as several problems  
appeared. For instance, Becerra (2010) shows that compliance to standards is highly 
related to whether there is an incidence of tax and legal aspects on the financial 
statements. Therefore, this evidence indicates that enforcement of standards needs to be 
improved. 
















Table 1: Summary of the adoption of IFRS 
 
3.3 The changes in the institutional environment 
The aim of this section is to investigate the strength and changes of the 
enforcement of accounting standards and investor protection mechanisms. This is 
important because past literature has shown that these factors affect managers’ intention 
to adopt IFRS (Ball et al., 2003; Nobes, 2006). Christensen et al. (2013) show that the 
inferences of previous studies may be due to a bundle effect of IFRS. That is that the 
results of previous studies were caused by the effect of the enforcement of accounting 
standards (Preiato et al., 2015), investor protection mechanisms, firms’ incentives and the 
adoption of IFRS. Moreover, the strength of the enforcement of accounting standards and 
investor protection mechanisms may change according to the progress of the 
  Salient features of IFRS - Summary 
Main Features Argentina Brazil Chile Mexico Peru 
Process 
started 
December 2009 - 
Regulation N.562 
December 2007 - 
Law 11.638/07 
October 2006 - 
Regulation N.368 
November 2008 
- Press release 
56/2008 




must adopt it? 
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apart from financial 
and insurance 
companies, that have 
securities publicly 



















From 1st January 
2012 From 2010 
From 31st December 
2009 
From 1st January 
2012 






Only from 1st 
January 2018 
From 2010, with a 
few differences 






From 31st December 
2009 Not Available Not Available 
Main Changes 
in Relation to 
IFRS 
In separate company 
financial statements, 
the equity method is 
required to account 
for investments in 
subsidiaries, 
associates, and joint 
ventures. 
It does not allow 
revaluation of 
property, plant and 
equipment under 
IAS 16 and 
revaluation of 
intangible assets 
under IAS 38. 
Banks need to measure 
loan loss provisions 
using an expected loss 
approach (disclosing 
according to IAS 39). 
Banks are not allowed 
to use the 'fair value 
option' in IAS 39. 
There are other minor 
differences for banks 
Not Applicable Not Applicable 
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implementation of IFRS (Brown et al., 2014), which makes it difficult to isolate the IFRS 
adoption effect from other institutional effects. On the other hand, in order to pinpoint the 
effects of the adoption of IFRS alone, there are limited studies focusing on the changes 
in the strength of the enforcement of accounting standards and investor protection 
mechanisms in the years around the date of mandatory adoption of IFRS. Apart from 
Brown et al. (2014) who developed their own measures, other studies only base their 
results on the World Bank’s historic legal enforcement data, or enforcement proxies based 
on one year only (see the rule of law of Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2007)), which 
are outdated for Latin American countries. Thus, as Latin American countries started to 
adopt IFRS after 2008, it is important to initiate new research about the status of the 
enforcement of accounting standards and investor protection mechanisms. Moreover, it 
is necessary to isolate the effects of the improvements in enforcement of accounting 
standards and investor protection mechanisms from the effect of mandatory adoption of 
IFRS in this study. Thus, this research design allows this study to pinpoint the effect of 
IFRS accurately.  
 
3.4 Research design to investigate the effects of enforcement, investor protection 
and legislation 
This chapter investigates whether there were any changes in the level of 
enforcement and investor protection in Latin American countries around the IFRS 
adoption.  
 
3.4.1 Sampling criteria 
In order to obtain first-hand data and result, this thesis issued a questionnaire to 
each country’s Securities and Exchange Commission, academics, and the Institute of 
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Federal Accountants and Auditors. I identified the target respondents of this questionnaire 
by searching the key contact details of the officers on the official websites of each 
country’s Securities and Exchange Commission, the Institute of Federal Accountants and 
Auditors. I also contacted academics whose published research related to the topic of the 
implementation of IFRS in their countries. These groups were chosen because they have 
experience in the process of adoption of IFRS as well as its enforcement and the changes 
that were derived from the adoption in each country. 
 
3.4.2 The questionnaire 
The design of the questionnaire is based on the works of La Porta et al. (1998), 
Hope (2003), the World Bank (2008) report on the observance of standards and codes, 
and Brown et al. (2014); the questionnaire is presented in Appendix 1. 
It has three sections: the first section deals with enforcement of accounting 
standards; the second section focuses on the level of investor protection, and the third 
section focuses on general legislation issued regarding the adoption of IFRS, which 
supports the evaluation of the changes in the enforcement and investor protection 
mechanisms. At section one, questions 1 and 2 are based on Brown et al. (2014) and 
address whether there is a government body or a regulator monitoring the financial 
reporting of public companies. The third question is based on the work of Hope (2003); 
it addresses whether there were any companies that did not follow the IFRS guidelines 
even under mandatory adoption. Questions 4, 5 and 6 are designed based on the World 
Bank (2008) report. Questions 4 and 5 are designed to discover the penalties or 
consequences that each country issues for firms and managers if they do not comply with 
accounting rules in force. Moreover, it also helps to identify when the country enacted 
these rules. Emerging markets may only have enacted these laws more recently in 
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comparison with developed markets. This is due to the level of development of local stock 
markets in comparison with those in developed markets. Question 6 investigates whether 
these penalties turned to be stricter after the adoption of IFRS. Question 7 is based on the 
rule of law of Hope (2003) and addresses whether the regulator has taken judicial action 
against a firm’s non-compliant financial statement. Finally, the last question of the 
enforcement section measures whether there was an increase in the number of staff 
members responsible for monitoring the statements of public companies. This question is 
designed based on the enforcement index of Brown et al. (2014).  
At the investor protection section, questions 9 to 19 are designed based on La 
Porta et al. (1998) and Hope (2003). Question 9 seeks the answer to the type of 
shareholder voting system in each country as the voting mechanism could be unbalanced 
(shares that have more voting rights) or balanced (one-share-one-vote). La Porta et al. 
(1998) argue that the preferred mechanism to ensure the investor protection is the one-
share-one-vote system. This is preferable because there are companies that issue 
nonvoting shares, founders’ shares with extreme voting rights and shares that may have 
more voting rights according to the period for which one shareholder has held them. Thus, 
the one-share-one-vote system is preferable in order to guarantee equal and democratic 
rights. Questions 10 and 11 focus on the easiness of the voting system; they investigate 
whether the shareholder can vote through the mail or if the shareholder needs to present 
himself at the shareholders’ meeting in order to be eligible to vote. The shareholders’ 
protection is higher if there are fewer constraints within the voting system. Question 12 
evaluates whether the minority shareholders have any right to challenge a director’s 
decision in court; if they have the right to challenge his decisions, this is a sign of higher 
shareholder protection. Question 13 focuses on the minimum requirement of share capital 
needed in order to call for a shareholder meeting. A lower percentage of share capital 
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needed indicates higher investor protection. That is, as the requirement is lower, 
shareholders can exercise their rights with greater ease. Question 14 evaluates whether 
there is a minimum mandatory dividend. La Porta et al. (1998) argue that countries with 
low investor protection mechanisms may require a minimum mandatory dividend in order 
to guarantee investors’ rights. Thus, countries with stronger investor protection 
mechanisms may not require a minimum mandatory dividend because they have other 
mechanisms to safeguard the investors’ interests. Questions 15 and 16 evaluate whether 
there was any change or increase in the shareholder’s protection after the adoption of 
IFRS. Finally, questions 17 to 19 investigate the insider trading laws and enforcement of 
these laws. Question 17 addresses whether there were any insider trading activities in 
recent years. Question 18 discusses whether the regulator prosecuted the people involved 
in these insider trading activities. It is worth noting that countries with higher investor 
protection have a history where the regulator prosecuted the people involved in such 
activities. Question 19 investigates whether there were any convictions for those involved 
in insider trading activities. It is worth noting that countries with a higher degree of 
investor protection have caught insider trading activities since more than 50 years ago, 
which led to the imprisonment of those involved. For instance, in the U.S., the first case 
was ruled in 1909. Nevertheless, in Latin American countries, this situation might not be 
the same as the capital markets and enforcement institutions are still developing. 
Additionally, the third part of the questionnaire is a general question about which 
legislations were enacted in order to allow the adoption of IFRS. This helps to identify 





3.4.3 Implementation of the questionnaire 
Firstly, the questionnaire was prepared in the local language of the target 
countries, and it was pre-tested (pilot tested) with native speakers in order to ascertain 
whether the questions were clear (Saunders, Thornhill and Lewis, 2009). Secondly, the 
questionnaire was uploaded to Google's forms in order to guarantee the consistency of its 
format for respondents over the globe, and to allow a quicker and easier way for 
respondents to reply (Hewson, Yule, Laurent and Vogel, 2003). Thirdly, the questionnaire 
was issued through the official online forms of each institution as well as through an e-
mail according to the contact information retrieved from the official websites. Each e-
mail was addressed to one target respondent only, containing a covering letter and the 
link to access the questionnaire, stored at Google forms, as well as the questionnaire in a 
Microsoft Word file (Hewson et al., 2003; Dillman, 2007; Saunders et al., 2009). 
Fourthly, the target respondents were reminded every four weeks to complete the 
questionnaire (Saunders et al., 2009), which composed of 5 rounds of 1 month each. In 
the final attempt, a hard copy of the questionnaire was sent as well as phone calls being 
made to the target respondents from the remaining countries that had not yet replied. It is 
worth noting that the reply rate in this study is not to be considered an issue as the 
objective of this analysis is to discover the fact of the institutional factors around the 
period of the IFRS adoption. Finally, the survey was officially closed once there was a 
minimum of one reply from each country. Regarding the analyses of the replies, this study 
reports exactly the feedbacks from the respondents. This study only received more than 
one reply from Brazil (from the Securities and Exchange Commission of Brazil as well 
as from the Brazilian Institute of Federal Accountants). In this case, the replies were 
highly consistent and this study reports the consolidated answer in the following sections. 
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For the other countries, this study received replies from all Securities and Exchange 
Commissions of the sampling countries. 
  
3.5 Results  
3.5.1 Enforcement of accounting standards 
 With regard to questions 1 and 2, all five countries have had a securities market 
regulator monitoring the financial reporting of public companies, and this has not changed 
since the mandatory IFRS adoption. 
Regarding question 3, the Securities and Exchange Commission of Argentina 
reported that all firms followed the IFRS requirement, whereas a senior office of Brazilian 
Securities and Exchange Commission reported that several companies did not follow the 
IFRS requirements (a detailed number is described in Appendix 2). A senior officer from 
the Securities and Exchange Commission of Chile recognises that many companies did 
not follow the IFRS requirements; however, he did not provide statistical figures. A senior 
officer from the Securities and Exchange Commission of Mexico did not provide an 
answer for this question whereas an officer from Peru reported that 3 firms did not follow 
the IFRS requirements, and 1 auditor’s firm was caught for providing inaccurate evidence 
of a firm’s financial statement. These results show that firms still do not comply with the 
IFRS requirements and illustrate that the enforcement of accounting standards in Latin 
American countries is weak. Referring to question 4, all countries can issue fines and 
charges if a firm or manager does not comply with the accounting standards in force; 
however, only in Brazil the Securities and Exchange Commission has the power to 
suspend temporarily the manager from his role. With regard to question 5, the legislations 
that present the penalties and consequences are respectively for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Mexico and Peru: Law N. 26.832 (Legislación y normas de Mercado de Capitales), Law 
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N. 6.385/76, Law N. 3538. (Ley Orgánica de la Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros), 
Law of Stock Markets/05 (Ley del Mercado de Valores/2005), and Norm CONASEV N° 
0055-2001. The replies from question 6 indicate that there has been no change in the 
penalties and consequences for firms’ and managers’ noncompliance behaviours since 
the adoption of IFRS. Regarding the number of firms caught by the regulator in the post-
IFRS period for a non-compliant financial statement (question 7), Brazil is the only 
country where several firms have been caught.7 The regulator of Chile reported that there 
were cases from only before the IFRS adoption, but the number of cases was not provided. 
Moreover, in Peru, only 1 firm was identified with a non-compliant financial statement, 
but it was before the IFRS adoption. Overall, this indicates that the enforcement of these 
countries is weak in comparison to developed nations; however, Brazil has a stronger 
enforcement in comparison with the other sampling countries, which is consistent with 
the findings of Brown et al. (2014).  
 With regard to question 8, no country reported an increase in staff members 
responsible for monitoring the implementation of IFRS concurrent with the adoption of 
IFRS. There was an increment in staff members responsible for assisting in the 
monitoring of the accounting standards in force after two and two and a half years of the 
adoption of IFRS in Brazil and in Peru, respectively. Brazil hired 3 extra staff members 
in January of 2012, but they have been relocated to other roles in due course; by 2015, 
the number of staff responsible for the enforcement of the standards increased by only 1 
member, and in Peru, 1 extra staff member was hired in July 2014. Unfortunately, the 
senior officer of Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission as well as the senior 
officer of the Peruvian Securities and Exchange Commission did not provide further 
clarification on this issue. Overall, in Brazil and in Peru where the number of staff was 
                                                 
7 Please refer to the footnote of appendix 2 for the detailed number of firms caught by the regulator per 
year as well as the type of action issued. 
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increased by only 1 member after more than 2 years following the adoption of the 
standards and considering that this member has also been responsible for other roles, this 
is not considered as a significant change.  
According to the results of questions 2, 6 and 8, there were no concurrent changes 
in enforcement alongside the adoption of IFRS, which implies that enforcement should 
not affect the inferences of this thesis. The next section illustrates the results regarding 
the investor protection mechanisms. 
 
3.5.2 Investor protection mechanisms 
 Regarding questions 9 and 10, all five countries adopt the system “one-share-one-
vote”; however, only in Peru and Chile the shareholder can vote through the mail. Thus, 
it is worth noting that Peru and Chile have higher investor protection mechanisms in 
comparison to the other Latin American countries with regard to question 10. Regarding 
question 11, only in Argentina the shareholder, in order to be eligible to vote, needs to 
deposit his shares in the company prior to a shareholder meeting. As a result, this 
represents a higher constraint in relation to other Latin American countries, which 
indicates that the investor protection mechanism in Argentina is lower than the other 
countries. Referring to question 12, all countries allow the minority shareholders to 
prosecute and challenge the directors’ decision in the court of justice. Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile and Mexico, however, define that it is required at least 5% of share capital in order 
to challenge a director’s decision in court, whereas Peru does not require a minimum 
percentage of share capital. Thus, Peru has a higher investor protection in comparison to 
the other Latin American countries with regard to this question. With regard to question 
13 (percentage of share capital needed to call for a shareholder meeting), Argentina 
requires 60% in the first call and 30% in the second call; Brazil and Chile require 10%, 
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Mexico specifies 75%, unless defined otherwise in the firm’s statute, whereas Peru 
requires 20%. As Mexico demands the highest percentage, it is the country with the 
lowest investor protection mechanism in respect to this issue. Regarding the mandatory 
dividend (question 14), Argentina does not specify a minimum, whereas Brazil, Chile and 
Mexico specify 25%, 30% and 5%, respectively. Moreover, Peru only defines 50% of 
mandatory dividends if 20% of the shareholders demand it. Thus, as Argentina and Peru 
do not specify a minimum percentage, they are likely to have stronger mechanisms to 
safeguard the investors’ capital. In relation to questions 15 and 16, it is worth noting that 
none of the countries have improved their investor protection mechanisms since the IFRS 
adoption. This allows this study to pinpoint with greater precision the impact of IFRS and 
firm-level incentives. 
With regard to question 17, only Brazil and Chile have informed the number of 
insider trading activities caught by the regulator8. In Brazil, the regulator caught the first 
case of insider trading in 2009, and the first conviction was only in November 2016. In 
Chile, the regulator caught 32 companies involved in insider trading activities, but the 
senior officer from the Securities and Exchange Commission of Chile did not specify 
them according to every year nor provided any information regarding whether they have 
been convicted. In Brazil and Chile, the replies of questions 18 and 19 illustrate that it is 
not the responsibility of the regulator to take further actions to court, but from the public 
ministry. Moreover, only in Brazil the regulator has prosecuted companies (please refer 
to Appendix 2 for the detailed number of firms per year), whereas the regulators from the 
other countries have not provided an answer to these questions. This illustrates that the 
investor protection mechanisms in Latin American countries are weak, and it is consistent 
with the investor ranking of La Porta et al. (1998) and the World Bank’s ranking. It is 
                                                 
8 Please refer to the footnote of appendix 2 for the detailed number of firms. 
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worth noting though, that Brazil, Chile and Peru have stronger investor protection 
mechanisms than Argentina and Mexico. Finally, with regard to question 20, please refer 
to Appendix 2 for the detailed norms involved in the IFRS adoption for each country.9  
In conclusion, the investor protection mechanisms of these countries are weak in 
comparison to developed nations and have not been substantially improved concurrent 
with the adoption of IFRS, which implies that the institutional environment should not 
affect the inferences of this thesis. Indeed, these countries have a slightly different 
institutional setting: Brazil has the strongest enforcement among these countries and 
Brazil, Chile and Peru have stronger investor protection mechanisms, the country fixed 




 In this chapter, I overview the background of the mandatory IFRS adoption in 
Latin American countries. Then, I turn to investigate the changes in the institutional 
settings of Latin American countries around the official year of the mandatory adoption 
of IFRS. This is because the identification of these changes is essential to control their 
effects in order to focus on examining the effect of IFRS in the following chapters. The 
results show that the enforcement and investor protection mechanisms in Latin America 
are weak, and there is a huge gap between IFRS and previous domestic accounting 
standards. There is no significant change in the institutional environment around the 
mandatory dates of the adoption. Thus, the results of the questionnaire support the 
following analyses and help to pinpoint the effects of IFRS accurately, which are 
investigated in the coming chapters. 
                                                 
9 These laws are not reported here because the relevant laws were discussed in the above sections. 
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 The next chapter focuses on the first study that investigates the impact of the 
mandatory IFRS adoption on accounting quality with regard to earnings management, 
























Chapter 4: The impact of mandatory IFRS adoption on accounting 
quality of Latin American firms 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The aims of this study are as follows: (i) to investigate whether IFRS adoption 
improves Latin American firms accounting quality; (ii) to investigate whether financial 
health, operating performance, and the status of listing on the U.S. stock exchanges affect 
the manager’s implementation of IFRS; and (iii) to investigate the external auditor’s 
report in order to show whether managers implement IFRS due to official requirements 
or if there is still room for discretion upon financial statements. This Chapter discusses 
the results based on accounting quality measured in terms of earnings management, 
timely recognition of losses and value relevance. The results are derived based on the 
common sample, and the classified groups due to operating performance, financial 
distress, and the status of listing on U.S. stock exchanges. Considering that enforcement 
of accounting standards and investor protection mechanisms are weak, these three firm-
level factors can illustrate new evidence on how they affect managers’ incentives in 
adopting IFRS and the implications for accounting quality. Additionally, the auditors’ 
reports were analysed in order to investigate further the firms’ behaviour due to the weak 
institutional setting, and the results are presented as well. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 presents the literature review. 
Section 4.3 presents the research opportunities. Section 4.4 develops the hypotheses. 
Section 4.5 presents the research design. Section 4.6 presents the data and sampling 
procedures. Section 4.7 presents the results. Section 4.7.1 discusses the results of earnings 
management and timely recognition of losses following the approach of Barth et al. 
(2008). Section 4.7.2 presents the results of timely recognition of losses according to the 
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model of Basu (1997) and an extended version that helps to track firms’ quarterly 
behaviour. Section 4.7.3 illustrates the results of value relevance following the approach 
of Barth et al. (2008) and the work of Ohlson (1995). Section 4.7.4 shows additional 
analysis regarding accrual aggressiveness as a proxy for earnings management. Section 
4.8 describes additional analyses regarding the examination of the external auditors’ 
reports. Finally, section 4.9 concludes. 
 
4.2 Literature review 
The purpose of this section is to review the main factors that could affect the 
adoption of IFRS, as well as to discuss the main ideas and empirical findings of an 
increase or decrease in accounting quality according to the adoption of IFRS. Firstly, this 
section discusses the role of firms’ incentives on accounting quality and the adoption of 
IFRS. Afterwards, this chapter discusses other institutional factors that affect accounting 
quality and the mandatory adoption of IFRS. Following on, an overview of the reasons to 
expect an increase or decrease in accounting quality as well as a summary of the empirical 
studies that investigated the impact of mandatory IFRS adoption is discussed. Then this 
chapter reviews the previous literature on emerging markets and Latin American markets, 
pointing out the factors that are relevant to be considered when investigating the impact 
of IFRS adoption on the accounting quality of Latin American firms. The summary of the 
empirical studies that investigated the impact of IFRS adoption on accounting quality are 




4.2.1 The adoption of IFRS and firms’ incentives  
The first studies that examined the impact of IFRS adoption on accounting quality 
focused on voluntary adopters10 (Bartov et al., 2005; Hung and Subramanyam, 2007; 
Barth et al., 2008; Barth et al., 2012). While this thesis focuses on the impact of the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS, the findings of previous studies on the impact of voluntary 
adoption of IFRS indicate that firms’ incentives play a role in explaining the effect of the 
IFRS adoption (Barth et al., 2008). Following this evidence, other studies also show the 
impact of firms’ incentives on the mandatory adoption of IFRS (Iatridis and Rouvolis, 
2010; Zéghal, Chtourou and Sellami, 2011; Doukakis, 2014; Christensen, Lee, Walker 
and Zeng, 2015).  
Barth et al. (2008) studied the early effects of voluntary IFRS adoption on earnings 
management, timely recognition of losses and value relevance on firms over the world. 
The main findings are that voluntary adopters experience less earnings smoothing, less 
managing of earnings towards a target, higher timely recognition of losses, and higher 
value relevance of net income related to book value of equity. Nevertheless, the 
improvements may not be due to the change in standards alone, but they may be due to 
concurrent changes in the reporting environment and firm’s incentives. Barth et al. (2008) 
argue that these firms commit to adopt IFRS in order to differentiate themselves and 
attract capital. Therefore, the benefits on accounting quality are not due to standards 
alone, but due to manager’s incentives to adopt IFRS. These arguments are key in 
explaining further results from the literature on mandatory adopters, which are discussed 
next. 
                                                 
10 Several studies have investigated the impact of voluntary adoption of IFRS; this thesis makes no claim 
to quote all of them, but the focus here is to illustrate what can be learned from these studies that can help 
to investigate the effect of mandatory adoption of IFRS. 
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Iatridis and Rouvolis (2010) investigated earnings management, timely 
recognition of losses and value relevance after the mandatory IFRS adoption on 254 
Greek firms from 2004 to 2006. They found evidence of earnings management on the 
year of the mandate (2005); however, it was reduced on the subsequent year. The value 
relevance followed the same trend; that is, the accounting numbers were more relevant 
on the year after the mandate (2005), and there was slightly more timely recognition of 
losses. The authors argue that the non-expected results for the year of the mandate are 
related to transitioning costs, which affected firms’ behaviour. Thus, the transitioning 
costs may have affected the firms’ incentives in adopting IFRS as the relation between 
costs and benefits of the adoption is not clear, and managers may not be willing to adopt 
IFRS on a timely manner. 
Zéghal et al. (2011) aim to shed light whether the level of earnings management 
decreased in France after the mandatory IFRS adoption. The main finding is consistent 
with a reduction in the level of earnings management after the mandatory IFRS adoption. 
In addition, the authors conclude that firms’ incentives of gathering funds on foreign 
financial markets are important to the IFRS adoption in France. 
Doukakis (2014) investigated whether the mandatory IFRS adoption had a 
significant impact on the level of accrual earnings management and on real earnings 
management in 22 countries. The author claims to be the first study to investigate real 
earnings management after the IFRS adoption. The author finds no evidence of a 
significant change on the level of earnings management after IFRS adoption. The author’s 
main argument is that firm-level incentives are the reasons for this result. 
Christensen et al. (2015) investigate whether the standards or the firms’ incentives 
are the key determinants of improved financial reporting. They examine this topic for 
both mandatory and voluntary adopters in Germany. They find that mandatory adopters 
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do not improve their accounting information quality after the adoption. However, this 
result does not depend on standards alone, but on the firms’ incentives to adopt IFRS. 
However, voluntary adopters improve their accounting information quality after the IFRS 
adoption in Germany. The authors argue that firms have incentives to adopt international 
standards in order to differentiate themselves and attract more capital. Thus, this is a key 
issue that explains their results. 
Overall, Iatridis and Rouvolis (2010), Zéghal et al. (2011), Doukakis (2014) and 
Christensen et al. (2015) show that even if the adoption of IFRS is mandatory, firms’ 
incentives can play a role in explaining the effects of the adoption. So future research 
needs to examine carefully the impact of these incentives on accounting quality and the 
adoption of IFRS. This is particularly important when enforcement of the accounting 
standards is weak.  
 
4.2.2 The adoption of IFRS and institutional settings 
 Apart from firms’ incentives, and following on the framework of Ball et al. (2003) 
and Nobes (2006), the literature argues that institutional factors (Jeanjean and Stowlowy, 
2008; Armstrong, Barth, Jagolinzer and Riedl, 2010; Devalle, Onali and Magarini, 2010; 
Tsalavoutas et al., 2012) such as investor protection mechanisms (Houqe et al., 2012; 
Christensen et al., 2013) and enforcement (Ahmed et al., 2013b; Christensen et al., 2013; 
Preiato et al., 2015; André, Filip and Paugam, 2015), can affect the adoption of IFRS.  
Jeanjean and Stolowy (2008) investigated whether there was a significant impact 
on earnings management after mandatory IFRS adoption in France, the U.K. and 
Australia. They find evidence that the level of earnings management increased in France 
and had no change in the U.K. and in Australia after mandatory adoption of IFRS. The 
authors raise a question, whether just the fact that countries share the same standards is 
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enough to create a common business language. They argue that the mixed findings are 
due to management incentives and institutional factors that play an important role in 
defining the determinants of financial reporting. Thus, the interplay among these factors 
can cause different results across countries. 
Armstrong et al. (2010) investigated the investor’s expectations about IFRS in 
Europe during 2002 and 2005. They investigated 16 events that were related to mandatory 
adoption. Through event study methodology, the authors find evidence that market 
returns are positively related to firms with lower pre-adoption information quality and 
higher pre-adoption information asymmetry. This reaction is more pronounced for banks. 
Although during the development of the standards there was a discussion on how IAS 39 
would affect banks, IAS 39 diminished information asymmetry, which led to positive 
market reactions. Nevertheless, there was a negative market reaction for firms in code 
law countries. This is consistent with investors’ concerns about enforcement, investor 
protection, and other institutional factors surrounding the application of the standards, 
and illustrate the importance of these factors when evaluating the effects of the adoption. 
It is noteworthy that this finding raises questions, in particular whether IFRS will improve 
the accounting quality information on emerging markets. This is because several 
emerging markets have inferior enforcement and investor protection mechanisms, and are 
code law countries.  
Devalle et al. (2010) investigated whether the earnings and the book value of 
equity are more value-relevant in the post-IFRS period in Europe. Overall, the authors 
find an increase in the value relevance of earnings while there is a decrease in the value 
relevance of book value of equity in Germany and France. Nevertheless, in the UK, the 
book value of equity is more relevant under IFRS; however, there is no evidence that 
Spain and Italy present any improvement on the value relevance of book value of equity 
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or earnings. Inconsistent with their predictions, there is no change in earnings smoothing 
between local GAAP and IFRS. There is evidence of more timely recognition of losses 
in local GAAP than in IFRS. The authors argue that this result may be due to differences 
in adopting IFRS across European countries. They argue that research on the impact of 
national factors associated with culture and legal systems is required in order to conclude 
the main reason for these mixed results. This evidence is consistent with the theoretical 
framework of Ball et al. (2003) and Nobes (2006). 
While the previous studies show that institutional factors affect accounting quality 
and the adoption of IFRS, the studies of Houqe et al. (2012), Tsalavoutas et al. (2012), 
Christensen et al. (2013), Ahmed et al. (2013b) and André et al. (2015) suggest that 
improvements are only to be found in countries where enforcement of accounting 
standards and investor protection mechanisms are strong or if the country has bundled the 
adoption of IFRS with concurrent changes in enforcement of accounting standards. 
Houqe et al. (2012) focus on the relation between earnings management and 
investor protection environment and their relation to the mandatory IFRS adoption in 46 
countries. Contrary to expectations, they gather evidence that IFRS alone does not 
improve earnings management; they find evidence of reduced earnings management only 
on higher investor protection countries that adopted IFRS. Therefore, they conclude that 
it is the combination of stronger investor protection and the adoption of IFRS that leads 
to a decrease on earnings management.  
Tsalavoutas et al. (2012) assessed whether the mandatory adoption of IFRS 
increased the value relevance of book value and net income in Greece. The authors 
analyse Greece as a case study because it is a small market with distinguished accounting 
environment and is often referred as having low-quality financial statements. This 
environment is composed of weak investor protection, low level of corporate governance, 
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high ownership concentration and code law system. Their main findings are that investors 
perceive value on the disclosure of specific IAS norms and that there is no improvement 
on the overall value relevance (measured by the adjusted R²) after the IFRS adoption. The 
net income coefficient presented a decrease in the post-IFRS period, and the book value 
of equity an increase. Therefore, the authors’ view highlight that markets with distinct 
characteristics such as Greece can indeed perceive unusual outcomes of mandatory IFRS 
adoption. It is worth noting that although the outcome is different, investors perceived 
new information disclosed under IFRS. 
Christensen et al. (2013) argue that the adoption of IFRS is due to a bundle effect: 
firms’ incentives, enforcement of accounting standards and investor protection 
mechanisms. That is, countries when adopting the standards may change their legislation 
in strengthening the penalties for firms’ non-compliant behaviours, hire significantly 
more staff to enforce the correct application of the standards, increase the investors’ 
protection mechanisms in order to signal to foreign investors higher reliability in 
investing in these countries. The authors only find improvement in liquidity for 5 EU 
countries that bundled the adoption of IFRS with significant changes in enforcement. 
Thus, any improvement found on accounting quality following the adoption of IFRS 
needs caution because of this bundle effect. The bundle effect then raises doubt on the 
findings of any improvements found by previous literature, but did not control for the 
changes in enforcement.  
Ahmed et al. (2013b) investigated three metrics of earnings management (income 
smoothing, managing earnings to meet or beat a target as Barth et al. (2008), and accrual 
aggressiveness by modifying the modified Jones (1995) model), and timely recognition 
of losses through Basu (1997) approach. Moreover, they analysed whether enforcement 
would affect the result. In order to achieve this, they divided the sample between higher 
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and lower enforcement countries according to the rule of law of Kaufmann et al. (2007). 
They find higher earnings management and lower timely recognition of losses for firms 
in strong enforcement regimes, and no change in these metrics for firms in weak 
enforcement countries. They argue that the principles-based IFRS rules are looser than 
domestic standards, and this provides a bigger room for earnings management. While for 
weak enforcement countries, the adoption of the standards will not change accounting 
quality because the standards are not enforced. However, this thesis argues that this might 
not always be the case, if firms have strong incentives to adopt IFRS and attract 
investments even in weak enforcement countries. 
André et al. (2015) analysed the longer time effects of IFRS on accounting 
conservatism. They also tested whether institutional characteristics (quality of audit and 
enforcement) play a role in financial reporting through the index of Brown et al. (2014). 
Their sample consists of firms from 16 European countries from 2000 to 2010. Their 
results show that mandatory adopters of IFRS do not present an increase on the degree of 
conditional conservatism after the adoption. Instead, the authors find an overall decline. 
Nevertheless, this decline is less pronounced for countries with higher audit and 
enforcement regimes. Moreover, the same trend occurs with firms that book an asset 
impairment test. The main argument of André et al. (2015) is that untimely impairment 
allows managers to postpone the recognition of bad news and as a result, it affects 
conditional conservatism behaviour. 
While Christensen et al. (2013) cast doubt on the findings of previous studies that 
did not investigate the changes on enforcement of accounting standards concurrent with 
the adoption of IFRS, the study of Preiato et al. (2015) corroborates with this evidence. 
Preiato et al. (2015) investigate the effect of IFRS on analysts’ information environment 
and provide consistent evidence that any improvements found are not valid if proxies for 
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enforcement are included in the models. This raises doubt about the findings from 
previous studies that have not considered the effect of enforcement on their analyses. 
Overall, this literature illustrates that the researcher needs to consider firms’ 
incentives, enforcement of accounting standards and investor protection mechanisms 
when investigating the effect of IFRS adoption. Moreover, there are other opportunities 
to evaluate the effect of firms’ incentives by considering firm-level factors such as 
operating performance and bankruptcy possibility. This is important because Christensen 
et al. (2009) provide evidence that IFRS affects debt contracting, which in turn may affect 
how managers adopt IFRS depending on firms’ financial performance and position. It is 
noteworthy that technical changes in GAAP on how earnings are measured may affect 
shareholders and debt covenants. Christensen et al. (2009) investigate earnings 
announcements on the mandated year and the one-year-ahead forecast on U.K firms. The 
authors argue that if the share price increases on the announcement date, it is likely that 
there is a transfer of wealth from lenders to shareholders. On the other hand, if the share 
price decreases, it is likely that there is a transfer of wealth from shareholders to lenders, 
and the company may face a technical default. Therefore, the authors argue that IFRS 
could imply a transfer of wealth between lenders and shareholders. Consistent with this 
rationale, debt, and financial distress may affect managers’ incentives to adopt IFRS in 
low enforced countries. That is, companies in financial distress may adopt IFRS more as 
a label if their earnings are likely to be reduced under IFRS. As the manager perceives 
that share prices may decline because of poor performance, there will be a transfer of 
wealth from shareholders to debt holders. Although previous literature argues that firms’ 
incentives affect the adoption of IFRS and accounting quality, these firm-level factors 
represent an opportunity to evaluate whether they would affect managers’ incentives, 
which in turn can affect the adoption of IFRS.  
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4.2.3 Overview of the literature regarding the mandatory adoption of IFRS 
This section discusses the reasons to expect an increase or a decrease in 
accounting quality after the IFRS adoption and summarizes the research evidence 
regarding this topic. 
Barth et al. (2008) argue that accounting choices such as measurement of fair 
value may provide a better and realistic vision of firm’s economic performance. Ball 
(2006) argues that fair value measurement implies more timely accounting information. 
This idea is supported, for instance, in the registration of gains and losses of securities, 
derivatives, and through impairment tests applied to long-term assets. Florou and Kosi 
(2015) argue that the recognition of impairment under IAS 36 may accelerate the 
recognition of bad news. These illustrate that the adoption of IFRS could increase firms’ 
accounting quality. On the other hand, there are reasons that could reduce the quality of 
accounting. Firstly, IFRS as a principle-based standard may provide higher flexibility to 
managers (Barth et al., 2008; Capkun, Collins and Jeanjean, 2016). Ahmed et al. (2013b) 
argue that because of the above, events such as the revenue recognition for multiple 
deliverables would significantly increase discretion and allowable treatments depending 
on managers’ interpretation. Capkun et al. (2016) do not find an improvement in earnings 
management after the mandatory IFRS adoption for several countries. The authors’ 
explanation is that principle based IFRS creates opportunities for managers’ discretionary 
ability. Secondly, use of fair value can increase the volatility of financial statements 
because it depends on managers’ discretion (Ball, 2006). Thirdly, Florou and Kosi (2015) 
point out that the recognition and measurement of financial instruments under IAS 39 and 
IFRS 9 can reduce accounting conservatism. This is because, in this case, IFRS may not 
contribute to clarify the decision-making of debt providers (Florou and Kosi, 2015). 
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Therefore, for the above reasons, there is a possibility that earnings management practices 
were increased and thus, the accounting quality reduced.  
Generally, there are both reasons to expect an improvement or a reduction on 
accounting quality following the adoption of IFRS as illustrated here. Consistent with 
this, there is mixed evidence regarding whether accounting quality increased after the 
mandatory IFRS adoption. Capkun et al. (2016) argue that the flexibility of IFRS does 
not contribute to an improvement to the accounting quality (regarding earnings 
management). There is evidence that accounting conservatism behaviour does not change 
or even decreases (Ahmed et al., 2013b; Christensen et al., 2015; André et al., 2015). 
Regarding value relevance, some studies did not find a significant improvement on value 
relevance on the initial years after the mandatory adoption (Callao et al., 2007; Gjerde et 
al., 2008). However, the literature indicates that there is an overall improvement on the 
value relevance of accounting numbers (Horton and Serafeim, 2010; Iatridis and 
Rouvolis, 2010; Tsalavoutas et al., 2012; Barth et al., 2014). Moreover, the greater is the 
difference between local GAAP and IFRS, the greater is the improvement on the value 
relevance of accounting numbers (Aharony et al., 2010). Overall, the literature indicates 
that accounting numbers are more value-relevant after the IFRS adoption. This summary 
of previous research is consistent with the study of Ahmed et al. (2013a) that drew 
conclusions about the impact of IFRS by doing a meta-analysis on 57 papers from both 
published and unpublished studies.  
Although the evidence of an improvement in accounting quality is mixed, the 
literature suggests that firms will increase their accounting quality depending on their 
incentives and based on strong institutional settings surrounding the preparation of 
financial statements (Houqe et al., 2012; Ahmed et al., 2013b; Christensen et al., 2013; 
Doukakis, 2014; André et al., 2015).  
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In Latin America’s context, the investor protection mechanisms and enforcement 
of accounting standards are low (La Porta et al., 1998; Brown et al., 2014). Besides, these 
countries have a code law system where enforcement is demanded by the government and 
less demanded by market forces as in common law countries. According to the literature, 
the impact of the IFRS adoption may vary depending on firms’ incentives. Therefore, 
firms that have incentives to adopt IFRS may have increased their accounting quality. 
Next, a literature review on emerging markets is provided. 
 
4.2.4 Literature review on emerging markets 
This section discusses the studies in emerging markets and the factors affecting 
reporting quality and the adoption of IFRS. This is helpful because emerging markets 
share similar characteristics with Latin American countries. Regarding this topic, there is 
evidence on China, Poland, and Brazil. Moreover, an overview of the evidence in Latin 
America is discussed. 
Dobija and Klimczak (2010) investigated the value relevance of accounting 
numbers on the value of the firm in Poland. The authors find a positive significant relation 
between earnings and returns, but they do not find an improvement in its strength over 
time. The conclusion is that IFRS does not improve the value relevance of accounting in 
Poland; unfortunately, the authors do not discuss the reasons behind this result. 
Liu, Yao, Hu and Liu (2011) investigated whether there was an improvement in 
China’s accounting quality after the mandatory IFRS adoption. The authors investigated 
accounting quality using the methodology of Barth et al. (2008) for earnings management, 
timely loss recognition through Basu (1997), and value relevance through the framework 
of Ohlson (1995). They investigated 870 firms with A-shares (Firms that are owned by 
Chinese citizens, and traded with Chinese citizens only) that were mandated to adopt 
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IFRS in 2007. They investigate 2 years of the adoption (2005 as the pre-adoption year 
and 2008 as the post-adoption year). The authors find a lower level of earnings 
management (less earnings smoothing and managing towards a target), and higher value 
relevance (earnings per share is more significant) in the post-IFRS mandatory adoption 
period. However, timely loss recognition does not improve. Nevertheless, the authors 
conclude that overall, the quality of accounting improved after the IFRS adoption. 
He, Wong and Young (2012) investigated the fair value adjustments in the 
emerging market of China. The author argues that the accounting in China focuses on a 
contractual role rather than an informational role. Therefore, the IFRS might not be 
adequate to its current institutional scenario. Moreover, earnings management incentives 
are high due to stock market regulation. For instance, firms may be delisted if they report 
a loss in three consecutive years. Therefore, they investigated the fair value adjustments 
on 2007 and 2008 under IFRS in comparison to 2005 and 2006. Their findings indicate 
that firms do earnings smoothing through adjustments on fair value accounting. 
Moreover, firms with incentives to meet the zero earnings threshold are likely to sell 
securities in order to incur gains or losses due to fair value measurement. This evidence 
contrasts with Liu et al. (2011) in indicating that the institutional setting of China leads 
to unintended effects and not necessarily an improvement on accounting quality. Cang, 
Chu and Lin (2014) further corroborate with the evidence presented by He et al. (2012) 
that the Chinese institutional environment may lead to unexpected effects after the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS. They investigated earnings management after the 
mandatory IFRS adoption exploiting the property that the analyst coverage on a firm may 
influence in the degree of earnings management. Analysts can draw more attention to 
suspicious actions of the manager in order to reduce earnings management. However, the 
pressure from earnings forecasts can stimulate earnings management behaviour in order 
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to reach the analysts’ expectations. Investigating 4,587 firm-year observations with 
analyst coverage from 2003 to 2009, the authors find an increase in earnings management 
in the post-IFRS period. They find that IFRS creates new opportunities for earnings 
management in China, and the monitoring effect by analysts is not improved. These 
results suggest that IFRS adoption is not compatible with the market’s institutional 
environment. 
In summary, although Liu et al. (2011) show an improvement in the quality of 
accounting in China, He et al. (2012) and Cang et al. (2014) illustrate that IFRS is not 
compatible with the institutional characteristics of China. Thus, although the accounting 
numbers are more value-relevant, fair value estimation alongside market pressures create 
room for earnings management. This highlights that the different institutional 
environment of developing countries may result in different unintended effects of IFRS 
adoption. This might be the case in Latin America as their institutional environment is 
different from developed countries. Latin American studies are discussed next. 
 
4.2.4.1 Literature review in Latin America 
In Latin America’s context, there are two key points to consider regarding the 
adoption of IFRS. Firstly, before the adoption of IFRS, accounting was linked to the 
economic interest of the tax system, which created an incentive for companies to do 
earnings management in order to pay fewer taxes. For instance, in Brazil, the law 
11,941/09 provided neutrality for the tax system, separating the tax system from the 
reporting system. Thus, the past accounting system provided an environment where 
managers could do earnings management in order to save tax. The situation is similar in 
Peru as Becerra (2010) provides evidence that the compliance to the standards in the 
initial stage of the IFRS adoption is associated with tax and legal aspects. So, this might 
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indicate that some type of firms will comply more to the standards than others. This is 
related to the incentives that these firms have to adopt the standards and disclose higher 
quality to the market in order to attract investments. Secondly, ownership concentration 
is high in Latin American stock markets. Therefore, information asymmetry problems are 
more pronounced among big shareholders and minority interest groups. Leuz (2006) 
argues that the ownership concentration structure affects managers’ incentives to manage 
earnings and provides evidence that higher concentrated ownership structures are related 
to a higher degree of earnings management. So, in Latin America this could also happen, 
however the adoption of IFRS may reduce earnings management behaviour as these 
standards aim to improve information transparency and reliability of financial statements 
for investors. The adoption of IFRS brought several changes that enhance transparency 
and reliability of the standards. For instance, in Brazil prior to IFRS, intangibles were not 
properly recognised, there was no separation between current assets and non-current 
assets and several transactions were not correctly recognised such as operational leasing 
activities, a new recognition of items in fixed assets and others. Thus, overall regulators 
expect an improvement in the accounting quality. 
 In Brazil, Macedo, Machado and Reis (2013) studied the value relevance of 
accounting during the first phase (2008-2009) of the IFRS adoption. Different from Barth 
et al. (2008), the authors utilized share price in the same period as book value and net 
income per share and did not use the residual from a regression of price on several control 
variables. They find evidence of a more value-relevant earnings per share against a 
reduction in the book value per share. Santos and Cavalcante (2014) investigated the issue 
between 2010 and the first quarter of 2013. The authors find conflicting evidence for an 
improvement in the value relevance of accounting numbers. They find no improvement 
when the book value per share and the net income per share are regressed with price, but 
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they find an improvement when these variables are regressed with returns. Moreover, 
they do not find an improvement in accounting conservatism through Basu’s (1997) 
model. The authors did not investigate any further explanations regarding institutional 
factors or firms’ incentives in order to clarify these results. Besides, although they claim 
that the financial crisis may have affected the results, they did not control for it. Thus, it 
is necessary to control for the effects of the financial crisis by introducing macroeconomic 
variables that can capture the changes in the economic circumstances. Regarding earnings 
management, the only studies are those of Peluccio-Grecco, Geron, Grecco and Lima 
(2014), and Klann and Beuren (2015). The study of Peluccio-Grecco et al. (2014) 
investigated the degree of earnings management in Brazil from 2006 to 2011 with annual 
data considering firms that have different regulatory enforcement, auditors and corporate 
governance mechanisms. The regulatory enforcement is a dummy that equals to one if 
the company is regulated by an industry governmental agency. Auditor is a dummy that 
equals to one if the company is audited by the Big 4 auditors. Corporate governance is a 
dummy that equals to one if the company is quoted on segments of higher corporate 
governance practices of Brazilian stock exchange (BM&FBovespa). The authors 
investigated earnings management by using the Jones (1991) model, the modified Jones 
model, the model of Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995), and the approach of Kothari, 
Leone and Wasley (2005). Their main finding is that there is weak evidence of a reduction 
in the level of discretionary accruals in the post-IFRS period. Moreover, only the 
regulatory enforcement has a relation with the level of discretionary accruals. The authors 
state that future research should expand the sample size in order to compile results that 
are more robust. Klann and Beuren (2015) investigated earnings smoothing through the 
approach of Barth et al. (2008) in Brazil. The authors investigated the issue with annual 
data from 2005-2007 (pre-IFRS) and 2010-2012 (post-IFRS). Contrary to their 
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expectations, there is evidence that income smoothing is higher in the post-IFRS period. 
They argue that this result is possibly due to the weak enforcement and that the standards 
alone are not the main reason for improving accounting quality. Black and Nakao (2017) 
investigated accounting quality through earnings management, value relevance of net 
income and timely recognition of losses in Brazil from 2003 to 2014. The authors used 
cluster analysis based on market to book value, whether the company issues American 
Depositary Receipts (ADR), and volume traded. The objective of this analysis was to try 
to segregate firms that have incentives and firms that do not have economic incentives. 
They find increased accounting quality only for the firms with economic incentives. 
However, the authors have not evaluated the effect of the institutional setting on the 
results, and have not considered evaluating the topic using a common size sample. 
In Chile, Bertin and Moya (2013) investigated whether the conditional 
conservatism had increased since the adoption of IFRS in 2010. They followed the 
approach of Basu (1997) to investigate this issue. The authors find a higher degree of 
conservatism in the IFRS period, which indicates that the relevance and reliability of the 
reported accounting information improved. There is no evidence concerning this topic on 
Argentina, Peru, and Mexico. 
It is important to highlight that apart from Peluccio-Grecco et al. (2014), and 
Black and Nakao (2017) the limited research on Latin America does not consider firms’ 
incentives and institutional characteristics surrounding the adoption of IFRS. It is worth 
noting that these aspects need to be addressed by future research due to their impact on 
the IFRS adoption (Ball et al., 2003; Christensen et al., 2013; Christensen et al., 2015). 
Moreover, some studies use quarterly data whereas the majority rely on annual data. 
However, these studies do not take full advantage of the properties of quarterly data in 
order to investigate the managers’ behaviour in several time points during the year. This 
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analysis can illustrate other effects of the adoption of IFRS, and it is an opportunity for 
this study to fill this gap. 
 
4.3 Research opportunities 
This section focuses on research opportunities regarding the impact of IFRS 
adoption on emerging markets.  
Latin American firms have adopted IFRS recently and research evidence on its 
impacts is very limited. These countries are often used as performance matching in 
comparison to developed countries that have adopted IFRS earlier. That is, they are used 
as proxies (non-IFRS adopting countries) in order to compare with countries that have 
adopted IFRS earlier. Considering that their different characteristics from developed 
markets such as low enforcement, weak investor protection, less developed capital market 
and high ownership concentration can provide different evidence on the impact of IFRS 
adoption. In other words, the evidence found in developed nations may not hold for 
developing countries. Liu et al. (2011) and Ball (2016) point out to the importance of 
studies on the impact of IFRS adoption on countries with different institutional, political 
and cultural environment. There is also an interest from the IASB for research in 
developing countries. This also represents an opportunity to investigate more accurately 
the impact of IFRS since the results of this thesis are not due to a bundle effect as the 
questionnaire revealed that there is not any significant change in the enforcement of 
accounting standards and investor protection mechanisms. This overcome the limitations 
of previous research following the recommendations of Christensen et al. (2013) and 
Preiato et al. (2015). 
 One topic that deserves attention is the effect of corporate debt and financial 
distress on manager’s motivation to adopt IFRS. The evidence regarding the effect of 
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IFRS on debt is limited. Following on the evidence of Christensen et al. (2009), this thesis 
argues that it is important to investigate further whether debt and financial distress 
influence manager’s incentive to adopt IFRS in Latin American countries. It is worth 
indicating that there are opportunities for managers to adopt IFRS due to their own 
incentives even after the mandatory adoption of IFRS, in particular, when legal 
enforcement is weak. This is a research opportunity to investigate value relevance, 
earnings management and accounting conservatism in these countries. Moreover, Chapter 
6 further explores the issues with regard to the cost of debt. 
Finally, it is worth noting that published studies have investigated the concept of 
accounting quality through annual data. However, this represents a limitation in 
investigating managers’ incentives to adopt IFRS. This is because the behaviour of the 
firm throughout the year is not examined. Therefore, studies that investigate the 
phenomenon of accounting quality through quarterly data will be able to pinpoint the 
managers’ behaviour with greater accuracy. Hence, the first study of this thesis adopts 
quarterly data, and can provide new evidence regarding firms’ incentives to adopt IFRS.  
 
4.4 Hypotheses development 
The findings from past studies show some economic and financial benefits 
associated with the mandatory adoption of IFRS such as greater comparability, increased 
transparency, increased information content, greater relevance of accounting information 
and others (Horton and Serafeim, 2010; Li, 2010; Iatridis and Rouvolis, 2010; Horton, 
Serafeim and Serafeim, 2013; Tsalavoutas et al., 2012; Barth et al., 2014). The literature 
argues that it is the combination of stronger investor protection (Houqe et al., 2012), 
firms’ incentives, enforcement (Christensen et al., 2013; Doukakis, 2014; Preiato et al., 
2015) and the adoption of IFRS that increases accounting quality. However, there is also 
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evidence of reduced accounting quality (Callao et al., 2007; Ahmed et al., 2013b; 
Christensen et al., 2015; André et al., 2015; Capkun et al., 2016). Nevertheless, the 
findings from past research on developed markets may not hold because Latin American 
countries have a different institutional setting. For instance, the literature shows that the 
investor protection and enforcement are weak in these countries (La Porta et al., 1998; 
Brown et al., 2014). Past literature argues that it seems unlikely to expect higher 
accounting quality even with the best GAAP if the enforcement is compromised (Hope, 
2003; Leuz et al., 2003; Burgstahler et al., 2006; Jeanjean and Stolowy, 2008; Holthausen, 
2009; Christensen et al., 2013). Therefore, even considering that IFRS has higher quality 
than previous domestic GAAP in force in Latin American countries, it is a challenge 
whether this change alone will imply greater accounting quality. However, this thesis 
argues that due to the recent stagnant GDP growth period in Latin America and the 
increasing debt in these countries, the IFRS adoption is an opportunity for firms to adopt 
high-quality accounting standards and attract foreign investment. As there is a big gap 
between IFRS and previous domestic standards, and as IFRS requires greater level of 
disclosure in comparison to previous domestic accounting standards (Barth et al., 2008; 
Moura and Coelho, 2016), the accounting quality is expected to increase (Aharony et al., 
2010; Florou and Kosi, 2015). Thus, the hypothesis is as follows. 
H1: The quality of accounting of Latin American firms has increased since the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS. 
It is noteworthy that because the enforcement is weak, manager’s incentives may 
influence the adoption of IFRS. This thesis argues that the managers may still use their 
discretion even under the mandatory adoption of IFRS due to weak institutional factors. 
Ball et al. (2003) argue that the strength of market forces can affect the managers’ 
incentives to disclose information. Under this circumstance, the financial performance of 
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the firm may affect managers’ incentives to disclose information, and this situation may 
vary depending on the firms’ main sources of funding. The manager needs to meet certain 
requirements and disclose information in order to gather funding from equity and debt 
markets. Therefore, the source of funding may affect this behaviour. Consequently, the 
general hypothesis (H1) may not hold for all types of firms. That is, the effect of IFRS if 
considered firm-level factors may be different. This study argues that operating 
performance, bankruptcy possibility, and the status of listing on U.S. markets may affect 
the adoption of IFRS. First, regarding operating performance, the firms’ managers that 
experience a continuous decline in operating performance prior to the adoption may not 
adopt IFRS properly in order to not disclose fully their financial woes. They may delay 
the disclosure of losses, which would increase information asymmetry among 
shareholders. This may also be an opportunity to undertake earnings management. On the 
other hand, the manager of strongly performing firms may be motivated to adopt IFRS to 
signal higher reliability of financial statements and attract foreign capital. Therefore, the 
hypotheses are as follows. 
H2a: Accounting quality of poorly performing firms has not increased since the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS. 
H2b: Accounting quality of strongly performing firms has increased since the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS. 
Second, managers of firms with high bankruptcy possibility prior to the mandatory 
adoption date are pressured to adopt IFRS because they are under the scrutiny of debt 
holders and need to avoid penalty of covering material bad news (Watts, 2003a; Watts, 
2003b). However, the manager may be discouraged to adopt IFRS if the adoption implies 
in the disclosure of more bad news that do not help to improve firms’ financial position, 
credit ranking and further alert debt holders. In this case, managers may try to improve 
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the firms’ financial position by deferring the recognition of bad news and undertaking 
earnings management practices (Ramanna and Watts, 2012; André et al., 2015). 
Moreover, there could be a wealth transfer between shareholders to debt holders under 
IFRS (Christensen et al., 2009). That is, if the firms’ financial position is worse under 
IFRS and the firms face technical default, shareholders will not have priority in receiving 
their invested capital. Instead, debt holders will have higher priority in such 
circumstances. Thus, this represents a wealth transfer from shareholders to debt holders. 
On the other hand, managers of firms with low bankruptcy possibility may predict 
positive outcomes from the IFRS adoption. This can be an opportunity to indicate 
financial health and maintain the confidence of debt holders in the credit market (Wu and 
Zhang, 2014). Hence, the hypotheses for these two set of firms are as follows: 
H3a: Accounting quality of firms with high bankruptcy possibility in the post-
adoption period may not be higher than that in the pre-adoption period. 
H3b: Accounting quality of firms with low bankruptcy possibility in the post-
adoption period may be higher than that in the pre-adoption period. 
Third, Barth et al. (2008) and Armstrong et al. (2010) argue that investors perceive 
IFRS as higher quality than domestic standards. Therefore, this may be an opportunity 
for managers of domestic firms to increase accounting quality and attract more capital. 
Nevertheless, the quality of accounting may not have increased for those firms that have 
been trading stocks on U.S. stock exchanges before the IFRS adoption. These firms have 
already been adopting high-quality accounting standards as required by Securities 
Exchange Commission (SEC) prior to the mandatory adoption of IFRS. Thus, their 




H4a: There is no improvement in accounting quality of firms that list on U.S. stock 
exchanges after the mandatory adoption of IFRS. 
H4b: Accounting quality of firms that do not list on U.S. stock markets has 
increased since the mandatory adoption of IFRS. 
 
4.5 Research design  
 This section presents the econometric approach. This thesis relies on several 
accounting quality metrics in order to examine the accounting quality according to 
different aspects. These include the metrics of earnings management, value relevance and 
timely recognition of losses.11 
It is worth noting that there are several models to investigate earnings management 
(Healy, 1985; Deangelo, 1986; McNichols and Wilson, 1988; Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 
1995; Kang and Sivaramakrishnan, 1995; Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Land and Lang, 
2002; Leuz et al., 2003; Kothari et al., 2005; Lang, Raedy and Wilson, 2006; 
Roychowdhury, 2006; Dechow et al., 2012). There are also several metrics to investigate 
timely recognition of losses (Basu, 1997; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; Khan and Watts, 
2009). The metrics to investigate value relevance generally follow the framework of 
Ohlson (1995), and differ slightly on the dependent variable used: stock price, returns, 
abnormal returns or market value of equity (Barth et al., 2008; Devalle et al., 2010; 
Tsalavoutas et al., 2012; Barth et al., 2014). 
The econometric methods of this study follow Barth et al. (2008), Basu (1997), 
Ahmed et al. (2013b), and Dechow et al. (1995). The reasons for that are four-fold. Firstly, 
these metrics (earnings management, value relevance and timely recognition of losses) 
                                                 
11 Several accounting quality metrics were adopted to provide a clear picture of the situation in Latin 
America, moreover the models were expanded to reflect Latin American firms’ incentives and firms’ 
behaviour, such as the lagged recognition of bad news. 
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considered together provide consistent evidence of the manager’s behaviour in adopting 
IFRS, and illustrate the perception of reliability of accounting numbers to investors. 
Secondly, the combination of these methods helps to mitigate effects of management 
incentives to adopt IFRS and other economic changes. This also helps to provide a clear 
view regarding accounting quality, instead of relying only on one or two proxies. Thirdly, 
this thesis adopts this approach in order to be comparable with past research (Christensen 
et al., 2015), and expands these models in order to capture accurately the manager’s 
behaviour.12 Fourthly, in particular for adopting Barth et al. (2008) approach, even though 
the adoption of IFRS is mandatory for Latin American firms, as previously discussed, 
managers can still use their discretion upon the financial statements, which requires the 
models to control for firms’ incentives. The methods of Barth et al. (2008) includes 
several controls for firms’ incentives, which well matches the situation being examined 
for Latin American countries. This thesis also improves the models by introducing 
changes in the gross domestic product (GDP) and quarterly dummies in order to control 
for financial crisis effects and other macroeconomic changes in general. Additionally, this 
study investigates the effect of firm-level factors that could affect the adoption of IFRS. 
Regarding the econometric estimation, this thesis follows the approach of 
Wooldridge (2010), the models are estimated according to the best estimator (pooled 
ordinary least squares, fixed-effects, and random-effects). The Chow (1960) test, the 
Lagrange multiplier of Breusch and Pagan (1968), and Hausman (1978) test were 
employed in order to decide the optimum estimator. Consistent with Barth et al. (2008), 
untabulated statistics indicate that fixed effects are more suitable for this approach. The 
fixed-effects approach not only mitigates survivorship bias, but also mitigates concerns 
                                                 
12 This thesis does not follow the metric of timely recognition of losses of Khan and Watts (2009) as they 
argue that their approach would be compromised in countries with weak enforcement, which is the case 
of Latin American countries. Thus, this thesis follows the other metrics of timely recognition of losses 
according to Basu (1997) and Barth et al. (2008). 
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about unobserved heterogeneity and (time-invariant) selection bias (Hail and Leuz, 2009; 
Wooldridge, 2010). Moreover, the regressions are estimated with the robust approach for 
heteroscedasticity. 
The econometric models are discussed in the following sections. 
 
4.5.1 Earnings management metrics 
Following Barth et al. (2008), the first metric is the variance of the residuals 
(variability of the change in net income scaled by total assets) of equation 1. Thus, 
following the adoption of IFRS the variance of net income should be higher as managers 
may have less room to smooth the earnings. Hence, the variability of the changes in net 
income should be higher in the post-adoption period.  
∆𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑀𝑉𝐼𝑆𝑈𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼5𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼6𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼7𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼8𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼9𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼10𝑋𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼11𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼12𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡






where: ∆𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡 is change in net income for firm i at quarter t. 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 is the natural 
logarithm of the market value of equity for firm i at the end of the quarter t. 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡 
is the percentage change in sales for firm i at quarter t. 𝑀𝑉𝐼𝑆𝑈𝑖,𝑡 is the change in 
quarterly common stock for firm i at quarter t. 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 is end-of-quarter total liabilities 
divided by end-of-quarter book value of equity for firm i at quarter t. 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is 
percentage change in total liabilities for firm i at quarter t. 𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡 is sales divided by 
end-of-quarter total assets for firm i at quarter t. 𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 is quarterly net cash flow from 
operating activities for firm i at quarter t. 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is an indicator variable that equals one 
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if the firm’s auditor is PwC, KPMG, Arthur Anderson, E&Y or D&T and zero 
otherwise, for firm i at quarter t. 𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡 is the number of foreign exchange markets 
that the company i lists on, at quarter t. 𝑋𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡 is an indicator variable that equals one 
if the firm i is listed on any U.S. stock exchange at quarter t. 𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 is book value 
divided by market value for firm i at quarter t. 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is the gross domestic product (GDP) 
growth rate for firm i at quarter t. 𝑃𝑊𝑖, 𝐼𝑖, 𝑀𝑖, 𝑈𝑖, 𝐿𝑖, and 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑖 are Hofstede’s culture 
dimensions of power distance, individualism, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, long-
term orientation, and indulgence13, respectively for firm i.  𝑁𝐴𝐼𝐶𝑆𝑖 are 12 dummies for 
industry activity: Dummy 1: Sector 11, agriculture, forestry, fishing & hunting; Dummy 
2: Sector 21, mining, quarrying, oil & gas extraction; Dummy 3: Sector 22, utilities; 
Dummy 4: Sector 23, construction; Dummy 5: Sector 31-33, manufacturing; Dummy 6: 
Sector 42, wholesale trade; Dummy 7: Sector 44-45, retail trade; Dummy 8: Sector 48-
49, transportation & warehousing; Dummy 9: Sector 51, information; Dummy 10: Sector 
54, Professional scientific and technical services; Dummy 11: Sector 72, accommodation 
& food services; Dummy 12: Sector 81 other services (exclude public administration, 
repair & maintenance).  
 In order to compare the earnings management behaviour between the pre- and 
the post- adoption periods, this study estimates the regressions for the whole period (Barth 
et al., 2008). Then, the residuals of each equation are analysed according to the period 
(pre- or post- IFRS). Secondly, a bootstrap procedure of 1000 times is processed for each 
period (pre- and post-IFRS). That is, 1000 samples are randomly created based on the 
original sample for each period. This procedure is used to test the significance of the 
                                                 




analysis. A “t” test of the variance of the residuals for the 1000 samples is employed in 
order to evaluate that they are different than 0. 
It is worth noting that the proxies for culture provide similar results as if country 
dummies are included. Moreover, the enforcement and investor protection indexes of 
Brown et al. (2014) and La Porta et al. (1998) were also included in the regressions for 
robustness of the results. As there was not a significant change in these indexes around 
the adoption of IFRS according to the results of the questionnaire on Chapter 3, the results 
of this Chapter reflect the specific effect of the adoption of IFRS. 
The second metric is based on the mean ratio of the residuals of equation 1 (the 
variability of the change in net income), to the residuals of equation 2 (the variability of 
the change in operating cash flows).  
∆𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑀𝑉𝐼𝑆𝑈𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼5𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼6𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼7𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼8𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼9𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼10𝑋𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼11𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼12𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡






where: ∆𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 is change in annual cash flow from operations for firm i at quarter t.  
Firms with high earnings volatility usually have high cash flow volatility; thus, 
this measure controls this behaviour (Barth et al., 2008). If the firm manages earnings via 
accruals, the variability of cash flows is higher than that of net income. Therefore, this 
ratio should be higher in the post-IFRS period. 
The third metric is the Spearman’s correlation between the residuals of equation 
3 and 4. Barth et al. (2008) argue that if the firm manages earnings via accruals, the 
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accruals will present a higher correlation with cash flows. Hence, this coefficient should 
be less negative during the post-IFRS period. 
𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑀𝑉𝐼𝑆𝑈𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼5𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼6𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼7𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼8𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼9𝑋𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼10𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼11𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼12𝑃𝑊𝑖 + 𝛼13𝐼𝑖






𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑀𝑉𝐼𝑆𝑈𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼5𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼6𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼7𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼8𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼9𝑋𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼10𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼11𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼12𝑃𝑊𝑖 + 𝛼13𝐼𝑖





where: 𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is net income less cash flow from operations for firm i at quarter t.                                    
Finally, the last metric for earnings management is the coefficient of 𝑆𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑖,𝑡 in 
equation 5. This is a metric of earnings smoothing, as companies tend to disclose a small 
profit than a loss. Hence, the coefficient should be negative, which implies that companies 
manage earnings towards small positive net income more in the pre-adoption period than 
in the post-adoption period. 
𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑆𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑀𝑉𝐼𝑆𝑈𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼6𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼7𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼8𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼9𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼10𝑋𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼11𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼12𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼13𝑃𝑊𝑖 + 𝛼14𝐼𝑖 + 𝛼15𝑀𝑖 + 𝛼16𝑈𝑖 + 𝛼17𝐿𝑖







where: 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is set as 1 if it is the post-IFRS adoption period, otherwise zero, for firm i 
at quarter t; 𝑆𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is a dummy variable that equals one if net income scaled by total 
assets is between 0 and 0.01 for firm i at quarter t (Lang, Raedy and Yetman, 2003). 
4.5.2 Metrics of timely recognition of losses 
The first metric is derived from Barth et al. (2008). In equation 6, the coefficient 
of 𝐿𝑁𝐸𝐺𝑖,𝑡 should be positive following the adoption of IFRS. That is, this means that 
companies tend to recognize large losses more in the post-IFRS period.  
𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐿𝑁𝐸𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑀𝑉𝐼𝑆𝑈𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼6𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼7𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼8𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼9𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼10𝑋𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼11𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼12𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡






where: 𝐿𝑁𝐸𝐺𝑖,𝑡 is an indicator variable that equals one for observations for which 
quarterly net income scaled by total assets is less than –0.2, and zero otherwise, for firm 
i at quarter t. 
 The second metric is derived from Basu (1997). Equation 7 is to control for several 
factors that could affect the result such as industry, culture, enforcement and 
macroeconomic volatility. The residuals of equation 7 are the dependent variable in 
equation 8. This thesis argues that alongside recognising the bad news in the current 
quarter, the manager may delay the recognition of bad news in earlier quarters or 
recognise the bad news in future quarters. Thus, this study proposes a third metric 
(equation 9) in order to capture firm’s behaviour in a timely manner by following the 
approach of Pope and Walker (1999), and Mak, Strong and Walker (2011). Equation 9 
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consists of the estimation of equation 8 with lagged returns in order to track the timely 
recognition of losses. 
𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑀𝑉𝐼𝑆𝑈𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼5𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼6𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼7𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼8𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼9𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼10𝑋𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼11𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼12𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼13𝑃𝑊𝑖 + 𝛼14𝐼𝑖 + 𝛼15𝑀𝑖
+ 𝛼16𝑈𝑖 + 𝛼17𝐿𝑖 + 𝛼18𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑖 + ∑ 𝛼𝑑+18𝑁𝐴𝐼𝐶𝑆𝑖
12
𝑑=1
+ ∑ 𝛼𝑦𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
(7) 
𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑃𝑖,𝑡


















where: 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is the quarterly net income divided by end-of-quarter number of shares 
outstanding and scaled by stock price at the beginning of the quarter t for firm i. 𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is 
the dummy variable for bad news for firm i at quarter t; that is when returns are less than 
0, it is equal to 1, otherwise zero. 𝐷𝑖,𝑡𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the dummy 𝐷𝑖,𝑡 multiplied by returns (𝑅𝑖,𝑡). 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡−𝜏 = (𝑃𝑖,𝑡−𝜏 − 𝑃𝑖,𝑡−𝜏−1)/𝑃𝑖,𝑡−8 are the lagged returns; 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−𝜏𝑅𝑖,𝑡−𝜏 are the lagged 
variables, which their coefficients of 𝛾𝜏 denote bad news. 𝛽𝜏 measures the recognition of 
good news on the current quarter (𝜏 = 0) and prior quarters (𝜏 = 1 to 7). 𝛾𝜏 measures the 
recognition of bad news on the current quarter (𝜏 = 0) and prior quarters (𝜏 = 1 to 7).14 
                                                 
14 The delay in the recognition of bad news could extend further from quarter 7, but due to data limitation 
this is not explored in this thesis. 
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𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡 are dummy variables for each quarter t to control for shocks 
throughout time. 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑃𝑖,𝑡∗  is the residual of equation 7 for firm i at quarter t. 
 The coefficient of 𝛽 and 𝛾 should be positive. A positive coefficient for 𝛽 implies 
that the firm recognises good news. Moreover, a positive coefficient of 𝛾 implies 
recognition of conservative accounting. This is because returns are a proxy for the 
economic performance of the firm, and timely accounting will disclose bad news on a 
timely manner. That is, a positive significant coefficient for 𝛾0 implies that firms 
disclosed bad news on a timely manner as this news are recognised by the market. On the 
other hand, a negative coefficient for 𝛾 implies that managers choose to inflate earnings 
when they experience bad news. It is worth noting that when firms recognise bad news in 
prior quarters (a positive and significant coefficient for 𝛾1…7), this might help to smooth 
earnings as the recognition of bad news is spread through several quarters. However, 
considering that the manager reduces the delay in recognising bad news, this can be a sign 
of improvement in accounting quality. This is because Ball et al. (2003) argue that firms 
may delay the recognition of bad news, in particular considering the institutional setting 
of Latin American countries. Therefore, a reduction in the delay represents an 
improvement as the recognition of losses is timelier than before. 
  
4.5.3 Value relevance metrics 
 Regarding the value relevance approach, this thesis follows the approach of Barth 
et al. (2008), which is based on the framework of Ohlson (1995). The measures for value 
relevance are presented in equations 10, 11 and 12.  
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𝑃𝑖,𝑡+2 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑀𝑉𝐼𝑆𝑈𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼5𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼6𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼7𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼8𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼9𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼10𝑋𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼11𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼12𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡




+ ∑ 𝛼𝑦𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
(10) 
𝑃𝑖,𝑡+2
∗ = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾1𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (11) 
𝑃𝑖,𝑡+2










where: 𝑃𝑖,𝑡+2 represents the share price of two quarters ahead. It is measured six months 
after the end of quarter t of firm i, in order to ensure that this information was available 
to the market (Lang et al., 2003; Lang et al., 2006). 𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the book value per share 
for firm i at quarter t; 𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the net income per share for firm i at quarter t; 
𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−𝜏(𝜏 = 0, 1 to 7) denotes 𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 on current (𝜏 = 0) and prior quarters (𝜏 = 1 to 
7); 𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−𝜏 (𝜏 = 0, 1 to 7) denotes 𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 on current (𝜏 = 0) and prior quarters (𝜏 = 1 
to 7). 𝑃𝑖,𝑡+2∗  is the residual of equation 10 for firm i at quarter t. 
 Equation 10 is the regression of share price with several control variables. This 
equation is estimated for the period before and after the IFRS adoption. Afterwards, the 
residuals of equation 10 are regressed as a dependent variable in equation 11. The 
coefficients of book value and net income per share should be positive, which indicate 
that investors rely on these accounting numbers. Considering that firms have the 
obligation to republish their past year financial statement in accordance to IFRS, the 
lagged 𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 are introduced into the model in equation 12 in order to 
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capture this phenomenon. Based on the assumption of higher accounting quality, 
investors should rely more on these lagged variables in the post-adoption period than in 
the pre-adoption period. Afterwards, the differences in the coefficients between the pre- 
and post-IFRS adoption periods are analysed. An overall increase in the value relevance 
of accounting figures would be achieved by finding significant higher coefficients of 
𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 in the post-IFRS period. Moreover, a higher adjusted R² is also 
expected in the post-adoption period. 
 
4.5.4 Accruals aggressiveness analysis 
I measure accrual aggressiveness by modifying the models of Ahmed et al. 
(2013b) and Dechow et al. (1995) and develop model 13. 
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑉𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼1𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑀𝑉𝐼𝑆𝑈𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼5𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼6𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼7𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼8𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼9𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼10𝑋𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼11𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼12𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡




+ ∑ 𝛼𝑦𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
(13) 
where: 𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑉𝐶𝑖,𝑡 =  ∆𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 − ∆𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑡, where ∆𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 is the change in quarterly revenue 
scaled by total assets in quarter t-1 for firm i. ∆𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑡 is the change in quarterly account 
receivable deflated by total assets in quarter t-1 firm i. 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is the quarterly gross 
property, plant and equipment deflated by end-of-quarter total assets for firm i at quarter 
t. 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is the inverse of the logarithm of total assets for firm i at quarter t. 
The aim of this analysis is to estimate the coefficient 𝛽1 of 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡. A significantly 
positive (negative) 𝛽1 indicates an increase (decrease) in managers’ discretionary use of 
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accruals. Thus, this coefficient is expected to be significantly negative as this illustrates 
that the mandatory adoption of IFRS is helpful to reduce firms’ behaviour of accrual 
earnings management. 
 
4.6 Data and sampling procedures 
The target population of this research is all publicly listed companies excluding 
banks and financial institutions in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Peru. The other 
Latin American countries are excluded because they adopt IFRS after 2014 and their 
required data was not available. The main data source is Economatica15.  
Table 2 reports that there are 116, 660, 241, 184 and 198 industrial firms 
respectively from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Peru. The total number of firms 
available are 1399 companies for these five countries in Economatica database. The data 
is winsorized at the 1% level in order to avoid the outlier’s effect.  
In order to examine the impact of the adoption of IFRS on accounting quality, the 
accounting and market data must be available in 2 years before and 2 years after the IFRS 
adoption. According to this criterion, the common sample size is 309 firms. Table 2, Panel 
A, illustrates the sample structure, and Panel B shows the common sample size after the 






                                                 
15 Economatica® is an international database founded in 1986. Economatica database contains more Latin 
American firms than other databases, such as Capital IQ and Datastream. Datastream does not provide 
quarterly information for the target firms, and Capital IQ has only 108 firms that suit the sampling 
criteria. It is noteworthy that similar empirical results were derived based on the data from Capital IQ. 
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Table 2. Sample structure 
Panel A. Number of firms from Economatica    
NAICS Argentina Brazil Chile Mexico Peru Total 
11 7 7 31 6 19 70 
21 27 43 47 10 65 192 
22  61  1  62 
23 4 38 7 23 4 76 
31–33 35 253 29 52 40 409 
42 2 18 9  2 31 
44–45 2 20 12 21 6 61 
48–49 3 32 11 7  53 
51 3 57 10 19 3 92 
54  1    1 
72 16 24 19 6 26 91 
81 17 106 66 39 33 261 
Total 116 660 241 184 198 1399 
Panel B. Number of firms whose data in two years pre- and two years post- the date of mandatory 
adoption of IFRS is available. 
NAICS Argentina Brazil Chile Mexico Peru Total 
11  2 7 3  12 
21  12 13 7 11 43 
22  17    17 
23  15 1 12  28 
31–33 1 47 11 20 1 80 
42  2 3   5 
44–45  7 4 10  21 
48–49  8 5 4  17 
51  4 3 7 1 15 
54      0 
72  7 8 1 3 19 
81   33 13 4 2 52 
Total 1 154 68 68 18 309 
Note: Panel A reports the number of firms downloaded from Economatica for the sample period from the 
first quarter of 2003 to the fourth quarter of 2014. NAICS 11: agriculture, forestry, fishing & hunting; 
NAICS 21: mining, quarrying, oil & gas extraction; NAICS 22: utilities; NAICS 23: construction; NAICS 
31–33: manufacturing; NAICS 42: wholesale trade; NAICS 44–45: retail trade; NAICS 48–49: 
transportation & warehousing; NAICS 51: information; NAICS 54: Professional scientific & technical 
services; NAICS 72: accommodation & food services; NAICS 81: other services (excluded public 
administration, religious organization, grantmaking & giving services, voluntary organization, social 
advisory services, human right organization, civil and social organization, business & professional, political 
& labour organization, business association, professional organization, private household etc.). Panel B 
displays the number of firms whose data in two years pre- and two years post the date of mandatory adoption 
of IFRS is available. 
 
The IFRS adoption date for each country was retrieved from the official 
documents (IFRS, 2013; IFRS, 2014a; IFRS, 2014b; IFRS, 2015a; IFRS, 2015b) and are 




 Table 3. The sample according to the mandatory adoption date of IFRS in Latin America 
Country Period classification Time Event 
Argentina 
Pre 2010q1-2011q4 Before IFRS adoption 
Post 2012q1-2013q4  Mandatory IFRS adoption 
Brazil 
Pre 2008q4-2010q3 Local GAAP - Before full mandatory IFRS adoption 
Post 2010q4-2012q3 Mandatory IFRS - Full adoption 
Chile 
Pre 2007q4-2009q3 Before IFRS adoption 
Post 2009q4-2011q3  Mandatory IFRS adoption 
Mexico 
Pre 2010q1-2011q4 Before IFRS adoption 
Post 2012q1-2013q4  Mandatory IFRS adoption 
Peru 
Pre 2010q1-2011q4 Before IFRS adoption 
Post 2012q1-2013q4  Mandatory IFRS adoption 
“q1” to “q4” denote quarter one to quarter four.  
 In order to test the hypotheses (H2a, H2b, H3a, H3b, H4a and H4b), the sample 
firms are divided into three subsample groups as follows. Firstly, poorly performing firms 
and strongly performing firms; poorly performing firms are those that net income over 
total assets are less than the mean of its industry whereas strongly performing firms are 
the remaining firms. Secondly, firms with high bankruptcy possibility and firms with low 
bankruptcy possibility; a firm with high bankruptcy possibility is identified if its AZ score 
is less than 1.2. On the other hand, a firm with low bankruptcy possibility is identified if 
its AZ score is more than 1.2. Finally, the third group is formed of firms that list on U.S. 
stock exchanges and firms that do not list on U.S. stock exchanges prior to the date of the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS. According to these three sets of groups, the accounting 
quality between the pre- and post-IFRS adoption period is compared. Table 4 illustrates 






Table 4. Classified sample groups  
Situation Number of Firms Total 
Poorly Performing firms 40 309 
Strongly  performing firms 269 
Firms with AZ < 1.2 30 309 
Firms with AZ > 1.2 279 
List on U.S. stock exchanges 57 309 
Do not list on U.S. stock exchanges 252 
 
4.6.1. Descriptive statistics 















Table 5. Descriptive statistics of common size sample – 309 firms 
  Pre  Post 
  Obs Mean Median Std. Dev   Mean Median Std. Dev 
Test variables        
𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑃𝑖,𝑡 2472 0.063 0.046 0.501  0.025*** 0.035 0.266 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 2472 0.078 0.034 0.319  0.023*** 0.020 0.196 
𝐷𝑖,𝑡 2472 0.428 0 0.495  0.447 0 0.497 
𝐷𝑖,𝑡𝑅𝑖,𝑡 2472 –0.072 0 0.125  –0.062*** 0 0.106 
𝑃𝑖,𝑡+2 2472 5.388 2.866 6.921  6.184*** 3.229 8.251 
𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 2472 4.783 1.971 12.832  4.613 2.391 6.812 
𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 2472 0.311 0.097 1.163  0.301 0.096 0.949 
𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 2472 0.047 0.040 0.078  0.043*** 0.036*** 0.064 
∆𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 2472 0.001 0.015 0.075  0.000 0.014 0.066 
𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡 2472 0.019 0.027 0.240  0.020 0.024 0.207 
∆𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡 2472 0.001 0.009 0.090  –0.002 0.008 0.081 
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡 2472 –0.021 –0.014 0.137  –0.019 –0.011 0.123 
𝑆𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑖,𝑡 2472 0.741 1.000 0.438  0.746 1.000 0.435 
𝐿𝑁𝐸𝐺𝑖,𝑡 2472 0.012 0 0.108  0.008 0 0.092 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 2472 0.168 0.166 0.021  0.164*** 0.162*** 0.020 
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 2472 0.360 0.356 0.231  0.321*** 0.309*** 0.234 
𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑉𝐶𝑖,𝑡 2472 0.007 0.117 0.384  0.004 0.114 0.361 
AZ 2472 1.403 1.483 10.963  1.189 1.434 7.741 
Control variables        
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 2472 13.287 13.229 1.942  13.739*** 13.819*** 1.893 
𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 2472 1.251 0.687 2.745  1.000*** 0.679 1.311 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 2472 1.813 1.075 3.538  1.826 1.159 3.143 
𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡 2472 0.337 0.441 0.724  0.296*** 0.409*** 0.671 
𝑀𝑉𝐼𝑆𝑈𝑖,𝑡 2472 0.053 0.036 0.251  0.013*** 0.017*** 0.205 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑖,𝑡 2472 0.040 0.028 0.355  0.045 0.019 0.292 
𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡 2472 0.462 0.350 0.385  0.438*** 0.341*** 0.360 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 2472 0.007 0.012 0.017  0.007*** 0.006*** 0.009 
𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡 2472 0.625 1.000 0.484  0.625 1.000 0.484 
𝑋𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡 2472 0.184 0 0.388  0.184 0 0.388 
𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡 2472 0.476 0 0.757  0.476 0 0.757 
𝑃𝑊𝑖  2472 0.215 0.212 0.020  0.215 0.212 0.020 
𝐼𝑖  2472 0.207 0.248 0.047  0.207 0.248 0.047 
𝑀𝑖 2472 0.198 0.201 0.056  0.198 0.201 0.056 
𝑈𝑖 2472 0.192 0.197 0.011  0.192 0.197 0.011 
𝐿𝑖 2472 0.247 0.215 0.061  0.247 0.215 0.061 
𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑖 2472 0.207 0.178 0.048  0.207 0.178 0.048 
*, **, *** significant difference between means (medians) in Pre and in Post at 10%, 5%, 1% level, two-
tailed test. 
 
Table 5 reports that earnings per share deflated by price in each quarter (𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑃𝑖,𝑡), 
stock return (𝑅𝑖,𝑡), operating cash flow deflated by end-of-quarter total assets (𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡), the 
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inverse of total assets (𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡), and property, plant and equipment (𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡) are 
significantly lower in the post-adoption period in comparison to the pre-adoption period. 
The stock price in the post-adoption period is significantly higher than in the pre-adoption 
period. The firms of the sample presented insignificantly fewer periods of small positive 
earnings (𝑆𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑖,𝑡) and insignificantly fewer periods of large negative earnings (𝐿𝑁𝐸𝐺𝑖,𝑡) 
after the adoption of IFRS. Because there is no significant difference between the two 
periods, this implies that firms may manage their earnings to meet a target and may not 
recognize losses in a timely manner. This result contradicts the findings of Barth et al. 
(2008) for developed countries. Regarding the control variables, firm size (𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡) is 
significantly larger during the period after the IFRS adoption. Book-to-market value 
(𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡), the percentage change in sales (𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡), the percentage changes in 
common stock (𝑀𝑉𝐼𝑆𝑈𝑖,𝑡), sales divided by end-of-quarter total assets (𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡) and 
gross domestic product growth rate (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡) are significantly lower in the post-adoption 
period than in the pre-adoption period. End-of-quarter total liabilities, as divided by end-
of-quarter equity book value (𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡) is insignificantly higher in the post-adoption period. 
This is consistent with the increase in the bankruptcy possibility assessed by the Altman 
Z-score (AZ) across the two periods.   
  
4.7 Results 
4.7.1 Earnings management and timely recognition of losses through Barth’s et al. 
(2008) approach 
Table 6 presents the results regarding the four measures of earnings management 
and one measure of timely recognition of losses according to the approach of Barth et al. 
(2008) for the common sample. It also reports the results of the subsample groups in terms 
of poorly performing firms, strongly performing firms, firms with A.Z < 1.2, firms with 
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A.Z > 1.2, firms listed on U.S. stock exchanges (Xlist), and firms that do not list on U.S. 

































Table 6. Comparison of earnings management metrics in the pre- and post-mandatory adoption of 
IFRS 
Metric Prediction   Obs. Pre Post Diff 
    N Pre Post       
Variability of ∆𝑵𝑰𝒊,𝒕∗         
All firms Post>Pre 309 2472 2472 0.0064*** 0.0057*** –0.0007*** 
Poorly performing firms Post>Pre 40 320 320 0.0064*** 0.0057*** –0.0007*** 
Strongly performing firms Post>Pre 269 2152 2152 0.0066*** 0.0055*** –0.0010*** 
Firms' AZ<1.2 Post>Pre 30 240 240 0.0065*** 0.0055*** –0.0010*** 
Firms' AZ>1.2 Post>Pre 279 2232 2232 0.0064*** 0.0057*** –0.0007*** 
Xlist firms Post>Pre 57 456 456 0.0063*** 0.0055*** –0.0007*** 
Non–Xlist firms Post>Pre 252 2016 2016 0.0064*** 0.0057*** –0.0007*** 
Variability of ∆𝑵𝑰𝒊,𝒕∗ /∆𝑪𝑭𝒊,𝒕∗         
All firms Post>Pre 309 2472 2472 2.2720*** 2.9209*** 0.6490*** 
Poorly performing firms Post>Pre 40 320 320 3.1640*** 2.6761*** –0.4879*** 
Strongly performing firms Post>Pre 269 2152 2152 2.2650*** 2.9364*** 0.6714*** 
Firms' AZ<1.2 Post>Pre 30 240 240 2.2995*** 2.8386*** 0.5391*** 
Firms' AZ>1.2 Post>Pre 279 2232 2232 2.3723*** 2.9949*** 0.6226*** 
Xlist firms Post>Pre 57 456 456 2.2769*** 2.9357*** 0.6588*** 
Non–Xlist firms Post>Pre 252 2016 2016 2.2827*** 2.9334*** 0.6507*** 
Correlation of 𝑨𝑪𝑪𝒊,𝒕∗  & 𝑪𝑭𝒊,𝒕∗         
All firms Post>Pre 309 2472 2472 –0.6025*** –0.6479*** –0.0454*** 
Poorly performing firms Post>Pre 40 320 320 –0.6215*** –0.6539*** –0.0324*** 
Strongly performing firms Post>Pre 269 2152 2152 –0.6028*** –0.6479*** –0.0452*** 
Firms' AZ<1.2 Post>Pre 30 240 240 –0.6250*** –0.6551*** –0.0302*** 
Firms' AZ>1.2 Post>Pre 279 2232 2232 –0.6026*** –0.6480*** –0.0454*** 
Xlist firms Post>Pre 57 456 456 –0.6211*** –0.6512*** –0.0300*** 
Non–Xlist firms Post>Pre 252 2016 2016 –0.6017*** –0.6481*** –0.0464*** 
Small positive NI (𝑺𝑷𝑶𝑺𝒊,𝒕)        
All firms – 309 2472 2472  0.02  
Poorly performing firms – 40 320 320  0.0787  
Strongly performing firms – 269 2152 2152  0.0141  
Firms' AZ<1.2 – 30 240 240  0.0419  
Firms' AZ>1.2 – 279 2232 2232  0.0193  
Xlist firms – 57 456 456  –0.0406  
Non–Xlist firms – 252 2016 2016  0.0301  
Timely loss recognition - large negative NI (𝑳𝑵𝑬𝑮𝒊,𝒕) 
All firms  + 309 2472 2472  0.0129  
Poorly performing firms  + 40 320 320  0.2333  
Strongly performing firms  + 269 2152 2152  0.0182  
Firms' AZ<1.2  + 30 240 240  0.1500  
Firms' AZ>1.2  + 279 2232 2232  –0.0592  
Xlist firms  + 57 456 456  –0.0409  
Non–Xlist firms  + 252 2016 2016   0.0026   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, two-tailed test. 
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The first set of findings regarding the variability of ∆𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡∗  is inconsistent with the 
prediction. That is, the changes in net income for all Latin American firms are 
significantly lower in the post-adoption period than in the pre-adoption period at the 1% 
level. This result is similar to the subsample groups. This finding suggests that firms may 
smooth earnings more in the post-adoption period; i.e. by allocating write-offs in 
subsequent periods via accruals. 
The second set of findings shows that the variability of ∆𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡∗  over ∆𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡∗  is 
significantly higher for all firms in the post-adoption period than in the pre-adoption 
period at the 1% level. Similar results are found for the subsample groups, except for the 
poorly performing firms. It is worth noting that firms with good performance, low 
bankruptcy possibility, and Xlist firms present a higher variability of ∆𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡∗  over ∆𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡∗  
in comparison with their counterparties. The result for Xlist firms is inconsistent. These 
firms should not present an increase in their accounting quality because they already adopt 
high-quality financial standards. The results for the other groups are consistent with the 
prediction that IFRS increases the accounting quality of Latin American firms. Moreover, 
for poorly performing firms, this finding may be lower in the post-adoption period 
because managers may be smoothing earnings via accruals. Overall, the results from the 
second finding contradict the first finding. This can be explained because although the 
∆𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡 is lower in the post adoption period, the ∆𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 is lower in the post-adoption period 
(the mean is 0.000) in comparison to the pre-adoption period (the mean is 0.001). Thus, 
this ratio is higher in the post-adoption period. It is worth noting that the difference is 
minor, and therefore the results of the first and second metrics are not significant two 
distinguish between the two periods. 
The result of the correlation between accruals (𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡∗ ) and cash flow (𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡∗ ) show 
that, the result of all firms is more negative after the IFRS adoption; the results of the 
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subsample groups remain similar. These set of findings are consistent with the first one 
that suggests companies may smooth earnings more in the post-adoption than in the pre-
adoption. Furthermore, coherent with the hypotheses, the correlations of the accruals and 
cash flow are less negative for strongly performing firms, firms with low bankruptcy 
possibility and Xlist firms than those for their counterparties. This indicates that these 
firms smoothed their earnings to a lesser degree than their counterparties in the post-
adoption period.  
The fourth set of findings does not show that firms recognise more events of small 
positive net income in the post-adoption period than in the pre-adoption period. The 
coefficient of 𝑆𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is insignificant for the common sample. The results of subsample 
groups remain similar. There is no evidence to support that firms recognise fewer small 
positive net income events in the post-adoption period than in the pre-adoption period. 
For the result of timely loss recognition – large negative, the coefficients 
(𝐿𝑁𝐸𝐺𝑖,𝑡) of the common sample and of the subsample groups for all the groups of firms 
are statistically insignificant. This suggests that there is not a significant change in the 
firms’ behaviour of timely loss recognition in the post-adoption period.  
In summary, the results of these four earnings management metrics and the timely 
recognition metric are not sufficient to conclude that there is any improvement in 
accounting quality in the post-adoption period. The limitation of these metrics is that they 
are based on one current quarter only. However, the fact is that firms may undertake 
earnings smoothing and delay the recognition of good or bad news besides recognising 
them in the current period. This phenomenon is not captured by the earnings management 
metrics of Barth et al. (2008). Therefore, based on the thesis of Ball et al. (2003) and the 
work of Pope and Walker (1999) and Mak et al. (2011), this thesis develops further the 
Basu’s (1997) model introducing independent lagged variables in order to capture the 
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delay in recognising good or bad news. According to Ball et al. (2003), for firms in Latin 
American countries, the mandatory adoption of IFRS may reduce the delay in recognising 
good or bad news. The following section discusses the results of this analysis. 
 
4.7.2 Timely recognition of losses through Basu’s (1997) approach 
Table 7  reports the results of the timely loss recognition derived by Basu’s (1997) 
model and the extended version with independent lagged variables. Table 7 contains four 
panels that illustrate the results based on all firms and on three subsample groups. They 
are: Panel A reports the results for all firms; Panel B presents the results of good and poor 
operating performance firms; Panel C displays those of firms with high and low 
bankruptcy possibility; and Panel D reports the results of firms that list or not list on U.S. 















Table 7. Timely loss recognition16 
Panel A. All firms 
𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑃𝑖,𝑡










 All All 
 Pre Post Diff Pre Post Diff 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 0.0641** 0.0730** 0.0089 –0.0530 0.1200** 0.173 
 (2.01) (2.12)  (–0.32) (2.59)  
𝐷𝑖,𝑡𝑅𝑖,𝑡 –0.1141 –0.0226 0.0915 0.1782 –0.0682 –0.2464 
 (–1.11) (–0.42)  (0.57) (–0.56)  
𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1    0.0305 –0.1504 –0.1809 
    (0.58) (–0.77)  
𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1    0.1565 0.2650 0.1085 
    (1.19) (1.00)  
𝑅𝑖,𝑡−2    0.0910 –0.1247 –0.2157* 
    (1.19) (–1.26)  
𝐷𝑖,𝑡−2𝑅𝑖,𝑡−2    0.0229 0.4987** 0.4758** 
    (0.19) (2.10)  
𝑅𝑖,𝑡−3    –0.0863 –0.2091 –0.1228 
    (–0.72) (–1.00)  
𝐷𝑖,𝑡−3𝑅𝑖,𝑡−3    0.2504** 0.5928 0.3424 
    (1.97) (1.30)  
𝑅𝑖,𝑡−4    –0.0452 –0.0120 0.0332 
    (–0.30) (–0.07)  
𝐷𝑖,𝑡−4𝑅𝑖,𝑡−4    0.5560 0.4426 –0.1134 
    (1.47) (0.87)  
𝑅𝑖,𝑡−5    0.2102 0.0207 –0.1895 
    (1.33) (0.41)  
𝐷𝑖,𝑡−5𝑅𝑖,𝑡−5    0.1605 0.0397 –0.1208 
    (0.64) (0.55)  
𝑅𝑖,𝑡−6    –0.0206 0.3020 0.3226 
    (–0.09) (1.15)  
𝐷𝑖,𝑡−6𝑅𝑖,𝑡−6    0.3383 –0.3241 –0.6624 
    (1.34) (–0.99)  
𝑅𝑖,𝑡−7    –0.1074 0.1972 0.3046 
    (–0.80) (1.12)  
𝐷𝑖,𝑡−7𝑅𝑖,𝑡−7    0.6092*** –0.2500 –0.8592*** 
    (2.64) (–1.25)  
Cons –0.0160 –0.0095  0.1257 0.0311  
 (–1.56) (–1.60)  (1.16) (0.36)  
Observations 2472 2472  2281 2472  
Adj. R2 –0.000 0.001  0.053 0.054  
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The first three columns of Panel A report the results of equation 8; these results 
do not show any significant difference in the good (bad) news coefficients “𝑅𝑖,𝑡” (𝐷𝑖,𝑡𝑅𝑖,𝑡) 
between the pre- and post-adoption period. Thus, there is no difference in the behaviour 
                                                 
16 The dummies 𝐷𝑖,𝑡, 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−2,𝐷𝑖,𝑡−3, 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−4, 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−5, 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−6, 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−7 are not presented in the table (but 
included in the regressions) due to easiness of exposition as they are not the focus on this analysis. “All 
firms” refers to the 309 firms from the common size sample. It is worth noting that the delay in recognising 
bad news could go beyond the 7th quarter, however this is a limitation of the data. 
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of timely recognition of losses between the two periods. Moreover, the coefficients of 
good news “𝑅𝑖,𝑡” are significantly positive in both periods. This indicates that firms 
recognise good news in the current quarter when they experience good news, but do not 
recognise bad news on a timely manner. This behaviour is predicted by Ball et al. (2003) 
in developing countries, as firms may defer the recognition of bad news. Regarding this 
evidence, this model does not consider firms’ delay in recognising good or bad news. 
Hence, equation 9 includes lagged variables to track the earnings management and timely 
recognition of losses behaviour in earlier quarters. These results are presented in the last 
three columns.     
The results show that the coefficients of bad news (𝐷𝑖,𝑡−3𝑅𝑖,𝑡−3 and 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−7𝑅𝑖,𝑡−7) 
are positive, and significant at 1% in the pre-adoption period only, and that  
𝐷𝑖,𝑡𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is insignificant. This implies that firms defer the recognition of bad news in 
earnings to the third and to the seventh quarter. In contrast, the bad news coefficient 
(𝐷𝑖,𝑡−2𝑅𝑖,𝑡−2) and the good news coefficient (𝑅𝑖,𝑡) are significantly positive at 5% after 
the IFRS adoption; however, the coefficients of 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−3𝑅𝑖,𝑡−3 and 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−7𝑅𝑖,𝑡−7 are no longer 
significant in the post-adoption period. The difference between the coefficients 
𝐷𝑖,𝑡−2𝑅𝑖,𝑡−2 and 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−7𝑅𝑖,𝑡−7 across periods is significantly positive at 5% and 1%, 
respectively. This indicates that the delay in recognising news is reduced from up to seven 
quarters to up to two quarters. Therefore, this is evidence of improvement in the timely 
recognition of losses.  
 
4.7.2.1 Effect of operating performance on timely loss recognition 
The results from equation 9 for poorly and strongly performing firms are 




Table 7. Timely loss recognition17 
Panel B. Effects of operating performance. 
𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑃𝑖,𝑡










 Poor performance firms Good performance firms 
 Pre Post Diff Pre Post Diff 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 –0.7269** 0.1585 0.8854** 0.1114 0.1229*** 0.0115 
 (–2.41) (0.66)  (1.17) (3.24)  
𝐷𝑖,𝑡𝑅𝑖,𝑡 1.0735** –0.3481 –1.4216 –0.0033 –0.0180 –0.0147 
 (2.25) (–0.56)  (–0.01) (–0.29)  
𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 –0.3028* –1.0923 –0.7895* –0.0047 0.0578 0.0625 
 (–1.79) (–1.58)  (–0.08) (0.86)  
𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 0.6476** 1.8804 1.2328 0.1564 –0.0686 –0.225 
 (2.70) (1.87)  (1.05) (–0.73)  
𝑅𝑖,𝑡−2 –0.4273** –0.4305** –0.0032 0.1340* –0.0140 –0.148* 
 (–2.41) (–2.68)  (1.71) (–0.53)  
𝐷𝑖,𝑡−2𝑅𝑖,𝑡−2 0.5618*** 1.2531 0.6913 –0.0328 0.1821** 0.2149 
 (2.75) (1.84)  (–0.25) (2.47)  
𝑅𝑖,𝑡−3 –0.2170 –0.5693 –0.3523 –0.0966 0.0156 0.1122 
 (–0.79) (–1.33)  (–0.75) (0.47)  
𝐷𝑖,𝑡−3𝑅𝑖,𝑡−3 0.5039 2.1092 1.6053** 0.2674** 0.0803 –0.1871 
 (1.32) (1.62)  (2.17) (1.11)  
𝑅𝑖,𝑡−4 0.1137 –0.8105 –0.9242 –0.0936 0.1330*** 0.2266 
 (1.11) (–1.01)  (–0.58) (2.95)  
𝐷𝑖,𝑡−4𝑅𝑖,𝑡−4 0.2797 3.0371 2.7574 0.5980 –0.0697 –0.6677 
 (1.35) (1.35)  (1.51) (–1.24)  
𝑅𝑖,𝑡−5 0.2235* –0.4921 –0.7156 0.2067 0.0455 –0.1612 
 (1.90) (–0.97)  (1.16) (1.20)  
𝐷𝑖,𝑡−5𝑅𝑖,𝑡−5 0.3920** 1.1391 0.7471 0.1064 0.0059 –0.1005 
 (2.15) (1.26)  (0.36) (0.09)  
𝑅𝑖,𝑡−6 0.4814** 1.6881* 1.2067 –0.0855 0.0177 0.1032 
 (2.07) (1.90)  (–0.34) (0.79)  
𝐷𝑖,𝑡−6𝑅𝑖,𝑡−6 –0.2730 –1.1986 –0.9256 0.3971 –0.0181 –0.4152 
 (–1.03) (–1.57)  (1.49) (–0.23)  
𝑅𝑖,𝑡−7 0.4633** 1.2366 0.7733 –0.1597 0.0032 0.1629 
 (2.05) (1.66)  (–1.06) (0.13)  
𝐷𝑖,𝑡−7𝑅𝑖,𝑡−7 –0.0718 –1.3858 –1.314 0.6380** –0.0351 –0.6731** 
 (–0.24) (–1.60)  (2.46) (–0.41)  
Cons 0.2463 0.5962  0.1292 –0.0455  
 (1.55) (1.11)  (1.16) (–0.79)  
Observations 306 320  1975 2152  
Adj. R2 0.307 0.326  0.071 0.059  
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The bad news coefficients (𝐷𝑖,𝑡𝑅𝑖,𝑡, 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−2𝑅𝑖,𝑡−2, and 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−5𝑅𝑖,𝑡−5) of 
poorly performing firms are significantly positive in the pre-adoption period. Moreover, 
                                                 
17 The dummies 𝐷𝑖,𝑡, 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−2,𝐷𝑖,𝑡−3, 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−4, 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−5, 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−6, 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−7 are not presented in the table (but 
included in the regressions) due to easiness of exposition as they are not the focus on this analysis. It is 
worth noting that the delay in recognising bad news could go beyond the 7 th quarter, however this is a 




the good news coefficients (𝑅𝑖,𝑡, 𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1, and 𝑅𝑖,𝑡−2) are negative and significant at 5%, 
and 𝑅𝑖,𝑡−6 and 𝑅𝑖,𝑡−7 are positive and significant at 5%. This implies that these firms may 
allocate the recognition of bad and good news in prior quarters alongside news in the 
current quarter. This behaviour might assist to smooth earnings in order to reduce its 
variability. In the post-adoption period, the good news coefficient 𝑅𝑖,𝑡−2 is negative and 
significant at 5% whereas the coefficient 𝑅𝑖,𝑡−6 is positive at 5% level. The latter suggests 
that firms defer the recognition of losses when they experience good news in the sixth 
previous quarter. The bad news coefficients (𝐷𝑖,𝑡𝑅𝑖,𝑡, 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−2𝑅𝑖,𝑡−2, and 
𝐷𝑖,𝑡−5𝑅𝑖,𝑡−5) are no longer significant in the post-adoption period. Therefore, there is no 
significant improvement in timely recognition of losses or earnings management for the 
poorly performing firms.   
The bad news coefficients (𝐷𝑖,𝑡−3𝑅𝑖,𝑡−3 and 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−7𝑅𝑖,𝑡−7) of strongly performing 
firms are significantly positive at 5%, while the good news coefficient 𝑅𝑖,𝑡−2 is 
significantly positive at 10% in the pre-adoption period. This suggests that firms delay 
recognition of bad news to the third and to the seventh previous quarter and may choose 
to write off losses when they experience good news in previous two quarters. In the post-
adoption period, the good news coefficients 𝑅𝑖,𝑡, 𝑅𝑖,𝑡−4 and the bad news coefficient 
𝐷𝑖,𝑡−2𝑅𝑖,𝑡−2 are significantly positive at 1% and 5%. It is worth noting that the bad news 
coefficients 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−3𝑅𝑖,𝑡−3 and 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−7𝑅𝑖,𝑡−7 are no longer significant, and this difference 
between these coefficients in the pre- and post-adoption periods is statistically significant. 
This implies that the delay in recognizing bad news is significantly reduced in the post-




4.7.2.2 Effects of probability of bankruptcy on timely loss recognition 
Table 7. Timely loss recognition18 
Panel C. Effects of probability of bankruptcy 
𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑃𝑖,𝑡










 Firms’ AZ<1.2 Firms’ AZ>1.2 
 Pre Post Diff Pre Post Diff 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 –1.0166*** 0.0441 1.0607** 0.1750** 0.1040*** –0.071 
 (–4.00) (0.12)  (2.10) (2.85)  
𝐷𝑖,𝑡𝑅𝑖,𝑡 1.1778** –0.6812 –1.859** –0.2069 0.0169 0.2238 
 (2.63) (–0.78)  (–0.73) (0.26)  
𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 –0.2250 –1.465* –1.2401** 0.0391 0.0512 0.0121 
 (–0.88) (–1.87)  (0.84) (0.85)  
𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 0.5850** 1.2993 0.7143 0.0179 –0.0328 –0.0507 
 (2.32) (1.61)  (0.23) (–0.45)  
𝑅𝑖,𝑡−2 –0.5524 –0.9480*** –0.3956 0.1032 –0.0064 –0.1096 
 (–1.55) (–3.51)  (1.54) (–0.25)  
𝐷𝑖,𝑡−2𝑅𝑖,𝑡−2 0.8448* 0.9958* 0.151 –0.0512 0.2147*** 0.2659* 
 (1.81) (1.72)  (–0.46) (2.91)  
𝑅𝑖,𝑡−3 –0.8251** –1.0521* –0.227 –0.0728 0.0145 0.0873 
 (–2.24) (–1.90)  (–0.62) (0.49)  
𝐷𝑖,𝑡−3𝑅𝑖,𝑡−3 0.7630* 2.4692** 1.7062* 0.1417 0.0841 –0.0576 
 (1.77) (2.02)  (1.41) (1.14)  
𝑅𝑖,𝑡−4 –0.0676 –1.2321 –1.1645 –0.0608 0.1409*** 0.2017 
 (–0.25) (–1.23)  (–0.34) (3.11)  
𝐷𝑖,𝑡−4𝑅𝑖,𝑡−4 1.9483* 3.0678 1.1195 0.0981 –0.0872 –0.1853 
 (1.89) (1.43)  (0.37) (–1.71)  
𝑅𝑖,𝑡−5 0.9549* –0.6567 –1.6116 –0.0118 0.0582 0.07 
 (2.03) (–1.00)  (–0.13) (1.53)  
𝐷𝑖,𝑡−5𝑅𝑖,𝑡−5 –0.1995 1.9453 2.1448 0.1568 –0.0056 –0.1624 
 (–0.25) (1.40)  (1.47) (–0.09)  
𝑅𝑖,𝑡−6 –0.6587 2.0116** 2.6703* –0.0173 0.0026 0.0199 
 (–0.95) (2.50)  (–0.11) (0.12)  
𝐷𝑖,𝑡−6𝑅𝑖,𝑡−6 1.1293* –1.3593** –2.4886* 0.1330 0.0352 –0.0978 
 (1.81) (–2.24)  (0.63) (0.53)  
𝑅𝑖,𝑡−7 –0.4820 1.5373** 2.0193** 0.0202 0.0058 –0.0144 
 (–0.87) (1.97)  (0.28) (0.25)  
𝐷𝑖,𝑡−7𝑅𝑖,𝑡−7 1.3429** –0.9640* –2.3069** 0.1944*** –0.0238 –0.2182** 
 (2.05) (–1.89)  (3.73) (–0.33)  
Cons 0.8105** 0.8977  0.0485 –0.0391  
 (2.72) (1.28)  (0.42) (–0.71)  
Observations 236 240  2045 2232  
Adj. R2 0.481 0.399  0.022 0.064  
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
                                                 
18 The dummies 𝐷𝑖,𝑡, 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−2,𝐷𝑖,𝑡−3, 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−4, 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−5, 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−6, 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−7 are not presented in the table (but 
included in the regressions) due to easiness of exposition as they are not the focus on this analysis. It is 
worth noting that the delay in recognising bad news could go beyond the 7th quarter, however this is a 
limitation of the data. 
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The bad news coefficients of firms with high bankruptcy risk (AZ<1.2) are 
significantly positive at 5% and 10%, except for 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−5𝑅𝑖,𝑡−5, in the pre-adoption period. 
This illustrates that these firms spread the recognition of bad news through the current 
quarter up to seven prior quarters. The same trend occurs through the recognition of good 
news as the coefficients 𝑅𝑖,𝑡, 𝑅𝑖,𝑡−4 and 𝑅𝑖,𝑡−6 are significantly negative at 1%, 5%, and 
10% respectively. This implies that these firms recognize news in different quarters in 
order to smooth earnings. In the post-adoption period, the bad news coefficients 
𝐷𝑖,𝑡−2𝑅𝑖,𝑡−2 and 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−3𝑅𝑖,𝑡−3 are significantly positive at 10% and 5%, whereas 
𝐷𝑖,𝑡−6𝑅𝑖,𝑡−6 and 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−7𝑅𝑖,𝑡−7 are significantly negative, at 5% and 10% respectively. This 
indicates that firms may inflate earnings when experiencing bad news in the sixth and in 
the seventh preceding quarter, and also recognise bad news in earlier two and three 
quarters. These results indicate that the timely recognition of losses has not improved in 
the post-adoption period. Thus, managers decide to recognise news according to their 
needs in order to signal better performance to the market. This is consistent because these 
firms need to meet the requirements of debt covenants, target debt holders, and 
shareholders. Hence, the manager may use his discretionary ability in order to attend these 
expectations. 
For firms with a low probability of bankruptcy, the bad news coefficient 
𝐷𝑖,𝑡−7𝑅𝑖,𝑡−7 is significantly positive at 1%. The delay in recognition of bad news is 
significantly reduced from the previous seventh quarter to the previous second quarter in 
the post-adoption period. The difference between 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−2𝑅𝑖,𝑡−2 (𝐷𝑖,𝑡−7𝑅𝑖,𝑡−7) in the post- 
and pre-adoption period is statistically significant at 10% (5%). Therefore, this result 
suggests a significant improvement in the recognition of bad news in the post-adoption 




4.7.2.3 Effects of listing on U.S. stock exchanges  
Table 7. Timely loss recognition (cont.)19 
Panel D. Effects of listing on U.S. stock exchanges 
𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑃𝑖,𝑡










 Xlist firms Non–Xlist firms 
 Pre Post Diff Pre Post Diff 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 0.0220 0.0567 0.0347 –0.0630 0.1332** 0.1962 
 (0.29) (0.80)  (–0.33) (2.29)  
𝐷𝑖,𝑡𝑅𝑖,𝑡 0.0035 0.1175 0.114 0.1788 –0.0945 –0.2733 
 (0.02) (0.72)  (0.50) (–0.66)  
𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 0.1666** –0.0750 –0.2416** –0.0131 –0.1592 –0.1461 
 (1.97) (–0.78)  (–0.22) (–0.75)  
𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 –0.2481* 0.2044 0.4525*** 0.2264 0.2699 0.0435 
 (–1.77) (1.59)  (1.49) (0.91)  
𝑅𝑖,𝑡−2 0.0404 0.0667** 0.0263 0.1129 –0.1403 –0.2532* 
 (0.90) (2.17)  (1.37) (–1.39)  
𝐷𝑖,𝑡−2𝑅𝑖,𝑡−2 –0.0265 0.0074 0.0339 0.0034 0.5553** 0.5519** 
 (–0.40) (0.10)  (0.02) (2.17)  
𝑅𝑖,𝑡−3 0.0435 0.0944* 0.0509 –0.1026 –0.2489 –0.1463 
 (0.84) (1.84)  (–0.71) (–1.09)  
𝐷𝑖,𝑡−3𝑅𝑖,𝑡−3 –0.1464 –0.1610* –0.0146 0.3138** 0.6972 0.3834 
 (–1.02) (–1.85)  (2.13) (1.37)  
𝑅𝑖,𝑡−4 0.1611 0.1487 –0.0124 –0.0829 –0.0348 0.0481 
 (1.52) (1.57)  (–0.49) (–0.18)  
𝐷𝑖,𝑡−4𝑅𝑖,𝑡−4 –0.5004*** –0.2158* 0.2846 0.7168 0.5294 –0.1874 
 (–2.77) (–1.86)  (1.75) (0.93)  
𝑅𝑖,𝑡−5 0.0382 0.0704 0.0322 0.2506 0.0278 –0.2228 
 (0.33) (1.51)  (1.33) (0.54)  
𝐷𝑖,𝑡−5𝑅𝑖,𝑡−5 –0.1675 –0.0032 0.1643 0.1928 –0.0041 –0.1969 
 (–0.80) (–0.02)  (0.67) (–0.05)  
𝑅𝑖,𝑡−6 0.0585 –0.0448 –0.1033 –0.0336 0.3396 0.3732 
 (0.72) (–1.08)  (–0.13) (1.17)  
𝐷𝑖,𝑡−6𝑅𝑖,𝑡−6 –0.1194 0.0416 0.161 0.4276 –0.3997 –0.8273 
 (–0.75) (0.51)  (1.49) (–1.02)  
𝑅𝑖,𝑡−7 0.0539 0.0283 –0.0256 –0.1227 0.2151 0.3378 
 (0.52) (0.62)  (–0.75) (1.14)  
𝐷𝑖,𝑡−7𝑅𝑖,𝑡−7 0.0222 –0.1829 –0.2051 0.6765** –0.2567 –0.9332 
 (0.33) (–1.06)  (2.58) (–1.12)  
cons –0.1592 –0.0589  0.1627 0.0383  
 (–1.69) (–1.13)  (1.33) (0.42)  
Observations 456 456  1825 2016  
Adj. R2 0.039 0.065  0.070 0.061  
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The results for Xlist firms are inconsistent. In the pre-adoption period, the bad 
                                                 
19 The dummies 𝐷𝑖,𝑡, 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−2,𝐷𝑖,𝑡−3, 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−4, 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−5, 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−6, 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−7 are not presented in the table (but 
included in the regressions) due to easiness of exposition as they are not the focus on this analysis. It is 
worth noting that the delay in recognising bad news could go beyond the 7th quarter, however this is a 
limitation of the data. 
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news coefficients 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 and 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−4𝑅𝑖,𝑡−4 are significantly negative at 10% and 1% 
respectively. In addition, the good news coefficient 𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 is significantly positive at 5%. 
These results indicate that firms choose to inflate earnings (write off losses) when they 
experience good (bad) news in the first previous quarter and in the fourth previous quarter. 
This behaviour continues throughout the post-adoption period. The bad news coefficients 
𝐷𝑖,𝑡−3𝑅𝑖,𝑡−3 and 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−4𝑅𝑖,𝑡−4 are significantly negative at 10%, and the good news 
coefficients 𝑅𝑖,𝑡−2 and 𝑅𝑖,𝑡−3 are significantly positive at 5% and 10%. Therefore, these 
firms do not improve the timely loss recognition and earnings management practices in 
the post-adoption period.  
For Non-Xlist firms, the bad news coefficients 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−3𝑅𝑖,𝑡−3 and 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−7𝑅𝑖,𝑡−7  are 
positive and significant at 5% in the pre-adoption period. These results indicate that these 
firms recognise bad news with a delay of up to seven quarters. In the post-adoption period, 
this delay is significantly reduced as these coefficients are no longer significant, and 
𝐷𝑖,𝑡−2𝑅𝑖,𝑡−2  is positive and significant at 5%. Nevertheless, the positive and significant 
coefficient of 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 indicates that firms inflate earnings when they experience good news 
in the current quarter. Thus, these results suggest that the timely recognition of losses is 
improved; however, these firms still undertake earnings management after the IFRS 
adoption. 
In summary, poorly performing firms, firms with a high bankruptcy probability, 
and Xlist firms do not show an improvement in the recognition of losses after the IFRS 
adoption. On the other hand, firms with good performance, low bankruptcy probability, 
and Non-Xlist firms show an improvement in the delay of recognizing bad news after the 




4.7.3 Value relevance 
 The aim of this section is to investigate whether the accounting numbers are more 
value relevant in the post-IFRS period. Table 8 reports four different panels following the 
same fashion as table 7. Panel A presents the first set of results. 
 
Table 8. Value relevance 
Panel A. All firms  
𝑃𝑖,𝑡+2







 All All 
 Pre Post Diff Pre Post Diff 
𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 –0.0058 0.0457 0.515* –0.0131 0.0508 0.0639 
 (–1.05) (0.99)  (–1.12) (1.23)  
𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 0.0395 0.4038* 0.3643** 0.1437** 0.6993*** 0.5556*** 
 (0.84) (1.85)  (2.27) (2.76)  
𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1    –0.0196** 0.0117 0.0313 
    (–2.58) (0.33)  
𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−2    –0.0066 –0.0513 –0.0447 
    (–0.62) (–1.43)  
𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−3    0.0060 0.0075 0.0015 
    (0.66) (0.16)  
𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−4    0.0115 0.0126** 0.0011 
    (1.01) (1.99)  
𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−5    0.0097 0.0034 –0.0063 
    (1.23) (0.43)  
𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−6    0.0106 –0.0074 –0.018** 
    (1.62) (–0.98)  
𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−7    –0.0060 0.0014 0.0074 
    (–1.15) (0.24)  
𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1    –0.0784 0.0288 0.1072 
    (–1.50) (0.19)  
𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−2    0.1095* –0.1127 –0.2222 
    (1.88) (–1.20)  
𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−3    0.0667 0.4678*** 0.4011** 
    (0.88) (3.02)  
𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−4    –0.1931 –0.0596 0.1335 
    (–1.48) (–0.29)  
𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−5    –0.1802** –0.0288 0.1514 
    (–2.39) (–0.28)  
𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−6    –0.0503 0.1383** 0.1886 
    (–1.39) (2.20)  
𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−7    0.0610** 0.1525  
    (2.26) (0.86) 0.0915 
Cons 0.0238 –0.3406  0.0569 –0.5594*  
 (0.77) (–1.60)  (0.59) (–1.71)  
Observations 2472 2472  2426 2472  
Adj. R2 0.001 0.028  0.046 0.042  
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 




The first three columns report the results of equation 11, which show that there is 
an improvement in the value relevance of 𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡. The coefficient is not significant in the 
pre-adoption period; however, it is significant at 10% in the post-adoption period. The 
difference between these coefficients is 0.3643, and it is significant at 5% level. 
Moreover, the adjusted R2 increases from 0.1% to 2.8%. Although the significance of the 
earnings coefficient in the post-adoption period is weak, the joint results indicate that 
earnings are more value relevant after the adoption of IFRS.  
The other three columns report the results from the value relevance model that 
includes lagged earnings and book value per share. None of the  
𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 coefficients are statistically significant in the pre-adoption period. Nevertheless, 
in the post-adoption period, 𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−4 is statistically significant, which indicates that 
investors rely on the book value of the last year for investment decisions. This is 
consistent with the legislation that requires companies to prepare the financial statements 
of last year in accordance with IFRS. In comparison with the two periods, the coefficient 
of 𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 increases from 0.1437 to 0.6993 significant at 5% and 1%, respectively. This 
implies that investors rely more on the current earnings figures after the IFRS adoption. 
The coefficients of 𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−3 and 𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−6 are significant in the post-adoption period, 
which indicate that investors refer to the republished net income figures in accordance 
with IFRS. Nonetheless, there is a slight decrease in the adjusted R2 in the post-adoption 
period; it decreases from 4.6% to 4.2%. This can be explained due to the number of 
significant variables in both periods. In the pre-adoption period, there are five significant 
coefficients, whereas there are only four significant coefficients for the post-adoption 
period. Recall that the adjusted R2 includes a penalty for each additional variable; 
therefore, if the additional variables are not significant, the adjusted R2 will decrease. It 
is worth noting that, during the pre-adoption period, the coefficients for 𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 and 
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𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−5 are significantly negative at 5%. These non-expected results may be attributed 
to multicollinearity among the variables (Wooldridge, 2010). Although the variables are 
not perfectly collinear, the collinearity among them can interfere in the significance of 
the results. For instance, in the pre-adoption period, other variables such as 𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−2 and 
𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−7 are significant, and incorporate explanatory power from other correlated 
variables, which in turn can exhibit a non-predictable coefficient20. Overall, the results 
indicate an improvement in the value relevance of accounting figures. In the post-
adoption period, investors rely more on earnings and on the book value of last year. Panel 
B illustrates the effect of firms’ operating performance on the value relevance analysis. 
 
                                                 
20 Untabulated results from Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) indicates that the multicollinearity exists but 




4.7.3.1 Effect of firms’ operating performance on value relevance 
Table 8. Value relevance 
Panel B. Effect of firms’ operating performance 
𝑃𝑖,𝑡+2







 Poorly performing firms Strongly performing firms 
 Pre Post Diff Pre Post Diff 
𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 0.1120 –0.4466* –0.5586 0.0056 0.0517 0.0461 
 (0.33) (–1.73)  (0.64) (1.23)  
𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 0.7557* 0.2773** –0.4784 0.1028** 0.7099*** 0.6071*** 
 (1.80) (2.17)  (2.04) (2.70)  
𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 0.1313 –0.4298*** –0.5611 –0.0082* 0.0170 0.0252 
 (0.37) (–3.20)  (–1.89) (0.46)  
𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−2 –0.3538 –0.3225* 0.0313 –0.0116* –0.0518 –0.0402 
 (–0.94) (–1.92)  (–1.79) (–1.43)  
𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−3 0.5633 0.4579 –0.1054 0.0003 0.0096 0.0093 
 (0.92) (0.92)  (0.08) (0.20)  
𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−4 0.4787 –0.2033 –0.682 –0.0021 0.0128* 0.0149* 
 (1.48) (–0.39)  (–0.32) (1.95)  
𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−5 –0.2456 –0.6011 –0.3555 0.0009 0.0040 0.0031 
 (–0.88) (–1.24)  (0.15) (0.53)  
𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−6 –0.2043 –0.4503 –0.246 0.0042 –0.0072 –0.0114 
 (–0.69) (–1.23)  (0.78) (–0.95)  
𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−7 0.1465 –0.6121 –0.7586 0.0008 0.0016 0.0008 
 (0.51) (–0.97)  (0.15) (0.28)  
𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 0.1598 0.7643 0.6045 –0.0549 0.0121 0.067 
 (0.24) (1.29)  (–1.31) (0.08)  
𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−2 0.5270 –0.4235 –0.9505 0.0926** –0.1070 –0.1996 
 (0.81) (–0.85)  (2.20) (–1.11)  
𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−3 –0.1414 0.5703 0.7117 0.1481** 0.4662*** 0.3181* 
 (–0.24) (0.94)  (2.56) (2.94)  
𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−4 –0.8185*** 0.2199 1.0384 0.0355 –0.0704 –0.1059 
 (–11.05) (0.39)  (0.62) (–0.33)  
𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−5 0.1464* –0.2899 –0.4363 –0.0141 –0.0192 –0.0051 
 (1.94) (–0.36)  (–0.32) (–0.18)  
𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−6 –0.2891*** 0.9343* 1.2234** –0.0155 0.1315** 0.147 
 (–4.87) (1.94)  (–0.33) (2.02)  
𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−7 0.1838*** 0.2575 0.0737 0.0445 0.1523 0.1078 
 (4.53) (0.52)  (1.10) (0.83)  
Cons 0.1248 2.4833  –0.1730*** –0.5820  
 (0.35) (1.34)  (–2.67) (–1.53)  
Observations 316 320  2110 2152  
Adj. R2 0.463 0.164  0.006 0.044  
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 The poorly performing firms present a decrease in the value relevance of net 
income figures, except for the coefficient of 𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−6, which increases between the 
periods, and the difference is significant. The other comparable net income coefficients 
are not significant during the post-adoption period. It is worth noting that similar to the 
past analysis, the significant negative coefficients of 𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−4 and 𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−6 can be 
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explained due to collinearity with 𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−5 and 𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−7. The coefficients of book 
value figures do not present any improvement across the two periods. Moreover, the 
adjusted R2 decreases from 46.3% to 16.4%. In summary, these firms do not show any 
sign of improvement in the value relevance of accounting numbers. 
 The analysis of the strongly performing firms is similar to all firms. The 
coefficient (significance) of 𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 increases across the periods from 0.1028 (5%) to 
0.7099 (1%), and the difference between these coefficients is significant at 5%. In 
addition, the coefficients of 𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−4, 𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−3, and 𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−6 increased in the post-
adoption period. Finally, the adjusted R2 increases from 0.6% to 4.4% across these 
periods. Thus, there is evidence of an improvement in the value relevance of accounting 












4.7.3.2 Effect of bankruptcy possibility on value relevance 
Table 8. Value relevance 
Panel C. Effect of bankruptcy possibility  
𝑃𝑖,𝑡+2







 Firms’ AZ<1.2 Firms’ AZ>1.2 
 Pre Post Diff Pre Post Diff 
𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 –0.0589* 0.0329 0.0918 0.0104 0.0515 0.0411 
 (–1.69) (0.28)  (1.14) (1.19)  
𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 0.6171** 0.1948 –0.4223 0.1032* 0.7213*** 0.6181*** 
 (2.30) (1.13)  (1.95) (2.66)  
𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 –0.0157 –0.1369 –0.1212 –0.0075 0.0181 0.0256 
 (–0.68) (–1.15)  (–1.61) (0.49)  
𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−2 0.0835*** 0.1725 0.089 –0.0123* –0.0610 –0.0487 
 (3.12) (1.11)  (–1.86) (–1.55)  
𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−3 –0.0065 0.0970 0.1035 –0.0004 0.0085 0.0089 
 (–0.04) (0.53)  (–0.09) (0.17)  
𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−4 0.2709** –0.0507 –0.3216* –0.0027 0.0139** 0.0166* 
 (2.16) (–0.77)  (–0.42) (1.99)  
𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−5 –0.1451 –0.0714** 0.0737 –0.0007 0.0042 0.0049 
 (–0.73) (–2.26)  (–0.11) (0.55)  
𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−6 –0.0408 –0.0010 0.0398 0.0034 –0.0069 –0.0103 
 (–0.57) (–0.03)  (0.60) (–0.87)  
𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−7 –0.0189 –0.0198 –0.0009 0.0021 0.0013 –0.0008 
 (–0.44) (–0.38)  (0.35) (0.21)  
𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 –0.0422 0.1719 0.2141 –0.0413 0.0226 0.0639 
 (–0.23) (0.45)  (–1.00) (0.14)  
𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−2 0.1754 –0.3804 –0.5558 0.0993** –0.1224 –0.2217 
 (0.76) (–0.87)  (2.28) (–1.28)  
𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−3 –0.1686 0.1058 0.2744 0.1617*** 0.4778*** 0.3161* 
 (–0.49) (0.21)  (2.68) (2.87)  
𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−4 –0.6550*** 0.0243 0.6793 0.0465 –0.0618 –0.1083 
 (–3.52) (0.07)  (0.82) (–0.28)  
𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−5 –0.0154 –0.0944 –0.079 –0.0182 –0.0387 –0.0205 
 (–0.07) (–0.12)  (–0.40) (–0.37)  
𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−6 –0.2038 0.4009** 0.6047 –0.0126 0.1463** 0.1589 
 (–1.38) (2.06)  (–0.26) (2.23)  
𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−7 0.1272 0.5488 0.4216 0.0423 0.1476 0.1053 
 (1.59) (0.83)  (1.02) (0.78)  
Cons 0.3236 –0.7498  –0.1364** –0.5474  
 (0.29) (–0.61)  (–2.16) (–1.56)  
Observations 240 240  2186 2232  
Adj. R2 0.555 –0.018  0.007 0.045  
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
 There is no evidence that firms with high bankruptcy probability (AZ < 1.2) have 
more value relevant accounting amounts. The coefficient of 𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 decreases from 
0.6171 (significant at 5%) to 0.1948 (not significant). The coefficient of 𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−6 
increases from -0.2038 to 0.4009; however, this difference is not significant. Book value 
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figures present a similar trend as 𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 after the adoption of IFRS. In addition, the 
adjusted R2 decreases from 55.5% to -1.8%.  
 There is evidence of an increase in the value relevance of accounting numbers for 
firms with low bankruptcy possibility (AZ > 1.2). The coefficient for 𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 (𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−3) 
increases from 0.1032 (0.1617) to 0.7213 (0.4778) and is significantly positive at 10% 
(1%) and 1% (1%). In the post-adoption period, the coefficients for 𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−4 and 
𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−6 are significantly positive at 5%, and the adjusted R2 increases from 0.7% to 
4.5%. These results indicate that investors rely on accounting figures of earlier quarters. 
It is worth noting that this result is similar to the result for all firms. The last panel of table 

















4.7.3.3. Effect of listing on U.S. stock exchanges on value relevance 
Table 8. Value relevance 
Panel D. Effect of listing on U.S. stock exchanges 
𝑃𝑖,𝑡+2







 Xlist firms Non–Xlist firms 
 Pre Post Diff Pre Post Diff 
𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 0.1956** –0.3587 –0.5543** –0.0189 0.0625 0.0814 
 (2.00) (–1.14)  (–1.66) (1.43)  
𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 –0.1236 1.7140*** 1.8376*** 0.1331** 0.6064** 0.4733** 
 (–0.53) (2.98)  (2.22) (2.40)  
𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 –0.0275 –0.0558 –0.0283 –0.0191** 0.0238 0.0429 
 (–0.28) (–0.49)  (–2.25) (0.62)  
𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−2 0.0770 0.1003 0.0233 –0.0053 –0.0764 –0.0711 
 (0.75) (1.02)  (–0.51) (–1.64)  
𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−3 0.1657 –0.0763 –0.242 0.0086 0.0382 0.0296 
 (1.45) (–0.44)  (1.00) (0.74)  
𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−4 0.1631 –0.1354 –0.2985* 0.0106 0.0148** 0.0042 
 (1.37) (–1.41)  (0.97) (1.96)  
𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−5 0.0756 0.0989 0.0233 0.0128* 0.0033 –0.0095 
 (0.57) (1.45)  (1.78) (0.43)  
𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−6 0.0989 –0.0401 –0.139 0.0097 –0.0062 –0.0159* 
 (0.97) (–0.38)  (1.49) (–0.76)  
𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−7 0.0879 –0.1506 –0.2385 –0.0089* 0.0017 0.0106 
 (1.35) (–1.04)  (–1.77) (0.30)  
𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 –0.0111 0.4184 0.4295 –0.0919* 0.0643 0.1562 
 (–0.05) (1.09)  (–1.67) (0.34)  
𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−2 0.0398 0.2165 0.1767 0.1042 –0.1233 –0.2275 
 (0.38) (0.46)  (1.53) (–1.23)  
𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−3 0.1557 1.1133* 0.9576** 0.0143 0.3945** 0.3802** 
 (0.71) (1.75)  (0.19) (2.33)  
𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−4 –0.2260 –0.6784 –0.4524 –0.2098 0.0102 0.22 
 (–1.04) (–1.62)  (–1.61) (0.04)  
𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−5 –0.3093* –0.2310 0.0783 –0.1835** –0.0693 0.1142 
 (–1.76) (–0.86)  (–2.55) (–0.80)  
𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−6 –0.4862** 0.1576 0.6438 –0.0445 0.1369** 0.1814 
 (–2.34) (0.83)  (–1.22) (2.07)  
𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−7 –0.2558 0.3535 0.6093 0.0658** 0.1426 0.0768 
 (–1.28) (0.83)  (2.54) (0.66)  
Cons –3.6563*** 2.3016  0.1408 –0.6948  
 (–3.13) (1.06)  (1.49) (–1.84)  
Observations 456 456  1970 2016  
Adj. R2 0.087 0.094  0.058 0.042  
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
There is evidence that earnings are more value relevant in the post-adoption period 
for both Xlist and Non-Xlist firms. For Xlist firms, the coefficient of 𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 (𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−3) 
increases from -0.1236 to 1.7140 significant at 1% (0.1557 to 1.1133 significant at 10%). 
Book value amounts do not present any significant increase, and the adjusted R2 increases 
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from 8.7% to 9.4%. For Non-Xlist firms, the coefficient of 𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 increases from 0.1331 
to 0.6064 significant at 5%. The coefficients of 𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−3 and 𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−6 also increase and 
are significant at 5%; in addition, the coefficient of 𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−4 increases slightly. These 
indicate that investors rely on these past figures. Although the adjusted R2 presents a slight 
decrease from 5.8% to 4.2%, the joint evidence indicates an overall improvement in the 
value relevance. 
In summary, only the poorly performing firms and the firms with high bankruptcy 
probability do not present an improvement in the value relevance of accounting numbers; 
all the other groups present an improvement. It is worth noting that both Xlist and Non-
Xlist firms present an improvement in the value relevance of accounting numbers. 
Overall, the results from the sample of all firms indicate an improvement in the value 
relevance of accounting numbers. 
The next section illustrates the additional analysis regarding earnings management 
via accruals. 
 
4.7.4 Additional accruals aggressiveness analysis 
 This section investigates the degree of the accrual analysis via equation 13. The 













Table 9. Effect of mandatory adoption of IFRS on accruals 
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑉𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼1𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑀𝑉𝐼𝑆𝑈𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛼5𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼6𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼7𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼8𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼9𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼10𝑋𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼11𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼12𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼13𝑃𝑊𝑖 + 𝛼14𝐼𝑖 +
𝛼15𝑀𝑖 + 𝛼16𝑈𝑖 + 𝛼17𝐿𝑖 + 𝛼18𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑖 + ∑ 𝛼𝑑+18𝑁𝐴𝐼𝐶𝑆𝑖
12
𝑑=1 + ∑ 𝛼𝑦𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  












Xlist firms Non–Xlist 
firms 
𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡 – –0.0080*** 0.0091 –0.0108*** –0.0088 –0.0082*** –0.0043 –0.0086** 
  (–2.72) (1.57) (–3.01) (–0.62) (–3.06) (–1.01) (–2.47) 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 ? –1.6904** –2.1895*** –1.4626 –10.9935** –0.9893 0.5081 –1.8538** 
  (–2.50) (–3.31) (–1.79) (–2.20) (–1.84) (0.51) (–2.55) 
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 – –0.0264** –0.0032 –0.0283*** 0.0305 –0.0365*** –0.0249 –0.0279** 
  (–2.49) (–0.07) (–2.64) (1.11) (–3.17) (–1.15) (–2.38) 
𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑉𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + –0.0083 –0.0215 –0.0053 –0.0672 –0.0101 –0.0147 –0.0074 
  (–0.91) (–1.20) (–0.52) (–1.30) (–1.10) (–1.59) (–0.72) 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 0.0038 –0.0005 0.0060*** –0.0059 0.0057*** 0.0069 0.0033 
  (1.73) (–0.09) (3.02) (–1.00) (3.04) (1.13) (1.44) 
𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 – –0.0006 0.0015 –0.0006 –0.0040 –0.0006 –0.0047*** –0.0006 
  (–0.73) (0.68) (–0.64) (–1.54) (–0.68) (–3.35) (–0.63) 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 – –0.0005 –0.0027 –0.0004 –0.0002 –0.0011 –0.0105** –0.0004 
  (–0.99) (–0.94) (–0.75) (–0.37) (–1.43) (–2.43) (–0.86) 
𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡 + 0.0044** 0.0018 0.0046** 0.0090 0.0053** 0.0038 0.0045 
  (2.11) (0.39) (1.98) (1.89) (2.36) (1.17) (1.93) 
𝑀𝑉𝐼𝑆𝑈𝑖,𝑡 + 0.0094 0.0253** 0.0061 –0.0290 0.0226*** 0.0184 0.0077 
  (0.65) (2.50) (0.35) (–0.73) (3.46) (1.52) (0.47) 
𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 – –0.7517*** –0.7306*** –0.7668*** –0.6159*** –0.7676*** –0.7372*** –0.7549*** 
  (–17.48) (–7.38) (–16.90) (–6.77) (–17.94) (–20.62) (–15.72) 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑖,𝑡 – –0.0003 0.0011 –0.0000 –0.0444 –0.0000 –0.0062 0.0001 
  (–0.14) (0.40) (–0.01) (–1.08) (–0.01) (–0.70) (0.04) 
𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡 – 0.0385*** 0.0093 0.0432** –0.0589 0.0482*** 0.0555*** 0.0358** 
  (2.68) (0.48) (2.59) (–0.55) (3.39) (4.67) (2.22) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 0.0188 0.3408 –0.0218 –0.2048 –0.0015 0.1730 –0.0112 
     (0.23) (1.58) (–0.25) (–0.38) (–0.02) (1.26) (–0.12) 
Fixed effects: 
AUD  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
XLIST  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NAICS  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NUMEX  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
P  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
I  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
M  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
L  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Inn  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cons  0.2384 0.3233 0.1799 1.8571* 0.1045 –0.1492 0.2793* 
  (1.88) (1.88) (1.21) (2.09) (1.02) (–0.67) (2.03) 
Observations  4944 640 4304 480 4464 912 4032 
Adj. R2  0.414 0.410 0.427 0.307 0.488 0.552 0.404 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note that the coefficient of 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡 indicates whether the level of accruals is higher 
or not after the adoption of IFRS. This coefficient is significantly negative for all firms, 
strongly performing firms, firms’ AZ>1.2, and Non-Xlist firms. Thus, this is evidence 
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that the level of accruals is lesser after the IFRS adoption, and as such, the earnings 
management level is lower. In contrast, the coefficient of 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is statistically 
insignificant for poorly performing firms, firms’ AZ<1.2 and Xlist firms, which indicates 
that the earnings management level is not reduced after the IFRS adoption. Therefore, 
only the poorly performing firms, firms with high bankruptcy possibility and firms that 
list on U.S. stock exchanges do not present an improvement regarding the level of 
earnings management via accruals. 
The next section discusses an additional analysis based on the external auditors’ 
reports. 
 
4.8 Additional analyses - auditors’ reports regarding the quality of firms’ financial 
statements 
This thesis argues that managers can still utilise their discretion even under 
mandatory adoption of IFRS when the institutional environment (enforcement of 
accounting standards, investor protection) is weak. As such, this study investigates this 
behaviour by examining the auditors’ reports of all firms in the population. The auditors’ 
reports were manually collected from the official companies’ websites, the securities 
market regulator and the stock exchanges’ websites. This thesis investigates the auditors’ 
reports for each firm in the first two years following the mandatory adoption of IFRS. 
The auditors’ reports are classified according to 13 categories as follows: (1) 
auditor agrees with the financial statements; (2) auditor’s report is not provided; (3) 
auditor’s report is not available for one of the years; (4) auditor's report is not provided 
because the firm has failed, or it has delisted or merged with another company; (5) the 
firm provides a non-audited statement; (6) the auditor does not agree with the financial 
statements; (7) the auditor indicates that several problems (tax issues, judicial actions or 
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loan issues) may affect the financial position and performance of the firm; (8) the auditor 
indicates that the firm does not comply with the IFRS requirements with regard to the 
recognition of “Investments in other societies”; (9) Auditor indicates that the firm does 
not perform an impairment test according to IFRS; (10) Auditor indicates that the firm 
does not recognise dividends according to IFRS; (11) Auditor indicates that the firm does 
not recognise depreciation according to IFRS; (12) Auditor does not have sufficient 
evidence to audit the statements; (13) Auditor agrees with the financial statements but 
reserves his report regarding tax issues/investments in other societies/judicial actions or 
due to the lack of information. 
This analysis is shown for all firms from the population, all firms from the sample 
and the three sets of subsamples defined according to the hypotheses (section 4.5). Table 





















 Table 10. Auditors’ reports on the two years following the mandatory adoption of IFRS 
Panel A. Population 
Category Situation of auditor's report Argentina Brazil Chile Mexico Peru Total 
1 Auditor agrees with the financial statements 44 290 100 77 102 613 
2 Auditor's report is not provided 11 1 37 15 7 71 
3 Auditor's report is not available for one of the years 3 6 5 5 2 21 
4 Auditor's report is not provided because firm has failed/delisted/merged 48 307 90 85 77 607 
5 Firm provides a non-audited statement 0 0 0 1 0 1 
6 Auditor does not agree with the financial statements 0 1 0 0 0 1 
7 
Auditor indicates that tax/judicial actions/loan 
problems may affect the financial position and 
performance of the firm 
10 36 4 1 3 54 
8 
Auditor indicates that the firm does not follow 
IFRS regarding the recognition of "Investments 
in other societies" 
0 1 2 0 0 3 
9 Auditor indicates that the firm does not perform an impairment test according to IFRS  0 1 0 0 1 2 
10 Auditor indicates that the firm does not recognise dividends according to IFRS  0 0 2 0 0 2 
11 Auditor indicates that the firm does not recognise depreciation according to IFRS  0 0 0 0 1 1 
12 Auditor does not have sufficient evidence to audit the statements 0 2 0 0 0 2 
13 
Auditor agrees with the financial statements 
but reserves his report regarding tax 
issues/investments in other societies/judicial 
actions or due to the lack of information 
0 15 1 0 5 21 
  Total 116 660 241 184 198 1399 
  
 Columns 1 and 2 refer to the situation of the auditor’s report whereas columns 3 
to 7 indicate the number of auditors’ reports according to each category by each country. 
It is apparent from this table that a significant number of firms (43%) have failed, or have 
delisted during the sampling period. Thus, there are 792 active firms during this period. 
Additionally, companies and security market regulators do not provide several auditors’ 
reports during this period. In total, category 1 indicates that 9% of the active firms do not 
provide an auditor’s report. Additionally, 21 auditors’ reports are not available for one of 
the years after the IFRS adoption. It is worth noting that one Mexican company provided 
a non-audited financial statement (category 5) to their stakeholders. These results might 
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be due to the lack of proper enforcement. There is also an issue regarding a Brazilian 
company in which the auditor does not agree with the financial statement. This illustrates 
that the manager might have manipulated the accounting figures in his own benefit, 
disregarding the accounting rules. 
As discussed in the introduction (Chapter 1) of the thesis, Latin America has faced 
recession and stagnant GDP growth in recent years, which may contribute to decrease 
firms’ performance. As such, this is consistent with the results reported in category 7, 
which shows that 7% of the firms face a risk of technical default and long-term continuity 
is at stake. It is worth noting that managers still have room upon the financial statements 
as categories 8 to 12 indicate that some companies did not follow IFRS regarding several 
aspects, which includes the recognition of investment in other societies, dividends, 
depreciation, and application of an impairment test. Moreover, two Brazilian firms have 
not provided sufficient evidence to auditors, which constrained these auditors’ reports. 
Lastly, category 13 shows that auditors provide their opinion with reservations for 
approximately 3% of active firms.   
Next, table 10, Panel B, addresses the auditors’ reports regarding the sample 
following the same fashion. However, it is worth noting that the number of categories are 
reduced to 8 due to the limited number of firms in the sample (309). 
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Table 10. Auditors’ reports on the two years following the mandatory adoption of IFRS 
Panel B. All sampling firms (Common size sample – 309 firms) 
Category Description Argentina Brazil Chile Mexico Peru Total 
1 Auditor agrees with the financial statements 1 146 61 55 18 281 
2 Auditor's report is not provided 0 0 3 4 0 7 
3 Auditor's report is not available for one of the years 0 0 2 6 0 8 
4 Auditor's report is not provided because firm has failed/delisted/merged 0 3 0 2 0 5 
5 Firm provides a non-audited statement 0 0 0 1 0 1 
6 Auditor does not agree with the financial statements 0 1 0 0 0 1 
7 
Auditor indicates that tax/judicial actions/loan 
problems may affect the financial position 
and performance of the firm 
0 3 0 0 0 3 
8 
Auditor indicates that the firm does not follow 
IFRS regarding the recognition of 
"Investments in other societies" 
0 1 2 0 0 3 
  Total 1 154 68 68 18 309 
 
 It is worth noting that 15 companies did not provide the auditor’s report, or it is 
not available for one of the years following the mandatory adoption of IFRS. Five 
auditors’ reports were not available because the companies were delisted. Only one 
company provided a non-audited financial statement. Moreover, there is evidence that 
three companies did not follow the IFRS requirements to recognise investments in other 
societies. In summary, 28 companies have an issue with their auditor’s report; these are 
approximately 9% of the sample size. Overall, this evidence highlights that the 
enforcement in the implementation of IFRS in Latin American countries is weak and 
managers of listed industrial firms can use their discretion to report the financial 
statements. The next panel shows the situation for the poorly performing firms. 
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Table 10. Auditors’ reports on the two years following the mandatory adoption of IFRS 
Panel C. Poorly performing firms       
Category Description Argentina Brazil Chile Mexico Peru Total 
1 Auditor agrees with the financial statements 0 9 8 14 2 33 
2 Auditor's report is not provided 0 0 0 2 0 2 
3 Auditor's report is not available for one of the years 0 0 0 1 0 1 
4 Auditor's report is not provided because firm has failed/delisted/merged 0 1 0 1 0 2 
5 Firm provides a non-audited statement 0 0 0 1 0 1 
6 Auditor does not agree with the financial statements 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7 
Auditor indicates that tax/judicial 
actions/loan problems may affect the 
financial position and performance of the 
firm 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
8 
Auditor indicates that the firm does not 
follow IFRS regarding the recognition of 
"Investments in other societies" 
0 0 1 0 0 1 
  Total 0 10 9 19 2 40 
 
 For the poorly performing firms, seven companies do not provide a fully 
compliant auditor’s report (categories 2, 3, 4, 5, and 8); these represent approximately 
17.5% of the sample size. This illustrates that a higher percentage of managers tend to 
utilise their discretion in order to boost the financial situation of the firm. This result is 
also consistent to those from the multivariate analysis as there are more firms involved in 
accounting irregularities, these firms do not present an improvement in their accounting 
quality. The next panel provides the results for the strongly performing firms.  
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Table 10. Auditors’ reports on the two years following the mandatory adoption of IFRS 
Panel D. Strongly performing firms 
      
Category Description Argentina Brazil Chile Mexico Peru Total 
1 Auditor agrees with the financial statements 1 137 53 41 16 248 
2 Auditor's report is not provided 0 0 3 2 0 5 
3 Auditor's report is not available for one of the years 0 0 2 5 0 7 
4 Auditor's report is not provided because firm has failed/delisted/merged 0 2 0 1 0 3 
5 Firm provides a non-audited statement 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 Auditor does not agree with the financial statements 0 1 0 0 0 1 
7 
Auditor indicates that tax/judicial 
actions/loan problems may affect the 
financial position and performance of the 
firm 
0 3 0 0 0 3 
8 
Auditor indicates that the firm does not 
follow IFRS regarding the recognition of 
"Investments in other societies" 
0 1 1 0 0 2 
  Total 1 144 59 49 16 269 
 
 For these firms, the results and inferences are similar to the one for all firms. That 
is, 21 (approximately 7.8%) of these firms do not have a fully compliant auditor’s report. 
The next panel illustrates the situation classified for financial distress firms. 
 
Table 10. Auditors’ reports on the two years following the mandatory adoption of IFRS 
Panel E. Financial distress firms 
Category Description Argentina Brazil Chile Mexico Peru Total 
1 Auditor agrees with the financial statements 0 13 2 7 1 23 
2 Auditor's report is not provided 0 0 0 2 0 2 
3 Auditor's report is not available for one of the years 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 Auditor's report is not provided because firm has failed/delisted/merged 0 1 0 1 0 2 
5 Firm provides a non-audited statement 0 0 0 1 0 1 
6 Auditor does not agree with the financial statements 0 1 0 0 0 1 
7 
Auditor indicates that tax/judicial actions/loan 
problems may affect the financial position and 
performance of the firm 
0 1 0 0 0 1 
8 
Auditor indicates that the firm does not follow 
IFRS regarding the recognition of 
"Investments in other societies" 
0 0 0 0 0 0 




 From Panel E, seven firms out of 30 have an issue regarding the auditor’s report 
(categories 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7); this represents approximately 23% of the sample size. It is 
worth noting that this percentage is much higher than that for all firms, which indicates 
that managers from these companies tend to utilise more their discretion over the 
implementation of IFRS in comparison with the analysis of Panel B. Similar to the results 
found for the poorly performing firms, as there are more firms involved in accounting 
irregularities, these firms do not present an improvement in their accounting quality, 
which is consistent with the evidence from the multivariate analysis. Next, Panel F shows 
the results of this analysis for non-financial distress firms. 
 
Table 10. Auditors’ reports on the two years following the mandatory adoption of IFRS 
Panel F. Non-financial distress firms 
Category Description Argentina Brazil Chile Mexico Peru Total 
1 Auditor agrees with the financial statements 1 133 59 48 17 258 
2 Auditor's report is not provided 0 0 3 2 0 5 
3 Auditor's report is not available for one of the years 0 0 2 6 0 8 
4 Auditor's report is not provided because firm has failed/delisted/merged 0 2 0 1 0 3 
5 Firm provides a non-audited statement 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 Auditor does not agree with the financial statements 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7 
Auditor indicates that tax/judicial 
actions/loan problems may affect the 
financial position and performance of the 
firm 
0 2 0 0 0 2 
8 
Auditor indicates that the firm does not 
follow IFRS regarding the recognition of 
"Investments in other societies" 
0 1 2 0 0 3 
  Total 1 138 66 57 17 279 
  
 For this group of firms, the number of firms that do not have a fully compliant 
auditor’s report is 21. The key issue is that this amount represents approximately 7.5% of 
the sample size. In other words, this amount is lower than the one found for all firms 
(9%), and much lower than the one for financial distress firms (23%). Thus, the number 
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of managers that tend to utilise their discretion is lower in comparison with financial 
distress firms. Panel G illustrates the results for companies that list on U.S. stock 
exchanges (Xlist). 
 
Table 10. Auditors’ reports on the two years following the mandatory adoption of IFRS 
Panel G. Xlist firms       
Category Description Argentina Brazil Chile Mexico Peru Total 
1 Auditor agrees with the financial statements 1 20 13 20 3 57 
2 Auditor's report is not provided 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 Auditor's report is not available for one of the years 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 Auditor's report is not provided because firm has failed/delisted/merged 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 Firm provides a non-audited statement 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 Auditor does not agree with the financial statements 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7 
Auditor indicates that tax/judicial 
actions/loan problems may affect the 
financial position and performance of the 
firm 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
8 
Auditor indicates that the firm does not 
follow IFRS regarding the recognition of 
"Investments in other societies" 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
  Total 1 20 13 20 3 57 
 
It is worth noting that companies that list on the U.S. stock market have a fully 
compliant auditor’s report. Thus, all auditors’ reports of 57 companies are in accordance 
with the legislation. This indicates that the enforcement of this market is higher than in 
Latin American stock markets. The next panel shows the results for companies that do 
not list on U.S. stock exchanges (Non-Xlist). 
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Table 10. Auditors’ reports on the two years following the mandatory adoption of IFRS 
Panel H. Non-Xlist firms       
Category Description Argentina Brazil Chile Mexico Peru Total 
1 Auditor agrees with the financial statements 0 126 48 35 15 224 
2 Auditor's report is not provided 0 0 3 4 0 7 
3 Auditor's report is not available for one of the years 0 0 2 6 0 8 
4 Auditor's report is not provided because firm has failed/delisted/merged 0 3 0 2 0 5 
5 Firm provides a non-audited statement 0 0 0 1 0 1 
6 Auditor does not agree with the financial statements 0 1 0 0 0 1 
7 
Auditor indicates that tax/judicial 
actions/loan problems may affect the 
financial position and performance of the 
firm 
0 3 0 0 0 3 
8 
Auditor indicates that the firm does not 
follow IFRS regarding the recognition of 
"Investments in other societies" 
0 1 2 0 0 3 
  Total 0 134 55 48 15 252 
 
The result for firms that do not list on the U.S. stock market is similar to Panel A; 
that is, 11.1% do not provide a fully compliant auditor’s report. This percentage is much 
higher than in comparison to Non-Xlist firms. Referring to the result for Xlist firms, this 
confirms that the enforcement of emerging markets is weaker than that in the U.S. 
In conclusion, these findings suggest that the institutional settings in Latin 
American countries are weak, and as such, there are still opportunities for managers’ 
discretion upon the financial statements. 
The next section reports an overview of this study and the conclusions. 
 
4.9 Conclusion 
This study investigates whether the mandatory adoption of IFRS is associated with 
higher accounting quality in Latin America according to three accounting quality metrics 
based on quarterly data in order to track accurately managers’ behaviour in adopting 
IFRS. Therefore, this approach provides new insights about earnings smoothing and the 
delay in recognition of bad news. Moreover, this work considers three firm-level factors 
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that would affect the IFRS adoption as follows: (i) operating performance, (ii) bankruptcy 
possibility and (iii) listing on U.S. stock exchanges. In addition, the value relevance 
approach of Barth et al. (2008) and the approach of Basu (1997) for timely recognition of 
losses are introduced with lagged independent variables in order to track managers’ 
behaviour in a timely manner. Table 11 summarizes the main results of this chapter, 
which are discussed next. 
Table 11. Summary of an improvement in accounting quality 
Sample group N 













All firms 309 Inconclusive Yes Yes Yes 
Poorly performing firms 40 Inconclusive No No No 
Strongly Performing firms 269 Inconclusive Yes Yes Yes 
Firms' AZ < 1.2 30 Inconclusive No No No 
Firms' AZ > 1.2 279 Inconclusive Yes Yes Yes 
Xlist Firms 57 Inconclusive No Yes No 
Non-Xlist Firms 252 Inconclusive Yes Yes Yes 
 
There is evidence that managers still undertake earnings management behaviour 
in the post-IFRS period. However, the degree of earnings management via accruals has 
decreased since the IFRS adoption (Model 13). Earnings are more value relevant in the 
post- than in the pre-IFRS adoption period (Model 12). The results indicate that the delay 
in recognising bad news is reduced from seven to three quarters in the post-IFRS period 
(Model 9). Conversely, there is evidence that firms may write off losses when they 
experience good news or inflate earnings when they experience bad news. These 
improvements in accounting quality are not valid for firms with poor operating 
performance and high bankruptcy possibility. Nevertheless, the results for Xlist firms are 
inconsistent; the only evidence of improvement in accounting quality is in the value 
relevance of accounting numbers.  
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From this set of results, this study concludes that the mandatory adoption of IFRS 
improved the accounting quality of Latin American firms. In addition, the findings show 
that firms still delay the recognition of bad news; however, this delay is reduced during 
the post-adoption period. Hence, an overall improvement is perceived. Moreover, firm-
level factors affect the manager’s behaviour in adopting IFRS. Financial characteristics 
of the firm such as poor performance and high bankruptcy possibility may constrain 
managers’ willingness in adopting IFRS. 
 This study provides new insight regarding the effects of the IFRS adoption on 
accounting quality. Past literature argues that the improvement on accounting quality is 
due to a combination of factors such as enforcement, managers’ incentives and the 
adoption of IFRS. As perceived in the results from the questionnaire (Chapter 3), it is 
worth noting that unlike developed countries where the degree of enforcement is high, 
the enforcement of these countries is weak, and it has not been substantially improved 
since the IFRS adoption. Thus, this illustrates that IFRS can improve the accounting 
quality in a country level. Considering firm-level factors, the results indicates that due to 
these factors influence managers’ incentives to adopt IFRS. Thus, for strongly operating 
performing firms and for firms with a low bankruptcy possibility, the accounting quality 
increases. Thus, this might relate to managers’ desire to attract overseas investment. 
Managers from poorly operating firms and firms with a high bankruptcy possibility may 
not have strong incentive to increase the accounting quality if the adoption of IFRS 
expose more the firms’ financial woes. These results suggest that for developing 
countries, an increase in accounting quality might relate to managers’ intention of 





Chapter 5: The impact of mandatory IFRS adoption on analysts’ 
information environment in Latin America 
 
5.1 Introduction 
After examining the impact of IFRS on accounting quality, this thesis turns to 
investigate the effect of IFRS on analysts’ forecasts in Latin American countries. This 
Chapter begins by reviewing the literature regarding the role of analysts in the market and 
the changes in the analysts’ information environment following the adoption of IFRS. 
Then, this study presents the research opportunities and investigates whether mandatory 
adoption of IFRS improves analysts’ information environment in Latin American 
countries where institutional settings of enforcement and investor protection are weak. 
The aims of this study are as follows. Firstly, it examines whether the adoption of IFRS 
improves analysts’ information environment measured in terms of earnings forecast 
accuracy and dispersion, analysts’ target price forecast dispersion, as well as the number 
of analysts following firms. Secondly, this study investigates whether firm-level reporting 
incentives affect analysts’ information environment. Thirdly, this study turns to re-
examine the impact of mandatory adoption of IFRS on analysts’ information environment 
after controlling for firm-level reporting incentives. Fourthly, this study also investigates 
whether mandatory adoption of IFRS improves the precision of public, private and 
consensus information based on the work of Barron et al. (1998) and Byard et al. (2011). 
This is important to evaluate whether the changes in properties of analysts’ forecasts and 
information environment stem from changes on public information or private 
information. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 discusses the literature review. 
Section 5.3 presents the research opportunities based on the gaps of previous literature. 
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Section 5.4 develops the hypotheses. Section 5.5 discusses the econometric methods 
employed. Section 5.6 illustrates the data and sampling procedures. Section 5.7 presents 
the results, which are presented according to the hypotheses of this study. Finally, Section 
5.8 concludes. 
 
5.2 Literature review 
This section firstly reviews the role of analysts in the market and the purpose of 
the accounting information for market participants. Then, the studies that investigate the 
impact of mandatory adoption of IFRS on analysts’ information environment are 
discussed. The summary of the empirical studies that investigate the impact of IFRS 
adoption on analysts’ information environment are available on Appendix 3, section 2. 
 
5.2.1 Accounting information and the role of analysts in the market  
The two functions of accounting information are, first, to enable shareholders and 
creditors to evaluate a firm’s financial performance and position; and second, to help 
investors to monitor their capital (Beyer et al., 2010). Analysts derive their forecasts based 
on two sources of information: public and private (Barron et al., 1998). Public information 
comprises all available information in the market such as public documents, financial 
statements and news etc. Private information is collected from private sources, such as 
via their relationship with the managers. Thus, analysts’ forecasts reflect how well 
analysts can predict a firm’s future based on these two types of information. It is worth 
noting that financial statements are a major source of public information to analysts. 
Consequently, it is important that accounting information be of high quality, because it 
has direct implications for analysts’ forecasts (Jiao, Koning, Mertens and Roosenboom, 
2012; Horton et al., 2013).  
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Analysts are responsible for several roles; to issue buy or sell recommendations, 
follow firms, follow news and their impact to the market, perform financial analysis of 
firms, and in particular, to issue accurate forecasts, which can enable investors to better 
assess their risks and investments. Thus, research in the past 40 years has focused on how 
analysts process and digest information in issuing their forecasts (Cragg and Malkiel, 
1968; Brown and Rozeff, 1978; Fried and Givoly, 1982; Abarbanell, 1991; Beyer et al., 
2010; Jiao et al., 2012; Horton et al., 2013). Prior literature has also investigated whether 
analysts’ forecasts are more accurate than econometric forecasts (Brown and Rozeff, 
1978; Fried and Givoly, 1982; Brown, Griffin, Hagerman and Zmijewski, 1987). The 
emphasis given on analysts by these studies relies on analysts’ capacity to convey 
information to the market. This is based on the market efficient hypothesis, which argues 
that stock prices reflect all available information in the market (Kothari, 2001). Analysts 
issuing more accurate forecasts increase investors’ confidence and may increase the flow 
of investments, which in turn could improve the market efficiency. Therefore, analysts 
have a key role in this environment, which can affect investors’ valuation and drift stock 
prices (Jennifer and Leonard, 1997; Hou, Hung and Gao, 2014; Kim and Song, 2015). All 
these works highlight the importance of studying analysts’ forecasts and their behaviour 
due to their capacity to affect market participants (Loh and Mian, 2006). 
It is worth noting that the literature suggests that there is a caveat in investigating 
analysts’ forecasts because some analysts have conflicts of interest in issuing forecasts. 
That is, Beyer (2008) and Beyer et al. (2010) argue that analysts’ forecasts are usually 
optimistic, and analysts may be influenced by two factors: first, the expectations of 
companies’ managers they follow, and second, by the managers of the investment 
banking industry (that is, the broker house that they work for). Firstly, companies’ 
managers are constantly managing analysts’ expectations in order to avoid negative 
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earnings surprises following the earnings’ announcement. That is, if analysts issue a 
higher than expected earnings forecast, and the actual earnings fall below their 
expectation, this would cause a negative earnings surprise to the market. In order to try 
to avoid this, managers can try to persuade analysts who follow their firm (Abarbanell 
and Lehavy, 2003; Beaver, Cornell, Landsman and Stubben, 2008). Secondly, managers 
of the investment banking industry (broker house) seek the expansion of their business, 
and therefore, they may affect how analysts issue their forecasts (Guan, Lu and Wong, 
2012). For example, analysts are more likely to issue a buy-side recommendation than a 
sell-side recommendation due to the concerns of their managers (Beyer et al., 2010). 
Although some studies indicate that analysts may have a conflict of interest in issuing 
forecasts and recommendations, this is not valid for all analysts. In general, independent 
analysts cover a broad range of firms, which they do not have a conflict of interest as 
well.  
In summary, the literature illustrates that accounting information can have an 
impact on the quality of analysts’ forecasts; as IFRS is expected to increase the quality, 
consistency, reliability of the accounting information, it should have an impact on 
analysts’ forecasts. 
 
5.2.2 Analysts’ information environment and IFRS adoption 
The key studies that focus on analysts’ information environment after the 
mandatory IFRS adoption are those of Byard et al. (2011), Tan, Wang and Welker (2011), 
Jiao et al. (2012), Choi, Peasnell and Toniato (2013), Horton et al. (2013), Panaretou et 
al. (2013), Houqe, Easton and Zijl (2014), Liang and Riedl (2014), and Preiato et al. 
(2015), which are discussed next.  
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Byard et al. (2011) investigated the effect of the mandatory IFRS adoption in 
Europe between 2003 and 2006. The authors used voluntary adopters as a control group 
to assess the initial (2 years) effect of IFRS adoption. They employed three proxies to 
capture analysts’ information environment as follows: absolute forecast errors, forecast 
dispersion and the number of analysts following a firm. These measures are more directly 
related to the impact of mandatory IFRS adoption than other analyst-related measures that 
also reflect non-accounting information (like stock recommendations, forecast revisions, 
and forecast frequency) (Byard et al., 2011). To control for institutional factors, the 
authors used the rule of law from Kaufmann et al. (2007), and the measure (GAPP 
differences) of Bae, Tan and Welker (2008) to control for differences in IFRS and local 
GAAP. Moreover, the authors control for firm-level reporting incentives through six 
measures as follows: profitability, growth opportunities, leverage, ownership 
concentration, international range, and quality of auditors. They find that analysts’ 
forecast errors and analysts’ forecast dispersion present a greater decrease for firms with 
stronger reporting incentives in countries where the enforcement is weak and the 
differences between IFRS and local GAAP are higher. The authors conclude that IFRS 
improves analysts’ information environment only when it is properly enforced. However, 
this thesis argues that this might not always be the case, as in countries with weak 
enforcement, firms may have incentives to increase their accounting quality and attract 
foreign investments and this will likely enhance analysts’ information environment. 
Distinguished from Byard et al. (2011), Tan et al. (2011) focus on the location of 
the analysts covering a firm; that is, they measure whether the number of foreign and 
local analysts increased and whether their earnings forecast is improved. The authors 
investigated the effect of this issue on mandatory adopters. The authors find that the 
number of analysts following firms increases for both local and foreign analysts following 
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the mandatory IFRS adoption. On the other hand, the same trend did not occur prior to 
the IFRS in several countries and there is an improvement in earnings’ forecast accuracy 
for foreign analysts. However, the forecast accuracy for local analysts does not improve. 
Therefore, this evidence illustrates that the comparability and usefulness of accounting 
information increased following the mandatory IFRS adoption for foreign analysts, but it 
has not impacted local analysts significantly. Jiao et al. (2012) investigated the year prior 
to the mandatory IFRS adoption and the year after the mandatory adoption in Europe. 
Like Byard et al. (2011), they find that the forecasts are more accurate and less dispersed 
after the IFRS adoption.  
While the reported studies are international, Choi et al. (2013) focus on the UK 
market solely and argue that they hold constant “the legal environment, corporate 
governance structure and enforcement institutions.” Although this might not necessarily 
be true, as these institutional factors could change over time. They focus on the value 
relevance of accounting information and whether the analysts’ forecast accuracy 
increased after the mandatory adoption by analysing the period from 2003 to 2007. The 
authors find that the analysts’ forecast accuracy increased, and dispersion decreased 
during these periods. These findings support IASB’s objective of enhancing the 
usefulness of accounting information and are beneficial for analysts who can issue more 
accurate forecasts. 
Horton et al. (2013) re-examined whether the mandatory IFRS adoption is really 
related to improvements on analysts’ information environment. If so, which attributes of 
IFRS are associated with these improvements? They tested whether these findings were 
driven by increased comparability and higher accounting information quality or whether 
IFRS facilitated earnings management in order for managers to meet the earnings targets. 
They evaluated this situation by analysing the analysts’ coverage in the following three 
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situations. Firstly, they examined whether the firm changed from local GAAP to IFRS, 
but also continued to report in local GAAP. For those analysts covering these firms, they 
expect comparability would decrease. Secondly, they investigated whether the firm 
changed from local GAAP to IFRS only. For those analysts covering these firms, they 
expect comparability would remain the same. Finally, they investigated whether the firm 
changed to report from multiple GAAP to IFRS only. For this case, they expect 
comparability to increase. They also compared whether reconciliation effects from local 
GAAP to IFRS affected earnings forecasts. They find that forecast accuracy increases 
more for firms with previous accounting choices that differ more from IFRS. Moreover, 
they find that forecast accuracy increases more for mandatory adopters than for voluntary 
adopters or non-adopters. Overall, considering evidence from the three situations, they 
argue that IFRS drives improvements in forecast accuracy due to increased comparability 
and higher informational benefits.  
Panaretou et al. (2013) focus on a specific topic about whether the accounting for 
derivatives enhanced transparency, or it increased earnings volatility of the U.K market 
after the mandatory IFRS adoption. In particular, they investigated the effect of hedge 
accounting on asymmetry information (measured by analysts’ forecast error and 
dispersion). According to the authors, they investigated the U.K because the use of hedge 
accounting in the U.K is widespread, and its disclosure has been mandatory since 1999. 
They find that firms reporting derivatives present significantly lower analysts’ forecast 
error and dispersion in the post-IFRS adoption period than the control group. The authors 
conclude that the bid-ask spread of firms reporting hedge accounting reduces significantly 
in the post-IFRS period. The author’s view is consistent with enhanced disclosure and 
transparent information following IFRS adoption. 
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Houqe et al. (2014) focus on the impact of the IFRS adoption on the analysts’ 
forecast accuracy on weak investor protection countries (France, Germany, and Sweden). 
They only compared 2003 (pre-adoption) and 2011 (mandatory adoption). The sample 
size of forecast accuracy (dispersion) is 208 (196) for 2003 and 370 (337) for 2011. The 
overall finding is that both analysts’ forecast error and dispersion are reduced in 2011. 
Moreover, France and Germany, which have the lowest investor protection score (index 
of La Porta et al. (1998)), present greater reduction on analysts’ forecast error and 
dispersion. Authors’ views of higher information environment after the IFRS adoption 
are similar to past studies of Horton et al. (2013) and Panaretou et al. (2013).  
Liang and Riedl (2014) investigated whether the fair value measurement of IFRS 
affects analysts’ forecast accuracy. Exploiting the property that U.K (U.S.) reports their 
assets using fair value (historical value); the authors investigated a balance sheet forecast 
net asset value (NAV) and EPS. Their sample consists of national U.K and U.S. firms 
from the real estate industry from 2002 to 2010. The authors find that the balance sheet 
forecast is greater for U.K firms, and the accuracy is attenuated during the financial crisis. 
Nevertheless, U.K firms that adopt the full fair value for measuring EPS demonstrate 
lower analysts’ forecast accuracy than U.S. companies. This result is consistent despite 
the fact that the fair value introduces a few omitted and non-observable terms in the time-
series trend. Therefore, this issue likely affects the accuracy of forecasts that are unable 
to predict such terms with high precision.  
Preiato et al. (2015) investigated analysts’ forecast accuracy and dispersion in the 
post-IFRS adoption period after controlling for various proxies of enforcement. They 
used the index of Brown et al. (2014) and other six enforcement indexes of which three 
vary over time, and the others are static. The three indexes that vary over time are as 
follows: the rule of law from Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2010); the measure based 
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on Jackson and Roe (2009) of resourcing of securities’ market regulators, and the average 
size of a company’s audit fee relative to its total assets. The three remaining are the origin 
of the country’s legal system (La Porta et al., 1998); the public and private enforcement 
measures of La Porta, Lopez-De-Sinales and Shleifer (2006), and the survey of 2008 from 
the World Economic Forum (WEF, 2010). Overall, countries with higher scores on the 
enforcement index present higher improvements on both analysts’ forecast accuracy and 
dispersion. Nevertheless, the authors do not find that IFRS per se is related to the 
improvements in analysts’ forecast accuracy and dispersion. These results shed light on 
whether the empirical findings of past studies are indeed reliable. Therefore, the authors 
suggest that the past evidence should be revisited controlling for the factor of 
enforcement. 
In summary, past studies report that there is an improvement in analysts’ 
information environment (Horton et al., 2013; Panaretou et al., 2013; Houqe et al., 2014). 
However, Preiato et al. (2015) argue that the enforcement is responsible for this 
improvement. Consequently, past literature should be revisited by future studies 
controlling for enforcement. This generates new research opportunities, which are 
discussed in the next section. 
 
5.3 Research opportunities 
It is apparent from the literature review that research in emerging markets 
regarding this topic is very limited. Thus, an opportunity arising from emerging markets, 
in particular in Latin America, is the impact of the mandatory IFRS adoption on analysts’ 
information environment. The past literature indicates that an improvement in analysts’ 
information environment is due to a combination of factors such as firm-level reporting 
incentives, the enforcement of accounting standards, investor protection mechanisms and 
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the adoption of IFRS (Byard et al., 2011; Christensen, 2012; Christensen et al., 2013; 
Preiato et al., 2015). Enforcement and investor protection mechanisms of Latin American 
countries are weak in comparison with developed countries (La Porta et al., 1998; Brown 
et al., 2014). Moreover, according to Chapter 3, there is no significant difference in these 
institutional settings in the pre- and the post-IFRS adoption period. Thus, this situation 
allows this study to pinpoint the effects of IFRS and firm-level reporting incentives. 
Secondly, although analysts are responsible for many tasks, Beyer et al. (2010) argue that 
the literature has focused mostly on one role of analysts: providing earnings’ forecasts. 
Thus, this implies other opportunities for research regarding the other types of forecasts 
that analysts issue. In particular, how would the IFRS adoption affect these other types of 
forecasts? Another avenue for research is to investigate how the IFRS adoption would 
affect the precision of public information in countries with weak institutional settings. 
This is helpful to examine whether any changes found on analysts’ information 
environment is derived by changes in the precision of public information, private 
information, or both. 
 
5.4 Hypotheses development 
The first objective of this study is to examine whether mandatory adoption of 
IFRS can improve the quality of analysts’ information environment in Latin American 
countries whose institutional settings of enforcement and investor protection are weak. 
This study conjectures that there is a positive effect of mandatory adoption of IFRS on 
the quality of analysts’ information environment measured in terms of analysts’ forecast 
accuracy, number of analysts following firms, dispersion of earnings forecasts and 
dispersion of target price forecasts. Firstly, this is because regulators expect that IFRS 
adoption will increase the transparency and quality of financial information of Latin 
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American firms in contrast with those prepared according to domestic GAAP (SVS, 2006; 
CNBV, 2008; CVM, 2008; CNV, 2009; CONASEV, 2010). Moreover, financial 
information is one of the major information sources for analysts (Jiao et al., 2012). Thus, 
as the quality of accounting information is expected to improve in the post-IFRS adoption 
period, analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy should improve as well. Secondly, previous 
literature suggests that countries with a big gap between the local standards and IFRS, 
which is the case of Latin American countries, should present an improvement in 
analysts’ forecast accuracy (Byard et al., 2011). Thus, the hypothesis is as follows: 
H5a: The accuracy of earnings forecasts is higher in the post-adoption period than that 
in the pre-adoption period. 
This thesis predicts that there is a reduction in analysts’ forecast dispersion. First, 
as mandatory adoption of IFRS increases the comparability of accounting information 
among firms, analysts can compare target firms’ information with other firms based on 
the same accounting standard. They can also compare their predictions with others, which 
would contribute to the improvement of their forecast accuracy and reduce dispersion 
(Houqe et al., 2014). Accordingly, the number of international analysts following Latin 
American firms could increase. Domestic analysts may also cover firms from other 
markets that published their financial reports according to IFRS, thus, they can also 
benefit from increased comparability (Tan et al., 2011). As such, the disagreement among 
them should reduce. Second, Jiao et al. (2012) suggest that analysts rely on both public 
and private information to generate forecasts. After the IFRS adoption, accounting 
information is expected to increase in quality and quantity, which would help to reduce 
the influence of private information and enhance the usefulness of public information, 
which leads to lower forecast dispersion (Ball, 2006; Jiao et al., 2012; Horton et al., 2013; 
Houqe et al., 2014). Third, this study argues that Latin American firms tend to increase 
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the quality of accounting information via mandatory adoption of IFRS in order to attract 
investments since the financial crisis in mid-2007. In turn, this situation helps to reduce 
analysts’ forecast dispersion. This argument finds its support on the signalling theory, as 
firms can signal the quality of their equity to investors by disclosing extra information 
and adopting additional mechanisms when the cost to rely and verify the information is 
high (Ross, 1979; Barth et al., 2008), which is the case in countries with weak institutional 
settings. Furthermore, Hope, Jin and Kang (2006) and Houqe et al. (2012) suggest that, 
according to the bonding theory, countries with weak investor protection mechanisms 
may have incentives to adopt IFRS in order to improve the comparability of financial 
information. This is because they want to “bond” higher quality of financial statements 
to their weak institutional setting in order to attract investments and increase investors’ 
confidence (Hope et al., 2006). Thus, information in higher quality and quantity help to 
reduce analysts’ disagreement, which leads to the following hypothesis: 
H5b: The dispersion of earnings forecasts is lower in the post-adoption period than that 
in the pre-adoption period. 
According to Lang and Lundholm (1996), the number of analysts following firms 
will increase if there is an improvement in firms’ information environment. Mandatory 
IFRS adoption may reduce analysts’ time and effort in acquiring and processing firms’ 
information (Tan et al., 2011). This reduces the costs and barriers for foreign analysts to 
cover more firms over the world. Prior to IFRS, as there was a huge gap between domestic 
GAAP (mainly suited for taxation purposes) and IFRS (investor and market-orientated), 
international analysts faced greater challenges to follow Latin American firms. However, 
under IFRS, the adaptation costs are lower as analysts are aware of this standard, which 
reduce the barriers for international analysts to follow Latin American countries. A 
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similar trend has occurred in European countries (Byard et al., 2011; Houqe et al., 2014). 
As such, the hypothesis is as follows: 
H5c: The number of analysts following firms is higher in the post-adoption period than 
that in the pre-adoption period. 
This study expands the measures of information environment to target price 
forecasts. It is noteworthy that prior research on the impact of the IFRS adoption 
examined analysts’ information environment by using earnings forecasts only (Byard et 
al., 2011; Jiao et al., 2012; Horton et al., 2013; Preiato et al., 2015). This study conjectures 
that the disagreement among analysts’ target price forecasts will decline in the post-IFRS 
adoption period. Firstly, this is because mandatory adoption of IFRS might improve the 
accounting quality, and thus analysts would generally have more high-quality information 
available from the financial statements. As firms need to disclose more information due 
to the IFRS requirements, the information asymmetry among firms and investors is 
expected to decline. This helps analysts to shape their target price forecast. As such, 
considering that analysts rely on the financial statements to issue their forecasts 
(Bandyopadhyay, Brown and Richardson, 1995; Loh and Mian, 2006), high-quality 
information and lower information asymmetry would help to reduce the dispersion of the 
forecasts (Jiao et al., 2012; Horton et al., 2013). Secondly, earnings forecasts are one of 
the key inputs for predicting target price (Bandyopadhyay et al., 1995; Brav and Lehavy, 
2003; Loh and Mian, 2006), and IFRS leads to higher disclosure and transparency, which 
enables analysts to issue earnings forecasts that are more accurate and less disperse, the 
disagreement in issuing target price should decrease among analysts. Thus, the hypothesis 
is as follows: 
H5d: The dispersion of target price forecast is lower in the post-adoption period than 
that in the pre-adoption period. 
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The second objective of this study is to investigate whether firm-level incentives 
on the implementation of IFRS affect analysts’ information environment. Previous 
studies report that the effects of the adoption of IFRS may be due to firms’ incentives, 
enforcement of accounting standards and investor protection mechanisms (Ball, Kothari 
and Robin, 2000; Ball et al., 2003; Byard et al., 2011; Christensen et al., 2012; 
Christensen et al., 2013; Christensen et al., 2015). As the institutional setting of Latin 
American countries is weak, there are opportunities for managers using their discretion 
on the implementation of IFRS. Moreover, domestic accounting standards were mainly 
focused to suit government and tax needs, and therefore differed from IFRS, which is 
mainly suited to inform investors and external users. Latin American countries 
experienced an economic recession during the post-IFRS period, thus, in order to 
maintain the business growth, managers’ desire of attracting foreign investments becomes 
stronger. IFRS adoption becomes their key signal to investors about the quality of 
accounting information. Therefore, this study sets the following hypothesis: 
H6a: Firms with stronger reporting incentives present a greater improvement in their 
information environment in the post-adoption period in comparison to that in the pre-
adoption period. 
Afterwards, this thesis turns to examine whether mandatory adoption of IFRS can 
improve analysts’ information environment in Latin American countries with weak 
institutional settings of enforcement and investor protection mechanisms after controlling 
for firm-level reporting incentives. In other words, this study investigates whether 
mandatory adoption of IFRS alone can be effective in improving analysts’ information 
environment. The hypothesis is in the following:  




This is because chapter 3 shows that there is no significant improvement in the 
enforcement of accounting standards and investors protection mechanisms between the 
pre- and post-mandatory IFRS adoption period for Latin American countries. This study 
also cannot find any other relevant event concurrent with the same period. Therefore, the 
remaining factors to be considered are the mandatory adoption of IFRS and firm-level 
reporting incentives. 
The third objective of this chapter is to investigate how mandatory adoption of 
IFRS affects analysts’ public information, private information, or both. According to Kim 
and Verrechia (1994) and Byard et al. (2011), IFRS adoption may increase the quality of 
public information, as firms are required to disclose more information in comparison to 
domestic standards. Thus, as financial information is expected to increase in quantity and 
in quality, the precision of analysts’ public information about a firm could increase (Ball, 
2006; Barth et al., 2008; Horton et al., 2013). Moreover, considering that the precision of 
public information increases, analysts could rely more on public information in relation 
to private information in the post-IFRS period. This does not imply that analysts would 
reduce their weighting on the private information. Thus, this study predicts that IFRS 
would improve the precision of public information as well as the precision of public 
information in relation to all available information (consensus)21. Therefore, the 
hypotheses are as follows: 
H7a: The precision of public information is higher in the post-adoption period than that 
in the pre-adoption period. 
H7b: The precision of consensus information is higher in the post-adoption period than 
that in the pre-adoption period.  
                                                 
21 If the precision of public information increases after mandatory adoption of IFRS, this also further 
supports an improvement in the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts. 
145 
 
 The next section illustrates the econometric methodology applied to test the 
hypotheses. 
 
5.5 Research design 
5.5.1 Measures of analysts’ information environment 
 In order to test hypothesis H5, this thesis adopts four metrics to evaluate whether 
analysts’ information environment improved after the IFRS adoption. Several metrics are 
used to evaluate the analysts’ information environment, this approach is also adopted 
seeking more robust results, and also it examines different perspectives of the analysts’ 
information environment for which the results will be helpful for investors, analysts and 
policy makers.22 First, following Lang and Lundholm (1996) and Panaretou et al. (2013), 




𝑡 )/𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1| (14) 
where: 𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑡  denotes current-year (the superscript t) earnings’ forecast error for firm i in 
year t (the subscript t). 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡𝑡  represents the mean of the current-year 
earnings per share for firm i in year t. 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡𝑡  is the realised earnings per share 
collected from the Actual file of I/B/E/S. 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 is the share price in year t-1.24 
The forecasts included are taken during the six months prior the earnings announcement 
date, for further clarification for this calculations and the following calculations, please 
                                                 
22 As these metrics are used also used to investigate the analysts’ information environment for international 
firms in the literature, these metrics are also applicable in investigating the topic in Latin America as 
analysts also cover Latin American and international listed firms. 
23 The share price is the share price of firm i at the beginning of the year t. 
24 This thesis also calculates the median of current-year and one-year-ahead earnings forecasts to estimate 
the forecast error, as it minimizes potential problems associated with mean calculations due to outliers 
(Preiato et al., 2015). The results are similar, which imply the same conclusion.  
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refer to figure 3. This study calculates the one-year-ahead earnings (the superscript t+1) 
forecast error for firm i in year t (𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1) in the same fashion. 
The second metric is the dispersion of current-year earnings forecasts                            
(𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ) of firm i in year t. According to Lang and Lundholm (1996) and Panaretou 
et al. (2013), it equals the standard deviation of forecasted EPS divided by the absolute 
mean of EPS forecast in equation (15)25: 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝑡 = 𝑆𝑡𝐷𝑒𝑣(𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡)/|(𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝑡 )| (15) 
This thesis also calculates the dispersion of one-year-ahead earnings forecasts                   
(𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1) of firm i in year t in the same fashion. The third metric is the log of the 
number of analysts following a firm in the following model (16). 
𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡
𝑡 = log (𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡
𝑡 ) (16) 
where 𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡𝑡  denotes the number of analysts following firm i at deriving current-
year forecast (the superscript t) in year t (the subscript t). This variable is calculated for 
analysts following firm i at deriving one-year-ahead forecasts in the same fashion. 
The fourth metric is the dispersion of current-year target price forecasts of firm i 
in year t (𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝐹𝐸𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ) in model (17). 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝐹𝐸𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝑡 = 𝑆𝑡𝐷𝑒𝑣(𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡)/|(𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡)| (17) 
where 𝑆𝑡𝐷𝑒𝑣(𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡)denotes the standard deviation of current-year target price 
of firm i in year t; 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡 represents the absolute mean of target price 
forecasts of firm i in year t. 
                                                 
25 This study also derives similar results scaling for stock price as in Byard et al. (2011) and Preiato et al. 
(2015). In order to calculate forecasts’ dispersion, there is a requirement of a minimum of two analysts 
issuing forecasts for a firm. 
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This study calculates forecast errors and dispersion of forecasts according to 
forecast observations issued in the first six months26 prior to the earnings announcement 
date of firm i in year t. Other market and accounting variables are calculated according to 
the financial year of firm i. Please also refer to Figure 3. 
Figure 3. Illustration of the calculations of forecast error and forecast dispersion 
 
 
Note: The observations of current-year and one-year-ahead earnings forecast errors, current-year target 
price are collected within the first six months prior to the earnings announcement date of firm i in year t. 
Then, the mean and median of forecast errors of current-year earnings and one-year-ahead earnings are 
calculated according to equation (14), dispersion of current-year earnings, one-year-ahead earning 
according to equation (15), number of analysts that issued forecasts according to model (16) and current-
year target price according to equation (17). These are based on these observations with the first six months 
prior to the earnings announcement date of firm i in year t. Market and accounting variables are calculated 
according to the financial year end of firm i in year t. 
  
 The next section focuses on the approach to investigate hypothesis H5. 
 
5.5.2 Overall impact of mandatory adoption of IFRS  
To examine the overall impact of mandatory adoption of IFRS on analysts’ 
information environment due to hypotheses H5a, H5b, H5c and H5d, this thesis estimates 
seven regressions according to models (18), (19) and (20) in the following.  
                                                 
26 The criterion of the first six months was adopted because the aim is to evaluate the latest forecasts of the 
analysts which would better reflect the impact of IFRS. I did not have enough observations if  one and three 





𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑃𝑆∆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡
𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽5𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐻𝑂𝑅𝐼𝑍𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡








At model (18), 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐸𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡𝑡  is a common variable, which denotes current-year earnings 
forecast error (𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ), one-year-head earnings forecast errors (𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1), dispersion of 
current-year earnings forecast error (𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ), or one-year-ahead earnings forecast 
error (𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1). 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is equal to 1 if the forecasts are derived in the post-IFRS 
period and is 0 otherwise, for firm i at year t. The following variables are control variables. 
𝐸𝑃𝑆∆𝑖,𝑡 is the change in reported earnings of firm i from year t-1 to t scaled by the share 
price in year t-1. It measures firms’ performance (Liang and Riedl, 2014). 𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 are the 
stock returns of firm i in year t-1. It measures whether analysts incorporate all previous 
stock returns in their forecasts (Clement, Hales and Xue, 2011). 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is the natural 
logarithm of market value of equity. This is because there are more analysts following 
large firms, who provide more information. 𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐻𝑂𝑅𝐼𝑍𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡𝑡  is the logarithm of 1 plus 
the average number of days between each analyst’s earnings forecast, and the earnings 
announcement date for firm i in year t. It measures the forecast horizon between the date 
of the forecast and the earnings announcement date. Analysts’ forecast error and 
dispersion may increase when the forecast horizon increases. There are twelve North 
American Industry Classification System (𝑁𝐴𝐼𝐶𝑆𝑖) group for the sampling firms. So, 
there are twelve industry dummies in the model: Dummy 1: Sector 11, agriculture, 
forestry, fishing & hunting; Dummy 2: Sector 21, mining, quarrying, oil & gas extraction; 
Dummy 3: Sector 22, utilities; Dummy 4: Sector 23, construction; Dummy 5: Sector 31-
33, manufacturing; Dummy 6: Sector 42, wholesale trade; Dummy 7: Sector 44-45, retail 
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trade; Dummy 8: Sector 48-49, transportation & warehousing; Dummy 9: Sector 51, 
information; Dummy 10: Sector 54, Professional scientific and technical services; 
Dummy 11: Sector 72, accommodation & food services; Dummy 12: Sector 81 other 
services (exclude public administration, repair & maintenance). These industry dummies 
control for the effect of different operating risks in different industries and the effect of 
different regulations. 𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑌𝑖 is a dummy variable for each country. It captures the 
effect of the institutional setting of the target countries. The results are similar when the 
enforcement proxy of Brown et al. (2014) is included.  
𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡









Model (19) examines the impact of mandatory adoption of IFRS on the logarithm 
of the number of analysts issuing current-year earnings forecasts for the firms in the 
sample (𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ) due to hypothesis H5c. This study also examines the same 
impact on the number of analysts issuing one-year-ahead earnings forecasts                                    
(𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1).  
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝐹𝐸𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑃𝑆∆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽5𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐻𝑂𝑅𝐼𝑍𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡








Model (20) investigates the association between mandatory adoption of IFRS and 
dispersion of current-year target price forecasts (𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝐹𝐸𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ) due to the hypothesis 
H5d. 𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑡  denotes the logarithm of the number of analysts issuing current 
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year target price forecasts for firm i at year t. 𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐻𝑂𝑅𝐼𝑍𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑡  is the logarithm of 1 
plus the average number of days between each analyst’s target price forecast, and the 
earnings announcement date for firm i at year t. The other independent variables are 
defined in the above models. 
The next section focuses on investigating whether firm-level reporting incentives 
play a role in shaping analysts’ information environment. 
5.5.3 Firm-level reporting incentives  
The second objective of this chapter is to investigate whether firms that have 
stronger incentives to adopt IFRS would perceive a greater improvement in analysts’ 
information environment, which matches the hypothesis H6a. Prior research (Ashbaugh, 
2001; Christensen et al., 2007; Barth et al., 2008; Byard et al., 2011; Daske et al., 2013) 
indicates that firms that: (1) are more profitable, (2) have more growth opportunities, (3) 
are more highly leveraged, (4) are more international, and (5) have higher-quality auditors 
have stronger incentives to provide high-quality financial reporting. As such, this study 
follows the model of Byard et al. (2011) by introducing the above five factors into the 
models (21), (22) and (23). They are in the following. 
𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐸𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐸𝑃𝑆∆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡
𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽10𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐻𝑂𝑅𝐼𝑍𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡












𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡 












𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐸𝑃𝑆∆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽9𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐻𝑂𝑅𝐼𝑍𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡








where 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡 equals one if firm i is audited by one of the big 4 auditors in year t, otherwise 
is 0. 𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 is the book to market value ratio for firm i at year t. It is a proxy for growth 
opportunities. 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 is equal to total liabilities divided by total assets; 𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡 is the 
number of stock exchanges that a firm list on. It denotes a firm’s internationality. 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 
is equal to net income divided by total assets.  
This thesis expects that the coefficients on 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡, 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡, 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡  
at the above models 21 and 23 (22) will be significantly negative (positive) whereas the 
coefficient of 𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 will be significantly positive (negative) if a firm has stronger 
reporting incentives and can improve analysts’ information environment. 
Afterwards, this study turns to investigate whether the adoption of IFRS can 
improve analysts’ information environment in Latin American countries with weak 
institutional setting after controlling for the effect of firm-level reporting incentives, 
which is the hypothesis H6b. Therefore, the 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡 dummy is introduced into the 
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following models (24), (25) and (26). These are the main models to investigate whether 
IFRS can be effective in improving analysts’ information environment. 
𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐸𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐸𝑃𝑆∆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡
𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽10𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐻𝑂𝑅𝐼𝑍𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡










𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 
+𝛽5𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 










𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐸𝑃𝑆∆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝑡











This study expects that the coefficient on 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡 will remain consistent to those 
in models (18), (19) and (20) due to the hypothesis H6b. 
The next section examines whether there is a significant association between IFRS 




5.5.4 Analysis of the precision of public, private and consensus information  
The above models demonstrate the impact of mandatory adoption of IFRS on 
analysts’ information environment. This section further examines this topic in relation to 
the precision of the information in order to find whether the improvement on analysts’ 
information environment is due to improvements in the public information, private 
information, or both. The models to investigate the precision of information started with 
Barry and Jennings (1992), and Abarbanell, Lanen and Verrechia (1995). Afterwards, 
Barron et al. (1998) extended their measure in order to model the type and the precision 
of information that analysts use to issue their forecasts. Barron et al. (1998) argue that 
analysts’ forecasts errors are composed of a common and an idiosyncratic error. The 
common part reflects the error in the public information that analysts rely on, whereas the 
idiosyncratic error arises from the error in the private information that analysts rely 
upon27. As such, in order to examine the precision of information after the IFRS adoption, 
this study adopts the approach of Barron et al. (1998) and Byard et al. (2011), which is 
detailed as follows: 
𝑃𝑈𝐵𝐿𝐼𝐶𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐷𝑖,𝑡 𝑁𝑖,𝑡⁄
[(1 − 1 𝑁𝑖,𝑡⁄ )𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡]
2  (27) 
𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑡 =
𝐷𝑖,𝑡
[(1 − 1 𝑁𝑖,𝑡⁄ )𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡]




  (29) 
                                                 
27 Note that the measure for PUBLIC reflects the error arising from both common and private information. 
Nevertheless, the measure for private reflects the forecast dispersion, which only reflects the idiosyncratic 
error arising from private information (Barron et al., 1998). 
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where 𝐷𝑖,𝑡 denotes variance of analysts’ forecasts for firm i in year t. 𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is the squared 
error in the mean forecast, and 𝑁𝑖,𝑡 is the number of forecasts for firm i in year t. Different 
from the approach of Barron et al. (1998) and Byard et al. (2011), this study standardizes28 
the variables of 𝑃𝑈𝐵𝐿𝐼𝐶𝑖,𝑡, 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑡 and 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑆𝑖,𝑡 after the calculations of 
models (27), (28) and (29). This is because the denominator of models (27) and (28) is 
too small in comparison to the numerator, which provides very large numbers and affects 
the scale of the variables in the following model (30).29 After the procedure of 
standardization, this study estimates the association between 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡, and 𝑃𝑈𝐵𝐿𝐼𝐶𝑖,𝑡, 
𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑡 and 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑆𝑖,𝑡 via model (30) respectively. 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐶𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡 is a 
common variable, which denotes 𝑃𝑈𝐵𝐿𝐼𝐶𝑖,𝑡, 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑡 and 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑆𝑖,𝑡. 









In order to maintain the consistency, 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is also standardized in the same 
fashion.30 This study predicts that the coefficient of 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡 associates with 𝑃𝑈𝐵𝐿𝐼𝐶𝑖,𝑡 or 
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑆𝑖,𝑡 positively, which indicates an improvement in the precision of public 
information or consensus information brought by mandatory adoption of IFRS. As 
                                                 
28 The standardization consists of subtracting for each variable the mean of the variable and scaling by its 
standard deviation. 
29 This study finds similar results by following the method of Byard et al. (2011), and by bootstrapping the 
sample 1000 times. 
30 As in Byard et al. (2011), 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is used as the only control variable because it is the variable that has 
higher influence over the quantity and quality of the information available. Another variable such as the 
number of analysts following could also affect the precision of information, the inferences are similar if 
𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡
𝑡  is included. 
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analysts may still rely on private information, therefore, this thesis does not exclude the 
possibility of the positive association between 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑡.  
The data and sampling procedures of this study are presented in the next section. 
 
5.6 Data and sampling procedures 
The target population of this research is all publicly listed companies excluding 
banks and financial institutions in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Peru. The other 
Latin American countries are excluded either because they adopted IFRS after 2014, or 
their required data was not available. Data for the sample were obtained from the Detail 
file of the Institutional Brokers' Estimate System (I/B/E/S). The actual earnings per share 
data are also taken from the Actual file of I/B/E/S. The market and financial data are from 
the DataStream database. Although I/B/E/S starts covering analysts’ EPS forecasts since 
1980, coverage in Latin America is limited because analysts tend to follow only large 
firms, which have higher trading volumes (Hayes, 1998). Therefore, the number of 
analysts following firms in Latin America is lower in comparison with developed nations. 
After the introduction of IFRS, the number of analysts following firms increases for all 
five countries in the sample. This thesis divides the sample period into two reporting 
regimes: the pre-adoption window is the last four fiscal years a firm reported using its 
domestic standards, whereas the post-adoption window is the first four years a firm 
reported using IFRS31. There are 618 firms on the Detail File of I/B/E/S, however, 
excluding the financial sector, there are 534 companies. Panel A of table 12 reports the 
sample structure of the five countries. In order to include as many sample firms as 
possible, this study includes firms whose data is available in at least one of the eight years 
                                                 
31 Unlike the analyses on previous chapters, this thesis adopts 4 years before and after the IFRS adoption 
for this analysis in order to increase the sample size. This is due to limited number of analysts issuing 
forecasts for Latin American firms. 
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around the official date of IFRS adoption. Panel B shows that there is 1 firm from 
Argentina, 76 firms from Brazil, 17 firms from Chile, 3 firms from Mexico and no firms 























































                                                 
32 This is the number of firms with available data for all control variables regarding earnings forecasts. 
The number of firms for the other analyses is different due to data availability. The number of firms for 
each analysis is indicated at the bottom of each table. 
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Table 12. Sample structure 2003-2015 
Panel A. Number of firms from I/B/E/S    
NAICS Argentina Brazil Chile Mexico Peru Total 
11 3 1 3 2  9 
21 7 17 8 9 16 57 
22 12 30 20 7 5 74 
23 8 13 16 25 6 68 
31–33 16 41 29 38 22 146 
42       
44–45 1 18 9 17 1 46 
48–49 3 11 8 4  26 
51 1 2 2 7 1 13 
54 1 3 1 2  7 
72  4 6 10 2 22 
81 3 34 6 19 4 66 
Total 55 174 108 140 57 534 
Panel B. Number of firms whose data is available at least for one of the years during the period of eight 
years around the date of mandatory adoption of IFRS.33 
NAICS Argentina Brazil Chile Mexico Peru Total 
11  1 1   2 
21  5 2   7 
22  5 6   11 
23  6 0   6 
31–33  17 3 1  21 
42       
44–45  8 2 1  11 
48–49  7 1 1  9 
51 1 1    2 
54  1    1 
72   1   1 
81   25 1   26 
Total 1 76 17 3 0 97 
Note: Panel A reports the number of firms downloaded from IBES for the sample period from 2004 to 
2015. NAICS 11: agriculture, forestry, fishing & hunting; NAICS 21: mining, quarrying, oil & gas 
extraction; NAICS 22: utilities; NAICS 23: construction; NAICS 31–33: manufacturing; NAICS 42: 
wholesale trade; NAICS 44–45: retail trade; NAICS 48–49: transportation & warehousing; NAICS 51: 
information; NAICS 54: Professional scientific & technical services; NAICS 72: accommodation & food 
services; NAICS 81: other services (excluded public administration, religious organization, grantmaking & 
giving services, voluntary organization, social advisory services, human right organization, civil and social 
organization, business & professional, political & labour organization, business association, professional 
organization, private household etc.). Panel B shows the number of firms whose data is available for at least 
one year between the four years before and after the date of mandatory adoption of IFRS. 
 The next table illustrates the descriptive statistics of the variables. 
                                                 
33 This thesis derives similar results for 115 firms which some of the control variables are not available 
through the 8 years of data. Respectively: Argentina: 1, Brazil: 82, Chile: 28, and Mexico: 4. Moreover, the 
sample size is higher for analysts issuing target price forecasts. There are 225 firms with data following the 
sampling criteria; however, this analysis is limited by the number of firms with available earnings’ 
announcement dates. Moreover, the sample size is higher for the analysis regarding the number of analysts 




Table 13. Descriptive statistics  
 Pre Post 
 Obs Mean Median Std. Dev Obs Mean Median Std. Dev 
Test variables         
𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝑡  257 0.0415 0.0116 0.173 369 0.0312** 0.00842 0.163 
𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝑡+1 267 0.103 0.0225 0.348 354 0.105 0.0187 0.517 
𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡
𝑡  264 1.394 1.386 1.006 371 1.871*** 2.079*** 1.001 
𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡
𝑡+1 272 1.412 1.386 1.005 354 1.993*** 2.197*** 0.964 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝑡  202 0.0216 0.0107 0.0290 325 0.0199 0.0103 0.0280 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝑡+1 223 0.0283 0.0168 0.0374 329 0.0263** 0.0125** 0.0446 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝐹𝐸𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝑡  238 0.0850 0.0306 0.152 348 0.0702** 0.0444** 0.0993 
𝑃𝑈𝐵𝐿𝐼𝐶𝑖,𝑡 168 -0.125 0.259 1.018 308 0.0682* 0.356* 0.819 
𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑡 168 0.0784 -0.298 0.973 308 -0.0428 -0.379 0.853 
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑆𝑖,𝑡 168 -0.246 -0.153 1.063 308 0.134*** 0.325*** 0.762 
         
Incentives variables         
𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡 264 0.898 1 0.304 371 0.906 1 0.293 
𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 234 0.647 0.495 0.547 366 0.683 0.571** 0.602 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 259 1.431 0.970 2.301 369 1.641 1.230 1.830 
𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡 264 0.345 0 0.707 371 0.240 0 0.605 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 259 0.0480 0.0497 0.0714 369 0.0404 0.0457 0.0872 
         
Control variables         
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 237 7.330 7.245 1.263 368 7.535** 7.527** 1.189 
𝐸𝑃𝑆∆𝑖,𝑡 219 -0.00746 -0.00936 0.0590 360 0.00833*** 0*** 0.0576 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 144 0.0891 -0.00335 0.486 268 0.0295 -0.0708* 0.446 
𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐻𝑂𝑅𝐼𝑍𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡
𝑡  260 4.501 4.727 0.793 365 4.501 4.700 0.705 
𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐻𝑂𝑅𝐼𝑍𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡
𝑡+1 289 6.243 6.256 0.232 365 6.238 6.240 0.257 
𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐻𝑂𝑅𝐼𝑍𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝑡  233 4.014 3.912 0.442 330 4.010 3.970 0.337 
𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡
𝑡  264 1.394 1.386 1.006 371 1.871*** 2.079*** 1.001 
𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡
𝑡+1 272 1.412 1.386 1.005 354 1.993*** 2.197*** 0.964 
𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝑡  261 2.511 2.708 1.299 357 3.237*** 3.526*** 1.259 
*, **, *** significant difference between means (medians) in Pre and in Post at 10%, 5%, 1% level, two-
tailed test. 
Table 13 shows that the current-year earnings forecast error (𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ) is lower in the 
post-IFRS period, and the difference between the pre- and the post-adoption period is 
significant at 5%. In contrast, the one-year-ahead earnings forecast error (𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1) is not 
significantly reduced in the post-IFRS adoption period. The dispersion of current-year 
earnings forecasts (𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ) is lower in the post-IFRS period; however, the difference 
is not statistically significant. The dispersion of one-year-ahead earnings forecasts 
(𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1) is lower in the post-adoption period and the difference between the two 
periods is statistically significant at 5%. The dispersion of current-year target price 
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forecasts (𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝐹𝐸𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ) is lower in the post-adoption period and the difference between 
the two periods is statistically significant at 5%. 𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡𝑡  and 𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 
are higher in the post-IFRS adoption period and their differences between the two periods 
are statistically significant at 1%. This suggests that the number of analysts following 
firms increased in the post-adoption period. The dispersion of current year target price 
forecasts declines in the post-IFRS period and its difference between the two periods is 
statistically significant at 5%. 𝑃𝑈𝐵𝐿𝐼𝐶𝑖,𝑡 and 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑆𝑖,𝑡 are higher in the post-IFRS 
adoption period than those in the pre-IFRS adoption period, and the difference is 
statistically significant at 10% and 1% respectively. These suggest that the precision of 
public and consensus information increased in the post-adoption period. However, there 
is no significant difference in 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑡 between the pre- and the post-IFRS adoption 
period. This suggests that there is no significant improvement in the precision of private 
information across the two periods. Overall, these results suggest that there is an 
improvement in analysts’ information environment in the post-adoption period.  
With regard to the incentives variables, only the difference of book-to-market 
value (𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡) between the pre- and post-IFRS adoption periods is statistically 
significant at 5%. For the control variables, the differences of 𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐻𝑂𝑅𝐼𝑍𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡𝑡 , 
𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐻𝑂𝑅𝐼𝑍𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡
𝑡+1 and for 𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐻𝑂𝑅𝐼𝑍𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑡  between the pre- and post-IFRS adoption 
period are statistically insignificant. These suggest that there is no significant change in 
analysts’ pattern of issuing forecasts. The differences of 𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡𝑡 , 
𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡
𝑡+1 and 𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑡  between the pre- and post-IFRS adoption 
period are statistically significant at 1%. Moreover, the log of market value (𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡), and 
the change in earnings per share (𝐸𝑃𝑆∆𝑖,𝑡) are higher in the post-adoption period in 
comparison to the pre-adoption period. Thus, firms are larger in the post-IFRS period and 
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there might be less earnings smoothing as the changes in earnings per share are 
significantly higher. 
The next section examines whether firms’ incentives play a role in shaping 
analysts’ information environment. 
 
5.6.1 Further univariate analysis for firm-level reporting incentives 
 In order to examine whether firm-level reporting incentives affect the analysts’ 
information environment, this study compares analysts’ earnings forecast errors and 
dispersion of earnings forecasts between firms with reporting incentives and firms 
without reporting incentives: (a) in 8 years around the IFRS adoption date, (b) in 4 years 
after the IFRS adoption date, and (c) only for firms with reporting incentives in 8 years 
around the IFRS adoption date. This study classifies a firm with or without reporting 
incentives based on five incentives variables as follows: (i) firms audited by big 4 audit 
firms versus the other audit firms, 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡; (ii) more internationalized firms versus less 
internationalized firms, 𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡; (iii) more profitable firms versus less profitable firms, 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡; (iv) firms with a greater debt ratio versus firms with a lower debt ratio, 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡; 
and (v) firms with more growth opportunities versus their counterparties, 𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡. This 
thesis classifies a firm with reporting incentives if it is audited by one of the Big 4 auditing 
firms (𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡) or lists on foreign stock exchanges (𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡). It is classified as the one 
without reporting incentives if it is audited by other auditing firms or only lists on 
domestic stock exchange. Similarly, a firm is classified with reporting incentives if its 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡, or 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 are above the average values of the variables in the same industry, 
otherwise it is classified as without reporting incentives. For 𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡, a firm is classified 
with reporting incentives if it has a lower than average value of the variable in the same 
industry, whereas their counterparties are those firms without reporting incentives.  
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Table 14. Changes in current year earnings forecast errors (𝑭𝑬𝒊,𝒕𝒕 ) for firms with reporting 
incentives and firms without reporting incentives  
Panel A. 𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑡  of firms with and without reporting incentives in 8 years around the IFRS adoption date  
Period/Incentives Statistics 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡 𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 
No incentives 
obs 56 517 288 437 246 
Mean  0.0780 0.0372 0.0590 0.0245 0.0342 
Incentives 
obs 570 109 338 189 380 
Mean  0.0312 0.0268 0.0152 0.0606 0.0361 
Incentives-No 
incentives 
Dif. -0.0468*** -0.0104* -0.0438*** 0.0361*** 0.0019*** 
Z-Wilcoxon -5.426 -1.731 -5.833 5.378 7.223 
Panel B. 𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑡  of firms with and without reporting incentives in 4 years after the IFRS adoption date 
No incentives 
obs 33 313 178 244 147 
Mean  0.0497 0.0314 0.0529 0.0242 0.0301 
Incentives 
obs 336 56 191 125 222 
Mean  0.0293 0.0292 0.0108 0.0446 0.0317 
Incentives-No 
incentives 
Dif. -0.0204*** -0.0022 -0.0421*** 0.0204*** 0.0016*** 
Z-Wilcoxon -5.052 -1.613 -5.232 3.766 6.62 
Panel C. 𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑡  of firms with incentives in 8 years around the IFRS adoption date 
Pre-adoption period 
obs 234 53 147 64 158 
Mean  0.0338 0.0242 0.0209 0.0918 0.0423 
Post-adoption period 
obs 336 56 191 125 222 
Mean  0.0293 0.0292 0.0108 0.0446 0.0318 
Post-Pre 
Dif. -0.0045*** 0.0050 -0.0101*** -0.0472** -0.0105*** 
Z-Wilcoxon -3.169 0.485 -3.157 -2.526 -3.535 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 significant difference between means in Pre and in Post, two-tailed test. 
 
Panel A of table 14 reports that the differences in the mean of current-year forecast 
errors (𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ) between firms with incentives and firms without incentives in 8 years 
around the IFRS adoption date defined by the above five variables are statistically 
significant at 1% and 10% respectively. Nevertheless, the forecast error for highly 
leveraged firms and with more growth opportunities is bigger, and the difference is 
significant at 1%. This implies that analysts have a challenging time to issue forecasts for 
these firms, as highly leveraged firms may defer the recognition of news in case this news 
does not help to improve the firms’ financial position, whereas there are higher 
expectations for firms with more growth opportunities, which can affect the forecasting 
ability of analysts.  
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Panel B shows the difference of current year forecast errors 𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑡   between firms 
with incentives and firms without incentives in 4 years after the IFRS adoption date are 
statistically significant at 1%, except the firms classified by 𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡. This suggests that 
the current earnings forecast errors for firms with incentives are significantly lower than 
that for firms without incentives in 4 years after the IFRS adoption date. The results of 
firms classified by 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 and 𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 are similar to that in Panel A. 
Panel C reports that the current year forecast errors for firms with incentives in 
the post-adoption period is lower than that in the pre-adoption period and this difference 
is statistically significant at 1%, except the firms classified by 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡. This suggests that 
for firms with incentives, there is a greater improvement in analysts’ information 
environment in the post-adoption period. These suggest that firms’ reporting incentives 
help to shape analysts’ information environment besides the impact of mandatory 
adoption of IFRS.    
 Table 15 reports the same analysis in the same fashion with regard to one-year-
ahead forecasts.  
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Table 15. Changes in one-year-ahead earnings forecast errors (𝑭𝑬𝒊,𝒕𝒕+𝟏) for firms with reporting 
incentives and firms without reporting incentives 
Panel A. 𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 of firms with and without incentives in 8 years around the IFRS adoption date 
Period/Incentives Statistics 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡 𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 
No incentives 
obs 56 518 277 440 244 
Mean  0.2071 0.1157 0.1562 0.0890 0.1411 
Incentives 
obs 565 103 344 181 377 
Mean  0.0944 0.0486 0.0630 0.1424 0.0809 
Incentives-No 
incentives 
Dif. -0.1127*** -0.0672 -0.0933*** 0.0534*** -0.0602*** 
Z-Wilcoxon -4.774 -0.024 -5.823 5.158 -5.022 
Panel B. 𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 of firms with and without incentives in 4 years after the IFRS adoption date 
No incentives 
obs 30 302 164 237 140 
Mean  0.1557 0.1131 0.1479 0.0990 0.1631 
Incentives 
obs 324 52 190 117 214 
Mean  0.1008 0.0610 0.0689 0.1186 0.0678 
Incentives-No 
incentives 
Dif. -0.0548*** -0.0522 -0.0790*** 0.0196*** -0.0953*** 
Z-Wilcoxon -4.446 -0.345 -5.154 4.385 -4.926 
Panel C. 𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 of firms with incentives in 8 years around the IFRS adoption date 
Pre 
obs 241 51 154 64 163 
Mean  0.0858 0.0359 0.0557 0.1860 0.0982 
Post 
obs 324 52 190 117 214 
Mean  0.1008 0.0610 0.0689 0.1186 0.0678 
Post-Pre 
Dif. 0.0150** 0.0250 0.0131** -0.0674 -0.0304*** 
Z-Wilcoxon 2.363 0.053 2.606 -0.789 2.764 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 significant difference between means in Pre and in Post, two-tailed test. 
 
 It is worth noting that the results of table 15 are similar to those of table 14. Next, 
table 16 reports the changes in dispersion of current-year earnings forecasts                                  
(𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ) for firms with incentives and firms without incentives in the same fashion of 









Table 16. Changes in the dispersion of current year earnings forecasts (𝑫𝑰𝑺𝑷𝑭𝑬𝒊,𝒕𝒕 ) for firms with 
reporting incentives and firms without reporting incentives 
Panel A. 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑡  of firms with and without incentives in 8 years around the IFRS adoption date 
Period/Incentives Statistics 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡 𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 
No incentives 
obs 40 437 234 371 199 
Mean  0.0407 0.0195 0.0268 0.0173 0.0299 
Incentives 
obs 487 90 293 156 328 
Mean  0.0188 0.0255 0.0154 0.0281 0.0148 
Incentives-No 
incentives 
Dif. -0.0219*** 0.0060** -0.0114*** 0.0108*** -0.0151*** 
Z-Wilcoxon -4.035 2.038 -4.634 3.615 -7.046 
Panel B. 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑡  of firms with and without incentives in 4 years after the IFRS adoption date 
No incentives 
Obs 25 274 154 216 123 
Mean  0.0403 0.0188 0.0271 0.0269 0.0299 
Incentives 
Obs 310 51 171 109 202 
Mean  0.0181 0.0252 0.0133 0.0162 0.0137 
Incentives-No 
incentives 
Dif. -0.0222*** 0.0064 -0.0138*** -0.0107** -0.0162*** 
Z-Wilcoxon -3.724 1.59 -4.514 -2.314 -6.78 
Panel C. 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑡  of firms with incentives in 8 years around the IFRS adoption date 
Pre 
Obs 187 39 122 47 126 
Mean  0.0200 0.0259 0.0184 0.0309 0.0165 
Post 
Obs 300 51 171 109 202 
Mean  0.0181 0.0252 0.0133 0.0269 0.0137 
Post-Pre 
Dif. -0.0019 -0.0007 -0.0051** -0.0040 -0.0028** 
Z-Wilcoxon 1.44 0.313 -2.283 1.574 -2.44 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
According to table 16, Panel A, firms with stronger auditors, greater profitability, 
and more growth opportunities present a significantly lower dispersion. Nevertheless, the 
analysts’ forecast dispersion is higher for firms that list on foreign stock exchanges as 
well as highly leveraged firms. This might relate to the number of analysts that cover 
firms that are more international, which creates room for more differing opinions, and a 
higher forecast dispersion. Moreover, similar to the analysis regarding forecast error, 
highly leveraged firms are under the scrutiny of debt holders, and might delay the 
recognition of news, which creates room for more differing opinions. Panel B shows that 
in the post-adoption period all subsample groups, apart from firms that are more 
international, present a lower forecast dispersion. Similar to the analysis of table 14, this 
indicates that firms’ incentives play a role in shaping their information environment. 
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Finally, Panel C shows that the forecast dispersion is lower for highly profitable firms in 
the post-adoption period in comparison to the pre-adoption period, and the difference is 
significant at 5%.  
 Table 17 illustrates the same analysis regarding the dispersion of one-year-ahead 
forecasts. 
Table 17. Changes in the dispersion of one-year-ahead earnings forecasts (𝑫𝑰𝑺𝑷𝑭𝑬𝒊,𝒕𝒕+𝟏) for firms 
with reporting incentives and firms without reporting incentives  
Panel A. 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 of firms with and without incentives in 8 years around the IFRS adoption date 
Period/Incentives Statistics 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡 𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 
No incentives 
Obs 43 461 240 393 213 
Mean  0.0446 0.0261 0.0358 0.0235 0.0352 
Incentives 
obs 509 91 312 159 339 
Mean  0.0256 0.0324 0.0204 0.0360 0.0220 
Incentives-No 
incentives 
Dif. -0.0190*** 0.0063* -0.0154*** 0.0125*** -0.0132*** 
Z-Wilcoxon -3.503 1.926 -4.471 3.239 -5.869 
Panel B. 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 of firms with and without incentives in 4 years after the IFRS adoption date 
No incentives 
obs 23 280 151 221 127 
Mean  0.0456 0.0253 0.0372 0.0216 0.0366 
Incentives 
obs 306 49 178 108 202 
Mean  0.0249 0.0323 0.0171 0.0360 0.0199 
Incentives-No 
incentives 
Dif. -0.0207*** 0.007* -0.0202*** 0.0143** -0.0167*** 
Z-Wilcoxon -3.207 1.836 -3.667 2.134 -6.239 
Panel C. 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 of firms with incentives in 8 years around the IFRS adoption date 
Pre 
obs 203 42 134 51 137 
Mean  0.0268 0.0324 0.0248 0.0362 0.0251 
Post 
obs 306 49 178 108 202 
Mean  0.0249 0.0323 0.0171 0.0360 0.0199 
Post-Pre 
Dif. -0.0019** -0.0001 -0.0078** -0.00024* -0.0053*** 
Z-Wilcoxon -2.654 -0.151 -2.466 -1.88 -3.687 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 significant difference between means in Pre and in Post, two-tailed test. 
 
 The results are similar to those of table 16. The next analysis is with regard to 






Table 18. Changes in the dispersion of target price forecasts (𝑫𝑰𝑺𝑷𝑭𝑬𝑻𝑷𝒊,𝒕𝒕 ) for firms with 
reporting incentives and firms without reporting incentives 
Panel A. 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝐹𝐸𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑡  of firms with and without incentives in 8 years around the IFRS adoption date 
Period/Incentives Statistics 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡 𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 
No incentives 
obs 52 481 269 411 230 
Mean  0.0666 0.0781 0.0955 0.0680 0.0756 
Incentives 
obs 534 105 317 175 356 
Mean  0.0771 0.0674 0.0598 0.0953 0.0765 
Incentives-No 
incentives 
Dif. 0.0105 -0.0107 -0.0357*** 0.0332*** 0.0009* 
Z-Wilcoxon 1.04 -1.296 -3.345 2.831 1.687 
Panel B. 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝐹𝐸𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑡  of firms with and without incentives in 4 years after the IFRS adoption date 
No incentives 
obs 29 290 166 230 208 
Mean  0.0701 0.0726 0.0949 0.0626 0.0869 
Incentives 
obs 319 58 182 118 140 
Mean  0.0702 0.0582 0.0476 0.0849 0.0589 
Incentives-No 
incentives 
Dif. 0.0001 -0.0144 -0.0473*** 0.0288 -0.0340*** 
Z-Wilcoxon 0.301 -1.144 -4.081 1.55 -3.414 
Panel C. 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝐹𝐸𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑡  of firms with incentives in 8 years around the IFRS adoption date 
Pre 
obs 215 47 135 57 148 
Mean  0.0874 0.0788 0.0762 0.1168 0.1013 
Post 
obs 319 58 182 118 208 
Mean  0.0702 0.0582 0.0476 0.0849 0.0589 
Post-Pre 
Dif. -0.0172** -0.0207 -0.0286 -0.0319 -0.0424 
Z-Wilcoxon -2.044 -0.982 -0.75 -0.134 -0.236 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 significant difference between means in Pre and in Post, two-tailed test. 
 
From table 18, Panel A, the dispersion of target price forecast is lower for firms 
with greater profitability. However, highly leveraged firms and firms with bigger growth 
opportunities present larger dispersion in comparison with their counterparties. These 
illustrate a greater disagreement among analysts in relation to target price forecasts for 
these firms. Panel B shows that the target price dispersion is significantly reduced for 
highly profitable firms and firms with bigger growth opportunities in the post-IFRS 
period. These illustrate that firms with stronger reporting incentives perceive a greater 
improvement in their information environment. Finally, Panel C indicates that analysts’ 
target price dispersion improves in the post-adoption period in relation to that in the pre-
adoption period for firms that are audited by stronger auditors. Thus, this further 
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illustrates that IFRS can improve analysts’ information environment even for firms with 
incentives.  
In summary, the results of tables 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18 suggest that IFRS can bring 
further improvement in analysts’ forecasts dispersion for firms with stronger reporting 
incentives.  
The next section presents the results of these analyses. 
 
5.7 Results 
5.7.1 Overall effect of the IFRS adoption (H5) 
 Table 19 reports the results of estimating models (18), (19) and (20), which regress 
the analysts’ information environment (measured by 𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑡 , 𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1, 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝑡 , 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1, 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝐹𝐸𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑡 , 𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡𝑡  and 𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1) on 
𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡 and the control variables. These results demonstrate whether the mandatory 
adoption of IFRS could improve the analysts’ information environment in Latin 























𝑡  𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑡  𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝐹𝐸𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑡  𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡𝑡  𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 
         
𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡 -/+ -0.0472** 0.0736 -0.00782** 0.00893 -0.0328* 0.406*** 0.406*** 
  (-1.993) (0.872) (-2.106) (1.347) (-1.759) (4.954) (5.661) 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 -/+ 0.0311* -0.133 -0.00476* -0.0114* 0.00522 0.283*** 0.324*** 
  (1.698) (-1.290) (-1.836) (-1.710) (0.242) (3.203) (4.343) 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 0.0317 0.165 0.00623 0.0214** 0.0448***   
  (0.577) (1.547) (1.042) (2.049) (3.025)   
𝐸𝑃𝑆∆𝑖,𝑡 +/- 0.602 0.320 0.00781 -0.0196 0.0475   
  (1.250) (0.852) (0.264) (-0.403) (0.309)   
𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡
𝑡  - -0.0109  0.00566***     
  (-0.949)  (2.776)     
𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐻𝑂𝑅𝐼𝑍𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡
𝑡  + 0.00287  -0.00268     
  (0.487)  (-1.137)     
𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡
𝑡+1 -  0.0126  0.000791    
   (1.603)  (0.995)    
𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐻𝑂𝑅𝐼𝑍𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡
𝑡+1 +  -0.0691  -0.00355    
   (-1.115)  (-0.231)    
𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝑡  -     0.000410   
      (1.185)   
𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐻𝑂𝑅𝐼𝑍𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝑡  +     0.0383*   
      (1.948)   
Fixed effects         
NAICS  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
COUNTRY  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
         
Constant  -0.206 1.347 0.0698** 0.119 -0.128 -1.656** -0.873 
  (-1.315) (1.647) (2.420) (1.318) (-0.942) (-2.346) (-1.597) 
         
Adjusted R-squared 0.115 0.084 0.044 0.046 0.038 0.192 0.216 
Observations  400 402 385 394 523 605 599 
Number of firms 98 96 94 96 110 115 112 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The results show that the coefficients on 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡 are significantly negative for the 
regressions on 𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑡  and 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑡 , as well as for the regression of 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝐹𝐸𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑡  at 5% 
and 10%, respectively. These indicate that analysts’ forecast errors and dispersion 
decrease in the post-IFRS adoption period. In contrast, for the regressions of 𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 
and 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1, the coefficients on 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡 are insignificantly positive. This indicates 
that there are no significant changes in analysts’ one-year-ahead earnings forecast errors 
and dispersion in the post-IFRS adoption period. This may be because analysts already 
digest the effect of IFRS adoption on firms’ accounting information quality in the year of 
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adoption. This good accounting information quality could be maintained in the future. In 
other words, they already reflect this consideration in one-year-ahead earnings forecasts. 
For the regressions of 𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡𝑡  and 𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1, the estimated 
coefficients on 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡 are significantly positive at 1%. These suggest that there are more 
analysts following firms in the post-IFRS adoption period. This may be due to increased 
disclosed financial information according to IFRS. In summary, the above results indicate 
that analysts’ information environment improves in the post-IFRS adoption period. As 
Chapter 6 shows that there are no significant changes in the enforcement of accounting 
standards and investor protection mechanisms around the IFRS adoption date, this thesis 
attributes these results to be the cause of IFRS adoption and firm-level reporting 
incentives. This study further investigates which of these two factors explain the changes 
in analysts’ information environment in the following sections.  
The coefficients on 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 are statistically significant for the regressions of 𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑡 , 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝑡  and 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 at 10% respectively. These suggest that the current-year 
earnings forecast error of analysts following bigger firms is slightly higher whereas their 
dispersion is lower. Moreover, the coefficients on 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 for the regressions of 
𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡
𝑡  and 𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 are significantly positive, which illustrates that 
larger firms have more analysts following them. The estimated coefficients on 𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 are 
significantly positive at 5% and 1% for the regressions on 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 and 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝐹𝐸𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑡 . 
These indicate that analysts refer to stock returns to derive their forecasts. However, this 
result illustrates that if analysts rely more on stock returns, their disagreement increases. 
The estimated coefficient on 𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡𝑡  is only significant for the regression of 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝑡 . This coefficient is significantly positive, which is against the prediction. 
However, it is worth noting that more analysts following firms create room for increased 
disagreement among analysts (Houqe et al., 2014), which explains these results. Lastly, 
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the estimated coefficient on 𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐻𝑂𝑅𝐼𝑍𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑡  is significantly positive, which indicates 
that the dispersion of target price forecasts is higher if the forecast horizon is longer. The 
above results are consistent with hypotheses, H5a, H5b, H5c, H5d. 
The next section reports the tests on firm-level reporting incentives, and if firms’ 
incentives affect the overall effect of the IFRS adoption. 
 
5.7.2 The impact of firm-level reporting incentives on analysts’ information 
environment 
 This section investigates how firm-level reporting incentives affect analysts’ 
information environment based on models (21), (22) and (23) by regressing the analysts’ 
information environment (measured by 𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑡 , 𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1, 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑡 , 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1, 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝐹𝐸𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝑡 , 𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡𝑡  and 𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1) on variables that denote firm-level 






















𝑡  𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑡  𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝐹𝐸𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑡  𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡𝑡  𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 
         
𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡 -/+ -0.0935 0.0140 0.0136 -0.0253 0.00140 -0.270 0.595*** 
  (-1.261) (0.0630) (1.342) (-1.282) (0.0309) (-1.184) (5.567) 
𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 +/- -0.00215 -0.0530 0.0106* 0.0162 -0.00625 0.318*** 0.220** 
  (-0.137) (-0.520) (1.873) (1.239) (-0.304) (2.640) (1.983) 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 -/+ -5.43e-05 0.0787 -0.000660 2.92e-05 -0.0147*** 0.0138 0.125 
  (-0.00784) (1.122) (-0.820) (0.00402) (-3.608) (0.522) (1.498) 
𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡  -/+ -0.0193 -0.0394 -0.00385* 0.00429 0.0210 0.0594 0.000180 
  (-1.326) (-0.773) (-1.905) (0.895) (1.607) (0.645) (0.00793) 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 -/+ -0.289 -0.843 -0.0196 -0.127 -0.262*** -0.744 -0.524 
  (-1.147) (-0.893) (-0.835) (-1.575) (-3.671) (-1.245) (-0.975) 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 -/+ 0.0276 -0.103 -0.00140 -0.000453 0.00144 0.555*** 0.550*** 
  (1.307) (-1.064) (-0.425) (-0.0477) (0.0892) (6.063) (6.500) 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 0.0237 0.105 0.00721 0.0205** 0.0476***   
  (0.421) (1.338) (1.104) (2.074) (3.188)   
𝐸𝑃𝑆∆𝑖,𝑡 -/+ 0.525 0.192 0.00788 -0.0659 -0.00430   
  (1.414) (0.453) (0.287) (-0.999) (-0.0288)   
𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡
𝑡  - -0.0369  0.000793     
  (-1.518)  (0.333)     
𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐻𝑂𝑅𝐼𝑍𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡
𝑡  + 0.00431  -0.00270     
  (0.786)  (-1.240)     
𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡
𝑡+1 -  0.0163  0.000502    
   (1.098)  (0.384)    
𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐻𝑂𝑅𝐼𝑍𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡
𝑡+1 +  -0.0724  0.00381    
   (-0.932)  (0.221)    
𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝑡  -     7.19e-05   
      (0.273)   
𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐻𝑂𝑅𝐼𝑍𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝑡  +     0.0260   
      (1.485)   
Fixed Effects         
NAICS  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
COUNTRY  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant  -0.132 1.348 0.0349 0.0168 0.0896 -2.617*** -2.429*** 
  (-0.979) (1.439) (1.087) (0.119) (0.649) (-3.560) (-3.572) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.102 0.130 0.038 0.110 0.094 0.146 0.151 
Observations  399 401 384 393 520 600 594 
Number of Firms 97 95 93 95 109 114 111 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 20 shows that 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is significantly associated with the number of analysts 
issuing one-year-ahead earnings forecasts (𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1) at 1%. 𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 is 
significantly associated with 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑡 , 𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡𝑡  and 𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 at 10%, 
1% and 5% respectively. These suggest that the dispersion of current-year earnings 
forecasts is lower for firms with greater growth opportunities, whereas there are more 
analysts following firms with lower growth opportunities. The coefficient of 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 is 
172 
 
significantly negative in the regression of 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝐹𝐸𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑡 , which indicates that the 
dispersion of current-year target price forecasts is higher for highly leveraged firms. The 
coefficient on 𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡 is significantly negative at 10% in the regression of  𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑡 , 
which indicates that the dispersion of current-year earnings forecasts is lower for firms 
that list on foreign exchange markets. Lastly, the coefficient of 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is significantly 
negative at 1% for the regression of 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝐹𝐸𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑡 , which indicates that the dispersion of 
target price forecasts is lower for firms with greater profitability. Overall, these results 
indicate that firms’ reporting incentives do affect analysts’ information environment to a 
certain degree. This is consistent to the hypothesis H6a and the results of the univariate 
analysis at Section 5.7.1. 
The next section focuses on identifying the effect of IFRS controlling for firm-
level reporting incentives. 
 
5.7.3 Impact of mandatory adoption of IFRS on analysts’ information environment 
after controlling for firm-level reporting incentives 
According to the results in tables 19 and 20, this study turns to examine whether 
mandatory adoption of IFRS helps to improve analysts’ information environment after 
controlling for firm-level reporting incentives based on models (24), (25) and (26), which 
regress the analysts’ information environment (measured by 𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑡 , 𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1, 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝑡 , 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1, 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝐹𝐸𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑡 , 𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡𝑡  and 𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1) on 
𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡, firm-level reporting incentives (𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡, 𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡, 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡, 𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡, 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡) as 






Table 21. Impact of mandatory adoption of IFRS on analysts’ information environment after 







𝑡  𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑡  𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝐹𝐸𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑡  𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡𝑡  𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 
         
𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡 -/+ -0.0487** 0.0687 -0.00877** 0.00784 -0.0528*** 0.380*** 0.406*** 
  (-1.962) (0.922) (-2.475) (1.227) (-3.139) (4.676) (5.664) 
𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡 -/+ -0.0878 0.0314 0.0159 0.0193 -0.0357 0.0285 0.0689 
  (-1.198) (0.132) (1.462) (1.273) (-0.754) (0.120) (0.434) 
𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 +/- 0.00778 -0.0634 0.0129** 0.0150 0.00984 0.173* 0.0614 
  (0.499) (-0.679) (2.195) (1.331) (0.476) (1.680) (0.648) 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 -/+ -0.000614 -0.0378 -0.000821 0.00449 -0.0156*** 0.0121 -0.00176 
  (-0.0722) (-0.889) (-0.831) (1.124) (-4.021) (0.711) (-0.118) 
𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡  -/+ -0.0204 0.111 -0.00462** 0.00374 -0.0123 -0.205 0.356*** 
  (-1.249) (1.091) (-2.213) (0.422) (-0.595) (-0.393) (4.342) 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 -/+ -0.322 -0.797 0.00694 0.0214** -0.325*** 0.253*** 0.0229 
  (-1.189) (-0.993) (1.088) (2.419) (-5.168) (2.786) (0.0499) 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 -/+ 0.0442 -0.122 0.00212 -0.00258 0.0220 0.372*** 0.356*** 
  (1.555) (-1.224) (0.626) (-0.292) (1.205) (4.164) (4.415) 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 0.0238 0.113 -0.0304 -0.122* 0.0463***   
  (0.432) (1.522) (-1.129) (-1.803) (3.059)   
𝐸𝑃𝑆∆𝑖,𝑡 +/- 0.516 0.191 0.00679 -0.0655 0.00899   
  (1.417) (0.519) (0.233) (-1.166) (0.0621)   
𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡
𝑡  - -0.00378  0.000525     
  (-1.255)  (1.032)     
𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐻𝑂𝑅𝐼𝑍𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡
𝑡  + 0.00429  -0.00287     
  (0.814)  (-1.365)     
𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡
𝑡+1 -  0.0105  -0.000169    
   (1.268)  (-0.161)    
𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐻𝑂𝑅𝐼𝑍𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡
𝑡+1 +  -0.0717  0.00395    
   (-0.997)  (0.226)    
𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝑡  -     0.000382   
      (1.485)   
𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐻𝑂𝑅𝐼𝑍𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝑡  +     0.0301*   
      (1.815)   
Fixed Effects         
NAICS  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
COUNTRY  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant  -0.265 1.449 -0.00320 0.00137 -0.0416 -1.408** -1.149* 
  (-1.373) (1.513) (-0.108) (0.0104) (-0.263) (-2.052) (-1.842) 
         
Adjusted R-squared 0.123 0.137 0.056 0.1151 0.125 0.210 0.223 
Observations  399 401 384 393 520 600 594 
Number of Firms 97 95 93 95 109 114 111 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 21 shows that 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is negatively associated in the regressions of  
𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝑡  and 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑡  as well as in the regression of 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝐹𝐸𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑡 , at 5% and 1% 
respectively. Moreover, it is positively associated with 𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡𝑡  and 
𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡
𝑡+1 at 1%. On the other hand, the association between 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡 and 𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 
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as well as 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡 and 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 is positive but insignificant. These results are 
consistent with those at table 19. This implies that mandatory adoption of IFRS can 
improve analysts’ information environment after controlling for firms’ incentives, where 
the institutional settings of Latin American countries, such as enforcement of accounting 
standards and investor protection mechanisms are weak and without significant changes 
in the pre- and post-IFRS adoption period. 
The next section reports the precision of the information under the new 
information environment. 
 
5.7.4 The precision of the information environment (H7) 
 Table 21, along with the previous sections, shows that mandatory adoption of 
IFRS can improve the analysts’ information environment in Latin American countries 
after controlling for firm-level reporting incentives and under a weak institutional setting 
without significant changes in enforcement and investor protection in the pre- and post-
IFRS adoption period. This section further investigates how mandatory adoption of IFRS 
affects analysts’ public, private and consensus information based on the work of Barron 
et al. (1998) and Byard et al. (2011). According to model (30), table 22 presents the 









Table 22. The impact of mandatory adoption of IFRS on analysts’ public, private and consensus 
information 







Independent variables Pred.           Sign 
Dependent variables 
𝑃𝑈𝐵𝐿𝐼𝐶𝑖,𝑡 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑡 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑆𝑖,𝑡 
     
𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 0.191** -0.117 0.383*** 
  (1.998) (-1.362) (3.600) 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +/? 0.0214 -0.0360* 0.0467* 
  (1.171) (-1.941) (1.860) 
Constant  -0.124** 0.0763 -0.222* 
  (-1.991) (1.360) (-1.716) 
     
NAICS  YES YES YES 
COUNTRY  YES YES YES 
Adjusted R-squared  0.007 0.002 0.013 
Observations  476 476 476 
Number of firms  93 93 93 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The results show that 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡 impacts positively on 𝑃𝑈𝐵𝐿𝐼𝐶𝑖,𝑡 at 5% statistical 
significance level. This suggests that the precision of public information is higher in the 
post-IFRS adoption period in comparison to that in the pre-IFRS adoption period. This is 
consistent with the hypothesis H7a. On the other hand, the association between 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡 
and 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑡, is insignificantly negative. This suggests that mandatory adoption of 
IFRS can improve the precision of public information, but it does not affect analysts 
gathering information from private sources.  
 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is positively associated with 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑆𝑖,𝑡 at 1%. This suggests that the 
precision of consensus information increased in the post-IFRS adoption period in 
comparison to that in the pre-IFRS adoption period. This implies that analysts may rely 
more on public information in relation to private information in the post-IFRS adoption 
period.  
In summary, mandatory adoption of IFRS improves the precision of public and 
consensus information. Together with the results in tables 19 and 21, this study concludes 
that mandatory adoption of IFRS improves the analysts’ information environment in 
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Latin American countries after controlling for firm-level reporting incentives. This 
improvement is mainly reflected in the precision of public information and consensus 
information. 
 
5.7.5 Additional robustness tests 
 Regarding the concern that the relevant findings on this chapter may be due to a 
time trend (analysts could improve their forecast accuracy over time) and not due to IFRS, 
I generate another set of results (untabulated) by estimating all models including a time 
trend variable. This time trend variable is set as a continuous increasing trend over the 
years. For instance, it is set as 1 if the year is 2006, 2 if the year is 2007, 3 if the year is 
2008, and this procedure continues until the last year (2015). This variable captures 
whether the metrics employed in this study suffer from a time trend. The results remain 
consistent to those presented here as this variable has proven to be insignificant. 
 Due to the reduced sample, I also generate another set of results by estimating all 
the regressions according to the I/B/E/S summary file. There are 285 firms with data 
available regarding the earnings’ forecasts (accuracy, dispersion and number of analysts 
following), and 278 firms with data available regarding target price forecasts. The 
inferences are qualitatively unchanged, and for easiness of exposition, these results are 
not presented here. 
The next section discusses the conclusion and implications of this study. 
 
5.8 Conclusion 
This study investigates whether mandatory adoption of IFRS can improve 
analysts’ information environment in Latin American countries whose institutional 
settings of enforcement and investor protection are weak. As Chapter 3 shows that there 
is no significant change in the enforcement of accounting standards and investor 
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protection mechanisms between the pre- and post-IFRS adoption period in these 
countries; this situation allows us to focus on the impact of mandatory adoption of IFRS 
and firm-level reporting incentives exclusively. This study expands the measures of 
analysts’ information environment from the number of analysts following the firms, 
errors and dispersion of current-year earnings forecasts to one-year-ahead earnings 
forecasts as well as to the dispersion of current-year target price forecasts. Moreover, this 
study also extends the measurement period to four years prior to and four years after the 
official date of mandatory adoption of IFRS. This research design allows for the 
examination of the long-term effect of IFRS adoption. The next table illustrates the 
summary of the main empirical results of this chapter. 
 
Table 23. Summary of empirical findings regarding analysts’ information environment 










































Improvement Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 











information     
Improvement Yes No Yes     
 
First, the results confirm that mandatory adoption of IFRS can improve analysts’ 
information environment in Latin American countries after controlling for firm-level 
reporting incentives. Second, firm-level reporting incentives can improve analysts’ 
information environment to a certain degree. That is, the joint effect of IFRS adoption 
and firm-level incentives can improve analysts’ information environment. Third, the 
results also show that analysts issue more accurate and less dispersed forecasts. The 
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number of analysts following Latin American firms in the post-IFRS adoption period 
increases, and target price forecasts are less dispersed. This might suggest that previous 
evidence of an improvement in analysts’ information environment might not only be due 
to increased informative capacity of earnings forecasts, but also due to increased 
informative capacity of target price forecasts. Fourth, the improvement in analysts’ 
information environment brought by mandatory adoption of IFRS is reflected in the 
precision of public and consensus information. 
The significant contributions of this study are, first, according to the economic 
condition and firms’ strong incentives of adopting IFRS, Latin American countries with 
weak institutional settings can still benefit from mandatory adoption of IFRS. This is 
different from the previous studies that emphasize strict enforcement regimes and strong 
investor protection mechanisms as the conditions for adopting IFRS successfully. As the 
time span of past studies is relatively short, the benefits of mandatory IFRS adoption 
could take more time to appear. Therefore, secondly, this study contributes to IASB and 
the regulators of Latin American countries. The results confirm the positive impact of the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS as well as the governments’ policies regarding the 
implementation of these standards. Thirdly, as there is an improvement in analysts’ 
information environment, investors will realise the benefits of making investment 
decisions, and in return the capital market efficiency will improve. Finally, this study can 
provide support for other developing countries, which have not yet adopted IFRS, and 
which share the characteristics of similarly weak institutional settings of enforcement and 
investor protection mechanisms. Thus, these countries may consider adopting IFRS, and 
expect an improvement in their information environment in order to attract foreign 
investments. 
 The next Chapter focuses on the impact of the IFRS adoption on the cost of equity. 
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Chapter 6: The impact of mandatory IFRS adoption on the cost of 
capital in Latin America 
6.1 Introduction 
After examining the impact of IFRS on analysts’ forecasts, this thesis turns to 
investigate the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on the cost of capital (equity and debt). 
Equity is an important source of funding for firms and investors require a premium to 
invest on public companies due to the perceived risk of operations and the reliability of 
financial statements. As the reliability of financial statements can signal to investors the 
quality of a firm, a change in accounting quality brought by IFRS could have affected 
investors’ perception of riskiness in Latin America. Thus, this topic has direct 
implications for investors’ decisions in investing in these markets. This also highlights 
the importance of understanding the implications of the changes brought by IFRS for 
investors, governments, regulators and other users of accounting. Governments and 
regulators can assess whether the goal of IFRS has been achieved in Latin America, 
whereas investors can better assess their risks based on the findings of this study. 
Debt is an important source of funding for firms, and lenders require a premium 
to lend to companies due to the risk involved; that is, a company can become insolvent 
and fail to pay the debt. Another situation that concerns lenders is the quality of financial 
statements (Florou and Kosi, 2015). As the reliability of financial statements can signal 
to lenders the financial position of the firm, an increase on accounting quality brought by 
IFRS could have affected how lenders perceive a firms’ riskiness in Latin America. This 
topic has direct implications for lenders’ decisions and it highlights the importance of 
understanding these implications of the changes brought by IFRS for lenders, 
governments, regulators and other users of accounting. Additionally, the effects of IFRS 
on debt contracting are not completely clear (Florou and Kosi, 2015).  
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This chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 discusses the studies that focus 
on the implications of mandatory adoption of IFRS on the cost of equity. Section 6.3 
reviews the implications of IFRS for lenders and debt holders as well as the few studies 
that investigated the impact of mandatory IFRS adoption on the cost of debt and credit 
risk. Section 6.4 presents the research opportunities. Section 6.5 develops the hypotheses. 
Section 6.6 discusses the econometric approach employed to investigate the cost of 
equity.  Section 6.7 reports the methodology adopted to investigate the cost of debt. 
Section 6.8 illustrates the data and sampling procedures. Section 6.9 discusses the results. 
Finally, section 6.10 concludes. 
 
6.2 Literature review: IFRS adoption and the cost of equity  
The literature shows that country and institutional differences are drivers of 
financial reporting quality (Ball et al., 2003; Nobes, 2006). These institutional factors 
alongside firms’ incentives are also valid when investigating the effects of the IFRS 
adoption on the cost of equity. For instance, Daske et al. (2013) studied firm-level 
incentives that could show a difference in incentives that increase reporting quality. They 
investigated whether voluntary adopters presented a change in the bid-ask spread and on 
the cost of equity. Overall, the findings on all firms indicate that firms do not present an 
increase in liquidity and a reduction in the cost of equity. On the other hand, “Serious” 
adopters presented an increase in market liquidity and a decline in the cost of equity 
compared to “label” adopters. These findings indicate that the accounting standard itself 
is not responsible for increased transparency. Increased transparency may also occur 
concurrently with the change in the standards; however, the incentives are a determinant 
factor to the reporting quality.  
Unlike Daske et al. (2013), Kim et al. (2014) find that the implied cost of equity 
is significantly lower for voluntary IFRS adopters. They find that the cost of equity 
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reduces more for firms with weak institutional settings than those from strong institutional 
settings. This is consistent with firms’ incentives playing a strong role in demonstrating 
high-quality accounting, which in turn would signal higher reliability to investors who 
would perceive a lesser risk in investing in these companies. Moreover, the cost of equity 
capital is lower (greater) for firms in strong (weak) institutional environment. Even 
considering that these inferences arise from voluntary adopters, in the case of mandatory 
adoption, firms’ incentives can still play a significant role in order to signal high-quality 
accounting, which in turn would reduce the perceived risk in investing in these companies 
and hence the cost of equity could reduce. 
Although Daske et al. (2013) and Kim et al. (2014) show that firms’ incentives 
and institutional settings affect the cost of equity for voluntary IFRS adopters, Daske et 
al. (2008), Lee, Walker and Christensen (2008), Li (2010), and Persakis and Iatridis 
(2017) also show that for mandatory IFRS adopters, a reduction of the cost of equity is 
valid only in countries with strong enforcement and investor protection as well as it is 
related to firms’ incentives.  
Daske et al. (2008) investigated this topic for a sample of 26 countries that were 
mandated to adopt IFRS. The authors claimed to be the first study to investigate the early 
capital market effects of mandatory IFRS adoption on a global sample of firms. They 
focus specifically on market liquidity, the cost of equity and Tobin’s q, and investigate 
whether institutional factors such as enforcement provide any discernible effects. For 
research design purposes, they utilised a benchmark of firms that had not adopted IFRS 
in order to compare the results. On the year of the mandate, the results indicate that 
mandatory adopters present an increase in market liquidity in comparison to the 
benchmark firms. However, the Tobin’s q does not present a change between mandatory 
adopters and the benchmark firms (i.e. statistically not different than zero), and their cost 
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of equity increases in relation to benchmark firms. The authors argue that these results 
are due to market anticipation phenomena, as the market anticipates the fact that the firms 
will adopt IFRS in the next year. To support this claim, they find that the cost of equity 
decreases by 26 basis points and Tobin’s q increases by 7% on the year that precedes the 
adoption. Another finding is that these changes only occur in countries with strict 
enforcement regimes (measured by the rule of law drawn from Kaufmann et al. (2007)). 
Moreover, the changes are higher for voluntary adopters than for mandatory adopters. 
This is consistent with firm’s incentives driving financial reporting quality.  
Lee et al. (2008) studied the impact of IFRS on the cost of equity in Europe in 17 
countries. There is evidence of a reduction in the cost of equity in Ireland, Portugal, 
Norway, Switzerland and the U.K. through the price earnings growth (PEG) model. 
Nevertheless, only Portugal and the U.K. present a decrease through the abnormal 
earnings growth (AEG) model. The authors also find that the reduction in the cost of 
equity is more pronounced for companies with greater foreign capital demand in the U.K. 
The authors conclude that the influence of IFRS on the cost of equity is weak and that 
firm’s incentives and institutional factors are drivers of financial reporting even under the 
situation of mandatory adoption of IFRS.  
Covering a broad range of countries as Lee et al. (2008) and Daske et al. (2008), 
Li (2010) investigated whether the cost of equity has decreased following the mandatory 
IFRS adoption. Li (2010) found evidence that mandatory adopters presented a reduction 
in the cost of equity by 47 basis point in 2005. However, voluntary adopters did not 
present any reduction. This is because the cost of equity probably had already been 
reduced during the years before the mandatory adoption. Therefore, it is unlikely to find 
significant results when analysing firms that previously reduced their cost of equity prior 
to the mandatory adoption. Li (2010) finds evidence that only countries with strong 
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enforcement mechanisms present a significant reduction on the cost of equity. As a result, 
this highlights the importance of institutional factors in the implementation of IFRS. Li 
(2010) extends the work of Daske et al. (2008) by showing that increased disclosure and 
comparability are two possible ways that contributed to a reduction of the cost of equity. 
Persakis and Iatridis (2017) investigated whether IFRS adoption implied lower 
cost of equity and higher accounting quality in 11 European and 8 Asian countries. The 
authors found evidence that IFRS is associated with lower cost of equity in these 
countries. However, these findings are not valid for countries where the enforcement is 
weak (Greece, Portugal, Philippines and Sri Lanka). For these countries, the cost of equity 
increased. This implies that institutional settings do affect whether IFRS is effective in 
reducing firms’ cost of equity. 
Although the literature indicates that a reduction in the cost of equity only was 
perceived on countries with strict enforcement regimes (Daske, et al., 2008; Li, 2010; 
Persakis and Iatridis, 2017), this thesis argues that firms in a weak institutional setting 
could also perceive a reduction in the cost of equity based on the assumption that 
increased accounting quality would reduce firms’ riskiness, which in turn could lower the 
cost of equity. Consistent with this argument, Eliwa, Haslam and Abraham (2016) 
examined the relationship between several earnings management metrics (accruals 
quality following Dechow and Dichev (2002), earnings predictability, earnings 
smoothing and earnings persistence) and the mean of several cost of equity models (the 
PEG and the modified PEG of Easton (2004), the model of Gode and Mohanram (2003) 
and the Ohlson and Juettner-Narouth (2005)); they find a negative association between 
the metrics of earnings management and cost of equity, which indicates that higher 
accounting quality is associated with lower cost of equity. This is consistent with IFRS 
increasing the quality of financial statements and might be related to improvements in the 
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disclosure and comparability of the standards as indicated by Li (2010). Similar evidence 
was found by Houqe et al. (2016) who investigated whether mandatory IFRS adoption 
can reduce firms’ cost of equity of New Zealand companies. Using a sample of 29 firms 
with data available for 5 years before and 5 years after IFRS adoption, and based on the 
model of Easton (2004) the authors find evidence that IFRS reduces the cost of equity 
significantly. It is worth noting the study would have benefited regarding robustness of 
the results if it had compared the estimates of the cost of equity with other methods. 
The next section discusses the studies with regard to this topic in Latin America. 
 
6.2.1 Literature review in Latin America 
 There is limited evidence with regard to this topic in Latin America. The study of 
Gatsios, Silva, Ambrozini, Neto and Lima (2016) investigated the impact of IFRS 
adoption on the cost of equity of Brazilian firms through the period of 2004-2013. Using 
the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) to calculate the cost of equity, the authors do 
not find a significant decrease in the cost of equity capital. The authors argue that the 
benefits of the adoption could take a longer time to appear, which explains the findings 
of the study. Therefore, it is still possible that IFRS could help in reducing the cost of 
equity significantly if the long-term is examined. 
The summary of the empirical studies that investigated the impact of IFRS 
adoption on cost of equity are available on Appendix 3, section 3. The next section 
discusses the models used by prior literature to calculate the cost of equity. 
 
6.2.2 Overview of the cost of equity metrics 
 There are several methods to investigate the cost of equity. The residual income 
valuation (RIV) model; the Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan (2001), henceforth GLS; the 
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economy-wide growth model of Claus and Thomas (2001), henceforth (EWG); the model 
of Easton, Taylor, Shroff and Sougiannis (2002), henceforth ETSS; the AEG model; the 
PEG model; the unrestricted AEG model of Gode and Mohanram (2003), henceforth GM; 
the restricted AEG of Easton (2004), and the model of Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth 
(2005). In order to provide consistent estimation results about the cost of equity, the 
literature often utilises either several methods or the average of a range of methods 
(Daske, 2006; Daske et al., 2008; Li, 2010; Daske et al., 2013). This method is more 
accurate than using only one model as this reduces the bias in the estimation of the cost 
of equity. 
Daske (2006) used the RIV model, the GLS, the ETSS, the AEG, the GM, and the 
model of Easton (2004). The author adjusted the models to monthly estimations in order 
to increase sample size and power of the tests. Lee et al. (2008) investigated the topic 
through the PEG and AEG models. While the reported studies rely on the analysis of 
these models individually, Daske et al. (2008), Li (2010) and Daske et al. (2013) argue 
that all models have limitations. Therefore, the estimation error can be reduced when the 
average of several models is used instead of just one. Thus, Li (2010) followed the 
average of four estimation models: the GLS, EWG, GM, and the restricted AEG of Easton 
(2004). Daske et al. (2008) and Daske et al. (2013) computed the cost of equity as the 
mean of four models as follows: EWG, GLS, Easton (2004) and Ohlson and Juettner-
Nauroth (2005). This approach is different from Li (2010) where the unrestricted AEG of 
Gode and Mohanram (2003) was used instead of the model of Ohlson and Juettner-
Narouth (2005).  
Kim, Shi and Zhou (2014) investigated the issue through the PEG model of Easton 
(2004). Although they recognise that past studies compute this as the average of several 
models, they prefer to rely on this model. This is because according to Botosan and 
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Plumlee (2002), this model has a stable association with firm risk measures (i.e., market 
risk, leverage, information risk, firm size, and growth) in a theoretically consistent way. 
Moreover, it is the only one that shows a positive correlation with one-year-ahead average 
realised risk premium. 
In summary, although Kim et al. (2014) and Houqe et al. (2016) adopted the model 
of Easton (2004), a more robust way to investigate the cost of equity is to compute the 
average of several models (Daske et al., 2008; Li, 2010; Daske et al., 2013). It is worth 
noting that because the cost of equity is not observable directly, some models rely on 
accounting and analysts’ forecast data. As this data may not be available for many firms, 
the implementation of several models is constrained by data availability. The models 
adopted in this thesis are further discussed in section 6.5. 
6.3 Literature review: IFRS adoption and the cost of debt 
Standards-setters argue that IFRS can reduce information asymmetry and the risk 
in assessing a firm’s performance due to high-quality standards, which in turn can 
facilitate financing (IASB, 2008). Past literature has focused mainly on the effect of IFRS 
on the cost of equity (Daske et al., 2008; Li, 2010; Daske et al., 2013). However, debt 
users have different needs than equity users (Florou and Kosi, 2015), and as such prior 
literature raised a question whether IFRS would meet creditors needs (Ball, Li and 
Shivakumar, 2015). This question arises because there are both positive and negative 
implications regarding the features of IFRS that concern lenders and debt holders. 
Lenders and debt holders concern about the book value of assets as a proxy to determine 
if a firm has the capacity to cope with future debt payments (Armstrong et al., 2010; 
Florou and Kosi, 2015). Thus, they require reliable estimates to evaluate debt contracting 
(Watts, 2003a). On one hand, features of IFRS such as fair value, recognition of 
impairment under IAS 36 and pension liabilities under IAS 19, would lead to an increase 
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in timely recognition of losses (Florou and Kosi, 2015). These would benefit debt holders 
and lenders as timely recognition of losses implies recognition of bad news in a timelier 
manner, and are in line with the expectations of debt holders for conservative accounting 
(Ball, Bushman, and Vasvari, 2008; Florou and Kosi, 2015). On the other hand, Ball et 
al. (2015) indicate at least three consequences of fair value accounting that would concern 
debt holders and lenders as follows. Firstly, fair value accounting of trading securities and 
other financial instruments may result in unrealized gains, which may alert the reliability 
of the financial instruments under IFRS. Secondly, under IFRS transitory gains and losses 
are recognized on the income statement, but this can be tricky for lenders to evaluate a 
firms’ capacity to pay the debt. Lastly, fair value accounting is subject to managers’ 
discretion in the evaluation of assets and liabilities, which would lead lenders to cast doubt 
in the reliability of the statements. Due to these reasons, the effect of IFRS on debt 
contracting is not completely clear (Florou and Kosi, 2015). Despite this, there are few 
studies regarding the impact of IFRS adoption on credit risk (Wu and Zhang, 2014; Bhat, 
Callen and Segal, 2014) and the cost of debt itself (Moscariello, Skerratt and Pizzo, 2014; 
Florou and Kosi, 2015; Persakis and Iatridis, 2017).  
With respect to the credit risk, Wu and Zhang (2014) evaluated the effect of IFRS 
adoption on the credit rating of firms. The authors evaluated the topic through Moody’s 
credit rating and compared with accounting ratios such as return on assets, leverage, and 
interest coverage. The sample contained Moody’s ratings history for 883 firms that 
adopted IFRS voluntarily and 1,917 firms for mandatory adoption from 1990 to 2007. 
The authors found evidence that voluntary adopters presented a significant increase in the 
sensitivity of credit ratings to the accounting factor (combination of ROA, leverage, and 
interest coverage). Nevertheless, mandatory adopters only presented an increase in the 
sensitivity of credit ratings on countries with a strong rule of law. The authors point out 
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to the importance of institutional factors (i.e. rule of law) that are related to the adoption 
of IFRS. 
Bhat et al. (2014) evaluated whether mandatory IFRS adoption had an impact on 
the pricing of credit risk. The authors focused on three accounting variables that inform 
about credit risk: earnings, leverage, and book value of equity. The sample is composed 
of 105 firms from 12 countries that adopted IFRS mandatorily, and 234 firms from the 
U.S. as a control group. The authors found that the three accounting metrics are significant 
determinants of credit risk both pre- and post-IFRS. However, IFRS did not cause an 
impact on the credit risk informative capacity of these metrics. This research evidence is 
conflicting from that of Wu and Zhang (2014) who found that IFRS increased the 
sensitivity of credit ratings. Moreover, the authors argue that the origin of law, legal 
system, earnings management, and other institutional factors affect credit risk. Wu and 
Zhang (2014) also found that these institutional factors do affect IFRS adoption.  
Overall, this literature (Wu and Zhang, 2014; Bhat et al., 2014) indicates that the 
effect of mandatory adoption of IFRS on credit risk is affected by institutional factors, 
and it is mixed. 
Moscariello et al. (2014) investigated the impact of IFRS on the cost of debt of 88 
UK and 74 Italian listed companies from 2002 to 2008. In addition to regressing the cost 
of debt with control variables and the dummy of IFRS, the authors also consider the 
interactive terms between IFRS and accounting variables (Log of sales, interest coverage, 
current ratio and tangibility). They argue that changes in these interaction variables could 
show whether lenders rely more on these figures in the post-adoption period in order to 
show that IFRS influences the accounting quality and as such on the cost of debt. The 
authors do not find any reduction on the cost of debt in the U.K. consistent with the 
standards being very similar to previous U.K. GAAP. They do not find that IFRS is 
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directly significant in explaining a reduction on the cost of debt in Italy. Nevertheless, 
they found that the interactive variable of interest cover and IFRS, which is a measure of 
borrower risk, is statistically significant in explaining the cost of debt in the post-IFRS 
period for the Italian sample. This illustrates that lenders rely more on accounting figures 
prepared under IFRS in debt contracting. This also highlights that as Italy has a weak 
institutional setting, lenders could also rely more on financial statements under IFRS in 
other countries with weak institutional setting. This is based on the presumption of higher 
quality of IFRS in comparison to domestic standards (Barth et al., 2008). 
Florou and Kosi (2015) focus on debt markets and examine debt financing 
consequences of mandatory IFRS adoption. They evaluate whether firms are more likely 
to issue bonds rather than obtain loans and its relation to the cost of debt in the post-IFRS 
adoption period, and whether there is a difference between public and private debt 
markets. The authors investigated private loan agreements and public bond issues from 
35 countries from 2000 to 2007. They find evidence that there is an increase of 8.4% in 
the likelihood that a firm will access the bond market after mandatory adoption. Secondly, 
the public debt market increases public debt by 9.7%. Not surprisingly, the cost of bonds 
under IFRS reduces by 36.6% compared to non-adopters. However, the authors did not 
find a relation between IFRS and loan rates. These results suggest that IFRS contributes 
to an improvement on the bond market where reliance on public financial reports is more 
frequent than private reports. Moreover, the authors provide evidence that it is more likely 
that first-time adopters will issue bonds and its costs are lower in countries where the 
discrepancies between domestic GAAP and IFRS are higher. The most striking feature is 
that debt-financing effects do not vary as a function of the enforcement level. These 
findings, however, are constrained as the authors cannot rule out the possibility of 
concurrent changes in institutional factors in their results (Florou and Kosi, 2015).  
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Persakis and Iatridis (2017) investigated whether IFRS is associated with lower 
cost of debt. Using a sample of 11 European countries and 8 Asian countries from 2000 
to 2014, the authors find that the cost of debt overall decreases in the post-IFRS period. 
However, the results among these countries are mixed.  
Overall, the literature shows that the impact of IFRS on the cost of debt is affected 
by institutional factors, and it is mixed (Moscariello et al., 2014; Florou and Kosi, 2015; 
Persakis and Iatridis, 2017).  
The summary of the empirical studies that investigated the impact of IFRS 
adoption on cost of debt and credit risk are available on Appendix 3, section 4. The next 
section presents the research opportunities. 
 
6.4 Research opportunities 
Prior research on developed markets has found contradictory evidence regarding 
the impact of mandatory IFRS adoption on the cost of equity. Daske et al. (2008) find 
that the cost of equity decreases by 26 basis points only for countries with strict 
enforcement regimes on the year before the mandate, and find an increase in the cost of 
equity in the year of the mandate. Lee et al. (2008) document conflicting evidence about 
a decrease and an increase in the cost of equity for different countries. However, Li 
(2010), Houqe et al. (2016) and Persakis and Iatridis (2017) document a reduction on the 
cost of equity following the mandatory adoption of IFRS. Besides, there is a lack of 
studies regarding this topic in Latin American markets, which represents an opportunity 
for this thesis to fill that gap. This is also important in terms of examining the relationship 
between accounting quality and cost of capital (Beyer et al., 2010). An opportunity arising 
from the methods used is that most of the studies relies on pseudo forecasts. That is, they 
estimate analysts forecast data using the long-term growth rate when the third-year-ahead 
through five-year-ahead earnings are missing (Claus and Thomas, 2001; Li, 2010). 
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However, considering only forecasts issued by analysts better represent analysts’ 
expectation of firms’ future and avoid potential measurement errors when the researcher 
forecasts the missing estimates. This method improves the calculation of the cost of equity 
according to analysts’ expectation. 
Regarding the cost of debt, there are only a few studies investigating the impact 
of IFRS on the cost of debt. This topic is important because this represents an important 
source of financing for firms and the cost of debt is associated with the reliability of the 
financial statements (Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983; Moscariello et al, 2014). Beyer et 
al. (2010) argue that research should consider the role of accounting information in debt 
markets. However, the effects of IFRS on debt contracting are not completely clear 
(Florou and Kosi, 2015). Additionally, the literature regarding this topic for Latin 
American markets is scarce. Thus, this is an opportunity for this thesis to analyse whether 
the cost of debt has decreased since the adoption of IFRS in Latin America as debt 
covenants will be more confident in firms’ financial statements and, as a result, may lower 
the interests on debt contracting. Florou and Kosi (2015) also indicate that they cannot 
rule out the possibility that their results are affected due to concurrent institutional 
changes. Persakis and Iatridis (2017) rely on static proxies of enforcement, and not 
directly related to the enforcement of accounting standards, which could cause bias in the 
results (Brown et al., 2014). This also is an opportunity to investigate the impact of IFRS 
more accurately as Chapter 3 shows that there were no concurrent changes in enforcement 
and investor protection mechanism of Latin American countries. The next sections 




6.5 Hypotheses development 
There are two main theoretical arguments supporting why this thesis expects the 
cost of equity to be lower after the mandatory IFRS adoption: enhanced disclosure and 
comparability, which affect pricing of estimation risk and pricing of information quality. 
First, disclosure and the cost of equity are related to estimation risk (Barry and Brown, 
1985). This stream of research suggests that a firm can reduce investors’ estimation risk 
by providing enhanced disclosures. Thus, considering that estimation risk is priced, 
enhanced disclosure may reduce firms’ cost of equity (Li, 2010). Consistent with this 
view, prior research provides evidence that IFRS requires greater financial disclosure than 
most local accounting standards (Ashbaugh and Pincus, 2001), and that increased 
disclosure reduces the cost of equity (Botosan, 1997; Botosan and Plumlee, 2002; Easley 
and O’Hara, 2004; Francis, Khurana and Pereira, 2005a; Lambert, Leuz and Verrecchia, 
2007). Moreover, the information asymmetry literature suggests that enhanced disclosure 
helps to mitigate the adverse selection problem and enhances liquidity; as a result, it can 
reduce the cost of equity through lower transaction costs (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; 
Easley and O’Hara, 2004; Muller, Riedl and Sellhorn, 2011). Thus, this illustrates that 
the mandatory adoption of international standards can reduce information asymmetry, 
which is consistent with investors’ expectation (Armstrong et al., 2010). Second, prior 
literature argues that one set of accounting standards can improve information 
comparability for firms over the globe, which in turn could reduce the cost of equity 
(Barth et al., 2008; Armstrong et al., 2010; Li, 2010). Barth, Clinch and Shibano (1999) 
argue that investors expect that international accounting harmonization is likely to reduce 
the expertise acquisition costs incurred in order to examine financial statements. Li (2010) 
argues that as more countries adopt IFRS, the comparability effects are magnified, and as 
such could help to reduce the cost of equity. Consistent with this view, several studies 
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have documented that IFRS helps to increase comparability of accounting information 
(Dargenidou and McLeay, 2010; Cairns, Massoudi, Taplin and Tarca, 2011; Jones and 
Finley, 2011; DeFond, Hu, Hung and Li, 2011; Yip and Young, 2012; Barth, Landsman, 
Lang and Williams, 2012; Brochet, Jagolinzer and Riedl, 2013; Wang, 2014; Cascino and 
Gassen, 2015)34. Although previous literature focuses mostly on developed nations, their 
findings are consistent with the expectations of regulators in Latin America (SVS, 2006; 
CNBV, 2008; CVM, 2008; CNV, 2009; CONASEV, 2010). The regulators expect an 
increase of accounting quality in Latin America, and previous research show that 
increased accounting quality is related to a reduction on the cost of equity (Eliwa et al., 
2016). Although Latin American countries are in a weak institutional setting, information 
asymmetry problems should reduce by adopting high-quality accounting standards due to 
improvements in disclosure and comparability of information. Therefore, considering that 
IFRS requires greater disclosure in comparison with previous domestic accounting 
standards, and it has the capacity to increase comparability across firms, which in turn 
can reduce information asymmetry, the hypothesis is as follows: 
H8: IFRS can reduce the cost of equity significantly. 
The second objective of this chapter is to investigate the impact of IFRS on the 
cost of debt. Generally, lenders face challenging situations when lending money to 
companies because they do not have complete information about the company, which can 
increase the perceived risk in debt contracting (Moscariello et al., 2014). Thus, lenders 
need to evaluate the quality and reliability of firms’ financial statements, and this 
generates risks and costs because information is costly to acquire and verify (Moscariello 
et al., 2014). This situation is worsened in particular if firms do not disclose relevant 
information or if the accounting standards are not perceived as high-quality; that is, 
                                                 
34 The summary of the empirical studies that investigated the impact of IFRS adoption on comparability 
are available on Appendix 3, section 3. 
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accounting quality can be a measure of information risk (Bharath, Sunder and Sunder, 
2008). Consistent with this view, past literature also shows that information quality 
affects firms’ estimated risk (Barry and Brown, 1985; Coles and Loewenstein, 1988; 
Coles, Loewenstein and Suay, 1995), and lower accounting quality is associated with 
higher debt interest rates (Francis, LaFond, Olsson and Schipper, 2005b).  
In Latin America, the previous domestic GAAPs were designed to meet tax 
regulations, and as such, poorly prepared to inform the external users. For instance, in 
Brazil, prior to the adoption of IFRS, there was no separation between short-term and 
long-term liabilities, leasing contracts as well as intangibles were not properly recognised. 
These issues of previous GAAPs did not help to reflect complete and accurate information 
about a firm in comparison to IFRS. Thus, these issues could increase lenders’ costs and 
time in acquiring information, which also illustrates an information asymmetry problem. 
In turn, lenders would increase the debt rates as the perceived risk is high. The shift to 
IFRS is expected to increase firms’ accounting quality and hence firms would disclose 
more reliable and material information (SVS, 2006; CNBV, 2008; CVM, 2008; CNV, 
2009; CONASEV, 2010). As such, more reliable and material disclosures help to mitigate 
the information asymmetry problem and reduce the risk (Easley and O’Hara 2004; 
Lambert et al., 2007) that lenders perceive when lending money. In Chile, Bertin and 
Moya (2013) document higher timely recognition of losses after IFRS adoption, which 
may facilitate debt contracting. This is consistent with high-quality accounting, which in 
turn can reduce debt interest rates (Bharath et al., 2008; Schenone, 2010). Following the 
adoption of IFRS, Florou and Kosi (2015) also provide evidence of reduced debt interest 
rates in countries with weak institutional settings and big gap between previous GAAPs 
and IFRS. Thus, the hypothesis is set as follows:  




6.6 Research design on the impact of IFRS on the cost of equity 
 As described in the last section, all models that estimate the cost of equity are 
subject to econometric estimation errors. For instance, Easton and Monahan (2005) show 
that accounting based proxies are biased in estimating the expected rate of return in cost 
of equity studies. As discussed in the literature review, it is more accurate to investigate 
the topic based on an average of several models as this approach reduces the risk of 
estimation error (Daske et al., 2008; Li, 2010; Daske et al., 2013). According to Li (2010) 
the cost of equity can be estimated by the mean of the four models proposed by Claus and 
Thomas (2001), Gebhardt et al. (2001), Gode and Mohanram (2003), and Easton (2004).  
The first model that this study adopts is from Claus and Thomas (2001) whose 
proposal was to calculate the cost of equity through the abnormal earnings approach. 
Equation 31 illustrates the abnormal earnings as follows:  
𝑎𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑘𝑒1𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑏𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 (31) 
where: 𝑎𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is the abnormal earnings per share for firm i at time t; 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is the earnings per 
share for firm i at time t; 𝑘𝑒1𝑖,𝑡 is the expected rate of return on the market portfolio (cost 
of equity), derived from the abnormal earnings model for firm i at time t, 𝑏𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 is the 
book value per share for firm i at time t-1.  
 It is worth noting that the model of Claus and Thomas (2001) requires clean 
surplus accounting. They derive the following equation to calculate the cost of equity: 



























where: 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is the stock price for firm i at time t, 𝑎𝑒1…5𝑖,𝑡 is the one-year-ahead through 
five-year-ahead abnormal earnings for firm i at time t, 𝑔𝑎𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is the long-term growth rate 
provided by analysts for firm i at time t. 
 The second model to calculate the cost of equity is from Gebhardt et al. (2001), 
which is illustrated as follows in equation 33 and 34.  







𝐵𝑖,𝑡+1 + 𝑇𝑉 
(33) 
𝐵𝑖,𝑡 = book value divided by the number of shares outstanding for firm i at time t; 𝑘𝑒2𝑖,𝑡 
= the cost of equity for firm i at time t; 𝐹𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡+ℎ= forecasted return on equity (ROE) for 
firm i for period t + h. For the first three years, this variable is computed as 
𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡+ℎ/𝐵𝑖,𝑡+ℎ−1, where 𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡+ℎ is the I/B/E/S mean forecasted EPS for firm i for 
year t+h and 𝐵𝑖,𝑡+ℎ−1 is the book value per share for firm i for year t+h-1. Beyond the 
third year, 𝐹𝑅𝑂𝐸 is forecasted using a linear interpolation to the industry median ROE;  
𝐵𝑖,𝑡+ℎ = 𝐵𝑖,𝑡+ℎ−1 + 𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡+ℎ + 𝐹𝐷𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡+ℎ, where 𝐹𝐷𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡+ℎ is the forecasted dividend 
per share for firm i for year t+h, estimated using the current dividend payout ratio (dk). 
This study assumes that 𝐹𝐷𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡+ℎ = 𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡+ℎ ∗ 𝑑𝑘. 













It is worth noting that the model from Gebhardt et al. (2001) also requires clean 
surplus accounting. This model relies on the industry growth rate as a long-term growth 
rate. The third model this thesis relies on is from Gode and Mohanram (2003). Unlike the 
previous models of Claus and Thomas (2001) and Gebhardt et al. (2001), the model of 
Gode and Mohanram (2003) does not require the clean surplus accounting assumption. 
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where: 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is the stock price for firm i at time t; 𝑘𝑒3𝑖,𝑡 is the cost of equity for firm i at 
time t; 𝑒𝑝𝑠1𝑖,𝑡 is the one-year-ahead earnings per share for firm i at time t; 𝑒𝑝𝑠2𝑖,𝑡 is the 
two-year-ahead earnings per share for firm i at time t; 𝑑𝑝𝑠1𝑖,𝑡 is the one-year-ahead 
dividend per share for firm i at time t; 𝑔𝑝𝑖,𝑡 is the long-term growth rate for firm i at time 
t. 
Rearranging the equation in function of the cost of equity (𝑘𝑒3𝑖,𝑡), one gets the 
following: 




(𝑔2𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑔𝑝𝑖,𝑡) 
(36) 






𝑔2𝑖,𝑡 is the short-term growth rate for firm i at time t. 
 In comparison to the previous models, this model requires two growth rates, a 
short-term and long-term. The short term is defined as the growth ratio between the one-
year-ahead and two-year-ahead earnings forecast whereas the long-term growth rate is 
for periods over five-years-ahead. The fourth model that this thesis adopts is the price 
earnings growth model (PEG) from Easton (2004), which is described as follows in 
equation 37. 
𝑘𝑒4𝑖,𝑡
2 − 𝑘𝑒4𝑖,𝑡 (
𝑑𝑝𝑠1𝑖,𝑡
𝑃𝑖,𝑡
) − (𝑒𝑝𝑠2𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑒𝑝𝑠1𝑖,𝑡)/𝑃𝑖,𝑡 =  0 
(37) 
The cost of equity is denoted by the variable (𝑘𝑒4𝑖,𝑡) for firm i at time t, and is the 
positive real root of this equation. Afterwards, this thesis calculates two different averages 
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of the cost of equity, denoted by a common variable 𝐾𝐸𝑖,𝑡, and regress it according to 
equation 8 (Li, 2010). The first average is denoted by the variable 𝐾𝐸1234𝑖,𝑡, which is the 
average of the cost of equity calculated based on the four models described in this section. 
The second average is calculated based on the average of the third model (GM) and the 
fourth model (Easton, 2004) adopted in this study, which is denoted by the variable 
𝐾𝐸34𝑖,𝑡. This is because these models do not rely on the clean surplus accounting 
assumption, as this assumption does not hold in Latin America (Pinheiro et al., 2012).35 
𝐾𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐴𝑖,𝑡






+ ∑ 𝛽𝑦𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
 (38) 
where: 𝐾𝐸𝑖,𝑡 denotes a common variable for 𝐾𝐸1234𝑖,𝑡, which is the cost of equity 
achieved by calculating the mean of the four models proposed by Claus and Thomas 
(2001), Gebhardt et al. (2001), Gode and Mohanram (2003), and Easton (2004) for firm 
i at time t, and for 𝐾𝐸34𝑖,𝑡, which is the cost of equity achieved by the mean of models 3 
(GM) and 4 (Easton, 2004) for firm i at time t. 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the variable of interest, which is 
equal to 1 if the cost of equity is calculated in the post-IFRS period and is 0 otherwise for 
firm i at time t. There are several control variables. 1) Variables controlling for firms’ 
financial and risk characteristics that would impact the variation of stock returns (Fama 
and French, 1992; Fama and French, 1993), which in turn would affect the cost of equity 
(Li, 2010). There are 3 variables to control for this as follows: 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is the natural 
                                                 
35 Models 3 and 4 are more suitable for investigating the cost of equity in Latin America, however the 
other two methods are also adopted for comparison and for robustness. 
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logarithm of market value of equity for firm i at time t. 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the annual standard 
deviation of monthly stock returns at year-end36 for firm i at time t. 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 estimated as 
the ratio of total liabilities over total assets at year-end for firm i at time t. 2) Variables to 
control for the expected return of buying the stock and to account for the cross-country 
variation as firms’ cost of equity are calculated in local currencies and nominal terms 
(Hail and Leuz, 2006; Hail and Leuz, 2009). There are two variables to control for this as 
follows. First, the expected one-year-ahead inflation (𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐴𝑖,𝑡) defined as the country-
year annual one-year-ahead inflation for firm i at time t, provided by Datastream. Second, 
the risk-free rate (𝑅𝐹𝑅𝑖,𝑡) defined as the country-year risk-free rate for firm i at time t, 
calculated using the yields of local treasury bills or central bank papers provided by 
Datastream. As the expected inflation may not be the only factor affecting nominal 
interest rates, previous studies (Hail and Leuz, 2006; Li, 2010) include the risk-free rates 
as they could affect the real interest rates. Consistent to the previous chapters, there are 
twelve North American Industry Classification System (𝑁𝐴𝐼𝐶𝑆𝑖) dummies that classify 
the industrial firms (for firm i). These industry dummies control for the effect of different 
operating risks in different industries and the effect of different regulations. 𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑌𝑖 
is a dummy variable for each country (for firm i). It captures the effect of the institutional 
setting of the target countries. The results are similar if the enforcement proxy of Brown 
et al. (2014) is used. Additionally, there are year-fixed effects to control for specific 
shocks over time. This is particularly helpful as a control for macroeconomic shocks in 
specific years, through long-term analysis. 
 In order to reflect the macroeconomic situation experienced by Latin American 
countries in recent years, this study also includes an interactive variable into the model, 
                                                 
36 As in Li (2010), this study also includes the book to market value ratio (𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡) as another control to 
substitute for 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡. The results are similar. 
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which is 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐴𝑖,𝑡 (represented by the product of 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡 and 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐴𝑖,𝑡); this is to 
control for the joint effect of these two variables. After introducing this variable into the 
model, this study expects that the coefficient on 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡 will be significantly negative, 
which would indicate that even considering the strong effect of the expected one-year-
ahead inflation, the adoption of IFRS can still contribute to reduce the cost of equity.  
 
6.6.1 Cost of equity and firm-level reporting incentives 
An additional check is to investigate whether IFRS can still contribute to reduce 
firms’ cost of equity after controlling for firms’ incentives. Previous studies report that 
the effects of the adoption of IFRS may be due to firms’ incentives (stronger operating 
performance, increased internationality, audited by strong auditors), enforcement of 
accounting standards and investor protection mechanisms (Ball et al., 2000; Ball et al., 
2003; Daske et al., 2008; Byard et al., 2011; Christensen, 2012; Christensen et al., 2013; 
Christensen et al., 2015). Thus, this study conjectures that firms’ incentives can play a 
significant role in affecting a firms’ cost of equity considering that the institutional setting 
is weak and has not changed significantly after the adoption of IFRS. Thus, in order to 
control for this, equation 39 includes proxies for firms with regard to: (1) operating 
performance measured in terms of return on assets (𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡), (2) internationality measured 
by the number of stock exchanges that a firm lists on (𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡), and (3) stronger 





𝐾𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐴𝑖,𝑡







+ ∑ 𝛽𝑦𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
(39) 
 
where 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡 equals one if firm i is audited by one of the BIG 4 auditors in year t, 
otherwise is 0. It is proxy for growth opportunities. 𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡 is the number of stock 
exchanges that a firm i list on year t. It denotes a firm’s internationality. 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is equal 
to net income divided by total assets. 
This study expects that the coefficient on 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡 will remain significantly 
negative. Moreover, this thesis expects that the coefficients on 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡, 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 and 
𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡 will be negative indicating that firms with stronger reporting incentives 
present a lower cost of equity. This is because these firms disclose more information, and 
increased disclosure can help to mitigate information asymmetry problems, which in turn 
can reduce the cost of equity. 
 The next section illustrates the research design employed to investigate the impact 
of IFRS on the cost of debt. 
 
6.7 Research design on the cost of debt 
 It is worth noting that unlike the cost of equity that needs to be estimated, the cost 
of debt is directly observable and could be calculated using the interest rates charged in 
the lending contracts. In order to investigate this topic, this thesis adopts the methodology 
of previous studies of Francis et al. (2005b), Christensen et al. (2009), Taylor (2013), 
Moscariello et al. (2014) and Florou and Kosi (2015) as follows. 
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𝐾𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑅𝐹𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑁𝐼𝐵𝐸𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶𝑂𝑉𝑖,𝑡






+ ∑ 𝛽𝑦𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 (40) 
In Equation 40, the dependent variable (𝐾𝐷𝑖,𝑡) is given by firm i’s net interest 
expense in year t to the average interest-bearing overall debt (short-term and long-term) 
outstanding during years t and t-1 (Francis et al., 2005b; Moscariello et al., 2014; Persakis 
and Iatridis, 2017). 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is a dummy variable indicating 0 for local GAAP and 1 for 
IFRS, for firm i at time t. Following Moscariello et al. (2014), the control variables 
included in Equation 40 represent controls for five factors: economy-wide influences; 
company-specific risk; the sensitivity of debt payments to company-specific risk; the 
security of debt holders in the face of default; country and industry dummy variables; and 
year-fixed effects. Economy-wide influences: risk-free rates (𝑅𝐹𝑅𝑖,𝑡) and one-year-ahead 
expected inflation (𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐴𝑖,𝑡) as lenders will take into consideration these factors prior to 
lend money to a firm. These factors capture the economic influences on a firm’s 
borrowing costs, and are similar to those used in previous studies to control for economic 
effects (Moscariello et al., 2014; Florou and Kosi, 2015). This study expects both 
variables to be positive as the cost of debt will rise if the risk-free-rate and expected 
inflation increase. Company-specific risk: This study includes the log of the standard 
deviation of net income before extraordinary items in the prior five-year period 
(𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑁𝐼𝐵𝐸𝑖,𝑡) in order to capture the effect of income volatility on the price terms of debt 
contracts as in Francis et al. (2005b) and Moscariello et al. (2014). This variable is 
expected to have a positive association with 𝐾𝐷𝑖,𝑡. This study also includes the book to 
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market value ratio (𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡) to control for company risk (Li, 2010), and it is expected 
that it would be negatively associated with 𝐾𝐷𝑖,𝑡. The sensitivity of debt payments to 
company-specific risk. This study uses firm size (𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡) denoted as the log of total assets 
for firm i at year t, the log of sales (𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡, defined as the log of net sales for firm 
i at year t) and interest cover (𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶𝑂𝑉𝑖,𝑡, defined as operating income divided by interest 
expense for firm i at year t) to control for firms’ specific performance factors that could 
affect the interest payments. Interest cover is largely used by bank covenants and in 
previous studies (Francis et al., 2005b; Christensen et al., 2009; Taylor, 2013; Moscariello 
et al., 2014). These variables are expected to be negatively related to 𝐾𝐷𝑖,𝑡. Security in the 
face of default: Considering that there is a risk that a firm defaults on a loan, this study 
includes two variables to control for this. The percentage of property, plant and equipment 
in relation to total assets (𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐼𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖,𝑡) and the ratio represented by current assets 
over current liabilities (𝐶𝑈𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑖,𝑡). 𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐼𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖,𝑡 is expected to be negatively 
related to 𝐾𝐷𝑖,𝑡, as the higher is the ratio, there is a lesser risk in lending to that firm. 
𝐶𝑈𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑖,𝑡 is expected to be positive (Florou and Kosi, 2015), as firms with more 
current liabilities would need to disclose more information to get access to borrowings, 
which may imply lower debt costs. Consistent to the previous chapters and equations, 
there are twelve North American Industry Classification System (𝑁𝐴𝐼𝐶𝑆𝑖) dummies that 
classify the industrial firms. 𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑌𝑖 are dummy variables for each country. It 
captures the effect of the institutional setting of the target countries. The results are similar 
if the enforcement proxy of Brown et al. (2014) is used. Additionally, there are year-fixed 
effects to control for specific shocks over time. 
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At this analysis, the variable of interest is 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡. This study expects that the 
coefficient of 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡 would be negatively significant, which would indicate that IFRS 
has contributed to a reduction on the cost of debt. 
 
  
6.8 Data and sampling procedures 
Data for the sample of cost of equity were obtained from the Institutional Brokers' 
Estimate System (I/B/E/S) whereas data for the sample of cost of debt were obtained from 
DataStream (Thomson Reuters). 
To estimate the cost of equity measures, this thesis obtains analyst forecasts from 
the I/B/E/S detail file and price information from Datastream. This study obtains the other 
estimation inputs, including the dividend pay-out ratio and book value of equity, from 
Datastream. These price and forecast data are in local currencies and are from 7 months37 
after the fiscal year-end in order to ensure the financial data are publicly available and 
priced at the time of estimation (Hail and Leuz, 2006; Li, 2010). In order to construct the 
sample, this study requires each firm-year observation to have current stock price data 
and at least two analysts issuing earnings forecasts for at least two periods ahead. This 
study also requires the availability of five-year-ahead forecast or long-term growth rate 
available from I/B/E/S (Gode and Mohanram, 2003). Following Li (2010), all earnings 
forecasts are restricted to be positive. Unlike previous research (Claus and Thomas, 2001; 
Li, 2010), this study relies only on the forecasts issued by the analysts. That is, this study 
does not use the long-term earnings growth rate to forecast the three-year through five-
year-ahead earnings forecasts if they are missing. This is because using only forecasts as 
                                                 
37 Li (2010) uses the data after 7 months of the financial year-end, whereas Hail and Leuz (2006) use 7 
and 10 months after the financial year-end.  
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generated by the analysts better reflect their expectation for the firms’ future. Pseudo 
forecasts do not have this key feature.38 
In order to calculate the mean of the cost of equity, this study further requires that 
the data must be available for all models. This study produces two sets of results, first in 
order to mitigate the estimation problems incurred in the calculation of the cost of equity, 
I estimate the mean of the four methods. Secondly, considering that there is evidence that 
clean surplus accounting does not hold before the IFRS adoption (Pinheiro et al., 2012) 
in Brazil, I also estimate the average of models 3 (Gode and Mohanram, 2003) and 4 
(Easton, 2004). It is worth noting that cost of equity estimates below 0 and above 1 are 
excluded (Li, 2010). 









                                                 
38 As an additional robustness test, this study forecasts the third-year through five-year-ahead if they are 
missing using the long-term growth rate. The results are similar and the inferences remain unchanged. 
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Table 24. Sample structure for the analyses on the cost of equity (2003-2015) 
Panel A. Number of firms from I/B/E/S    
NAICS Argentina Brazil Chile Mexico Peru Total 
11 3 1 3 2  9 
21 7 17 8 9 16 57 
22 12 30 20 7 5 74 
23 8 13 16 25 6 68 
31–33 16 41 29 38 22 146 
42       
44–45 1 18 9 17 1 46 
48–49 3 11 8 4  26 
51 1 2 2 7 1 13 
54 1 3 1 2  7 
72  4 6 10 2 22 
81 3 34 6 19 4 66 
Total 55 174 108 140 57 534 
Panel B. Number of firms whose data is available at least for one of the years during the period of eight 
years around the date of mandatory adoption of IFRS. 
NAICS Argentina Brazil Chile Mexico Peru Total 
11   1 
  1 
21  5 2   6 
22  3 6   10 
23  6 0   8 
31–33  16 3 1  20 
42   
   0 
44–45  9 2 1  12 
48–49  5 1 1  6 
51 1 1    2 
54  1    1 
72   1 
  1 
81   22 1   23 
Total 1 68 17 3 0 89 
Note: Panel A reports the number of Latin American firms downloaded from I/B/E/S for the sample period 
from 2003 to 2015. North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) 11: agriculture, forestry, 
fishing & hunting; NAICS 21: mining, quarrying, oil & gas extraction; NAICS 22: utilities; NAICS 23: 
construction; NAICS 31–33: manufacturing; NAICS 42: wholesale trade; NAICS 44–45: retail trade; 
NAICS 48–49: transportation & warehousing; NAICS 51: information; NAICS 54: Professional scientific 
& technical services; NAICS 72: accommodation & food services; NAICS 81: other services (excluded 
public administration, religious organization, grantmaking & giving services, voluntary organization, social 
advisory services, human right organization, civil and social organization, business & professional, political 
& labour organization, business association, professional organization, private household etc.). Panel B 
shows the number of firms whose I/B/E/S data is available for at least one year between the four years 
before and after the date of mandatory adoption of IFRS. 
It is worth noting that the data for the analyses on the cost of equity is limited, 
with a reduced sample size. There are only 89 firms for which a meaningful39 cost of 
                                                 
39 There are companies with data available to calculate the cost of equity, however the root of the equation 
calculated as the cost of equity is a complex number, and thus it is excluded. 
207 
 
equity could be calculated and the control variables are available. This study winsorizes 
the data at 1% level to mitigate the influence of outliers. 
With regard to the analyses on the cost of debt, initially there were 1226 
companies with data available for at least one of the years during the period of 2003 to 
2015. In order to evaluate the long-term effects of the IFRS adoption, this study requires 
the data to be available 4 years before and 4 years after the IFRS adoption date. It is worth 
noting that according to Florou and Kosi (2015), the financial crisis affected the interest 
rates for lenders, so an analysis in the period through 2008 to 2010 would affect the 
results. As such, this study adopts as the pre-adoption window the span from 2004 to 2007 
and as the post-adoption window the period from 2011 to 2015 (varying according to the 
date of mandatory IFRS adoption for each country). Following these criteria, there are 
279 firms with data available.40 The advantage of this analysis is that it avoids the intense 
macroeconomic shocks following the financial crisis on debt interest rates. The 
disadvantage is that the periods investigated as pre- and post-adoption present a gap of 3 
years between them (2008 to 2010). This could weaken the inferences, if any, that would 
be attributable to the IFRS adoption. In order to mitigate this, this study also investigates 
the pre-adoption period immediately before the IFRS adoption and achieves similar 




                                                 
40 For an additional analysis, this study considers firms with at least one year of data available in the 4 years 
before and after the IFRS adoption date following the set of criteria. There are 898 firms with data available 
that matches these criteria. The inferences are similar. 
41 For example, similar results are achieved if this study considers the pre-adoption window from 2006 to 
2009 for Brazil and the post adoption period from 2010 to 2013. 
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Table 25. Sample structure for the analyses on the cost of debt (2003-2015) 
Panel A. Number of firms from Datastream    
NAICS Argentina Brazil Chile Mexico Peru Total 
11 9 3 4 4  20 
21 20 46 12 25 41 144 
22 39 66 37 25 18 185 
23 12 33 18 61 14 138 
31–33 42 100 44 90 79 355 
42 1 4 3 6  14 
44–45 3 29 11 44 4 91 
48–49 5 17 12 12 1 47 
51 4 3 3 22 1 33 
54 1 6 2 4  13 
72 1 10 19 23 3 56 
81 9 49 17 37 18 130 
Total 146 366 182 353 179 1226 
Panel B. Number of firms whose data in four years pre- and four years post- the date of mandatory 
adoption of IFRS are all available. 
NAICS Argentina Brazil Chile Mexico Peru Total 
11 1  1   2 
21 4 14 6 6 9 39 
22 5 15 14 5 3 42 
23 5 9 8 14 6 42 
31–33 11 29 20 17 15 92 
42  2 2 4  8 
44–45 1 6 5 7 1 20 
48–49 1 1 7   9 
51  1 1 6  8 
54 1     1 
72   3 6 2 11 
81   2 3   5 
Total 29 79 70 65 36 279 
Note: Panel A reports the number of Latin American firms downloaded from Datastream for the sample 
period from 2003 to 2015. North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) 11: agriculture, 
forestry, fishing & hunting; NAICS 21: mining, quarrying, oil & gas extraction; NAICS 22: utilities; 
NAICS 23: construction; NAICS 31–33: manufacturing; NAICS 42: wholesale trade; NAICS 44–45: retail 
trade; NAICS 48–49: transportation & warehousing; NAICS 51: information; NAICS 54: Professional 
scientific & technical services; NAICS 72: accommodation & food services; NAICS 81: other services 
(excluded public administration, religious organization, grantmaking & giving services, voluntary 
organization, social advisory services, human right organization, civil and social organization, business & 
professional, political & labour organization, business association, professional organization, private 
household etc.). Panel B shows the number of firms whose data is available in four years pre- and four 
years post- the date of mandatory adoption of IFRS. 
There are 279 firms with data available for this analysis. This study winsorizes the 
data at 5% level in order to mitigate the effect of outliers.42 The next section illustrates 
the descriptive statistics of the variables of interest in this study. 
                                                 
42 This study also winsorizes the data at 1% and achieve similar results. 
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6.8.1 Descriptive statistics for the analysis on the cost of equity 
 Table 26 reports the descriptive statistics for all variables used in this study with 
regard to the analysis on the cost of equity in the pre- and post-adoption periods. 
        Table 26. Descriptive statistics for the analysis on the cost of equity 
 Pre Post 
 N Mean Median Std. Dev N Mean Median Std. Dev 
Test variables         
𝐾𝐸1234𝑖,𝑡 134 0.213 0.183 0.0946 208 0.181*** 0.168** 0.0666 
𝐾𝐸34𝑖,𝑡 143 0.246 0.210 0.120 222 0.208*** 0.184* 0.0940 
         
Control Variables         
𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐴𝑖,𝑡 166 0.0481 0.0489 0.0126 256 0.0544*** 0.0540** 0.0247 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 166 7.428 7.320 1.247 256 7.649** 7.596* 1.176 
𝑅𝐹𝑅𝑖,𝑡 166 0.0903 0.102 0.0475 256 0.0875*** 0.0900*** 0.0268 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 165 1.614 1.074 2.529 254 1.340 1.148 0.913 
𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 154 0.132 0.119 0.0643 254 0.0888*** 0.0833*** 0.0301 
         
Incentives Variables        
𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡 166 0.928 1 0.260 256 0.949 1 0.220 
𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡 166 0.373 0 0.742 256 0.266 0 0.638 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 165 0.0640 0.0579 0.0463 254 0.0688 0.0635 0.0498 
         
Cost of Equity          
𝑘𝑒1𝑖,𝑡 158 0.235 0.186 0.160 241 0.203*** 0.183 0.112 
𝑘𝑒2𝑖,𝑡 165 0.147 0.128 0.0894 254 0.122*** 0.112*** 0.0681 
𝑘𝑒3𝑖,𝑡 146 0.325 0.261 0.188 228 0.275** 0.242 0.148 
𝑘𝑒4𝑖,𝑡 146 0.166 0.148 0.0824 227 0.141*** 0.135 0.0607 
*, **, *** significant difference between means (medians) in Pre and in Post at 10%, 5%, 1% level, two-
tailed test. Where: 𝑘𝑒1𝑖,𝑡 is the average of the cost of equity calculated according to Claus and Thomas 
(2001); 𝑘𝑒2𝑖,𝑡 is the average of the cost of equity calculated according to Gebhardt et al. (2001); 𝑘𝑒3𝑖,𝑡 is 
the average of the cost of equity calculated according to Gode and Mohanram (2003); and 𝑘𝑒4𝑖,𝑡 is the 
average of the cost of equity computed according to the model of Easton (2004). 
 
 
About the test variables, table 26 shows that 𝐾𝐸1234𝑖,𝑡 is lower in the post-IFRS 
period by approximately 3%, and the difference between the pre- and the post-adoption 
period is significant at 1%. As this represents the average of the four models, this study 
also presents the descriptive statistics of each model, and presents the average of models 
3 and 4 because these do not rely on the clean surplus accounting assumption. The average 
of model 3 and 4 (𝐾𝐸34𝑖,𝑡) is significantly lower in the post-IFRS period by approximately 
3.8%, and the difference between the pre- and the post-adoption period is significant at 
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1%. These illustrate that these two metrics provide consistent results that the cost of equity 
is lower after the IFRS adoption. The end of table 26 shows the average of each model 
adopted to compute the averages of 𝐾𝐸1234𝑖,𝑡 and 𝐾𝐸34𝑖,𝑡. Although this study does not 
regress each of these averages separately, it is illustrated here to indicate that all four 
models show that the cost of equity is lower after the IFRS adoption. Model 1 of Claus 
and Thomas (2001) is denoted by the variable 𝑘𝑒1𝑖,𝑡 and it is significantly lower in the 
post-IFRS period by approximately 3.2%, at a significance level of 1%. Model 2 of 
Gebhardt et al. (2001) is denoted by the variable 𝑘𝑒2𝑖,𝑡, which is significantly lower in the 
post-IFRS period by approximately 2.5%, at 1% significance level. Model 3 of Gode and 
Mohanram (2003) is represented by the variable 𝑘𝑒3𝑖,𝑡, which is significantly lower in the 
post-IFRS period by approximately 5%, at 5% significance level. Lastly, the variable 
𝑘𝑒4𝑖,𝑡 that represents the cost of equity calculated according to the approach of Easton 
(2004) is significantly negative in the post-IFRS period by approximately 2.5%, at 1% 
significance level. These indicate that the cost of equity is indeed lower in the post-IFRS 
period in comparison to the pre-IFRS period. 
The descriptive statistics for the control variables indicate that the one-year-ahead 
inflation (𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐴𝑖,𝑡) and 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 are significantly higher in the post-IFRS period, at 1% 
significance level. The higher inflation reflects the instability of Latin American countries 
and stagnant GDP in the recent years, whereas size indicates that firms are slightly bigger 
in the post-IFRS period. The variable 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡, which represents the standard deviation 
of stock returns, is lower in the post-adoption period and significant at 1%. Moreover, the 
risk-free rate (𝑅𝐹𝑅𝑖,𝑡) is also lower and significant at 1% in the post-adoption period. 
With regard to the incentives variables, the variables 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡, 𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡 and 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 are similar between the pre- and post-IFRS adoption periods. These suggest that 
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there is no significant change in firms changing auditors, or listing in other markets or 
performing a higher return on assets in the post IFRS period.   
6.8.2 Descriptive statistics for the analysis on the cost of debt 
Table 27 reports the descriptive statistics for all variables used in this study with 
regard to the analysis on the cost of debt in the Pre and Post adoption periods. 
Table 27. Descriptive statistics for the analysis on the cost of debt 
 Pre Post 
 N Mean Median Std. Dev N Mean Median Std. Dev 
Test variable         
𝐾𝐷𝑖,𝑡 1,116 0.135 0.0826 0.146 1,116 0.104*** 0.0672*** 0.117 
         
Control Variables        
𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐴𝑖,𝑡 1,116 0.0437 0.0397 0.0218 1,116 0.0635*** 0.0411*** 0.0703 
𝑅𝐹𝑅𝑖,𝑡 1,116 0.0745 0.0668 0.0613 1,116 0.0744 0.0659*** 0.0489 
𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡 1,116 12.94 12.89 1.825 1,116 13.55*** 13.57*** 1.901 
𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐼𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖,𝑡 1,116 0.464 0.470 0.217 1,116 0.426*** 0.420*** 0.228 
𝐶𝑈𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑖,𝑡 1,116 1.705 1.500 0.982 1,116 1.668*** 1.428 1.015 
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶𝑂𝑉𝑖,𝑡 1,116 3.993 2.708 4.019 1,116 3.489*** 1.960*** 4.215 
𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑁𝐼𝐵𝐸𝑖,𝑡 1,116 9.754 9.574 1.836 1,116 10.33*** 10.41*** 1.786 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 1,116 5.550 5.605 2.332 1,116 6.360*** 6.474*** 2.406 
𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 1,116 1.542 0.832 1.873 1,116 1.320*** 0.733*** 1.659 
*, **, *** significant difference between means (medians) in Pre and in Post at 10%, 5%, 1% level, two-
tailed test. 
With regard to the test variable, table 27 shows that the (𝐾𝐷𝑖,𝑡) is lower in the post-
IFRS period by approximately 3.1%, and the difference between the pre- and the post-
adoption period is significant at 1%. This illustrates that the cost of debt is lower after 
IFRS adoption, which suggest that lenders and banks perceive a lesser risk to lend to Latin 
American firms after IFRS adoption.  
The descriptive statistics on the control variables indicate that the one-year-ahead 
inflation (𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐴𝑖,𝑡) and 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 are significantly higher in the post-IFRS period, at 1% 
significance level. As in the analysis of the cost of equity, the higher inflation reflects the 
instability of Latin American countries and stagnant GDP in the recent years, whereas 
size indicates that firms are slightly bigger in the post-IFRS period. The risk-free rate also 
increased in the post-adoption period, but only the median value is significant at 1%. The 
𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡 and 𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑁𝐼𝐵𝐸𝑖,𝑡 also increased in the post-adoption period, and the 
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difference is significance at 1%. These indicate that the operational activity increases in 
the post-adoption period, as well as the volatility of the net income. Moreover, 
𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐼𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖,𝑡, 𝐶𝑈𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑖,𝑡 decreased in the post-adoption period and the 
difference is significant at 1%. These facts indicate that companies lost fixed assets over 
the period from Pre to Post, and overall the current liabilities are bigger than the current 
assets in Post. This might be due to the stagnant GDP in recent years and economic and 
political instability in Latin America. Lastly, 𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 is lower in the post adoption period, 
indicating that there are higher growth opportunities for Latin American companies, and 
the difference is significant at 1%. 
 
6.9 Results 
 This section reports the results regarding the impact of IFRS on the cost of equity. 
 
6.9.1 Overall effect of the IFRS adoption (H8) 
 Table 28 reports the results of estimating the equation (38), which regress the 
average of the implied cost of equity (measured by 𝐾𝐸1234𝑖,𝑡 (average of all 4 models), 
and 𝐾𝐸34𝑖,𝑡 (average of models 3 and 4 that do not require clean surplus assumption to 
hold)) on 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡 and the control variables. These results demonstrate whether the 

















Table 28. Overall impact of Mandatory adoption of IFRS on the cost of equity 





𝑐=1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑦𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
  Dependent Variables 
Independent Variables Pred. Sign 𝐾𝐸1234𝑖,𝑡 𝐾𝐸1234𝑖,𝑡 𝐾𝐸34𝑖,𝑡 𝐾𝐸34𝑖,𝑡 
      
𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡 - -0.0206 -0.104** -0.0313* -0.118** 
  (-1.593) (-2.284) (-1.768) (-2.078) 
𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 0.694*** -1.155 0.731** -1.179 
  (2.700) (-0.957) (2.570) (-0.838) 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 - -0.00245 -0.00399 -0.0334 -0.0347 
  (-0.141) (-0.227) (-1.470) (-1.527) 
𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐴𝑖,𝑡 +  1.762*  1.823 
   (1.773)  (1.570) 
𝑅𝐹𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 0.0985 -0.0144 -0.141 -0.255 
  (0.561) (-0.0788) (-0.633) (-1.106) 
𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 0.0721 0.111 0.194 0.229 
  (0.474) (0.752) (0.884) (1.053) 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 - 0.00266 0.00229 0.00430 0.00394 
  (1.237) (1.055) (1.230) (1.153) 
Fixed Effects      
YEAR  YES YES YES YES 
NAICS  YES YES YES YES 
COUNTRY  YES YES YES YES 
      
Constant  0.0437 0.102 0.307* 0.358** 
  (0.342) (0.745) (1.800) (1.995) 
      
Adjusted R-squared  0.109 0.115 0.088 0.090 
Observations  339 339 361 361 
Number of Firms  90 90 94 94 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
It is worth noting that because inflation could affect results, the second and fourth 
column of table 28 include the interactive variable 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐴𝑖,𝑡 for robustness of 
results. These results show that the coefficients on 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡 are significantly negative for 
the regressions on 𝐾𝐸1234𝑖,𝑡 and 𝐾𝐸34𝑖,𝑡, except in the first regression. The second and 
fourth columns include the interactive variable 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐴𝑖,𝑡, in these cases the 
coefficient of 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is negatively significant at 10%. The coefficient of 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is 
positively significant, which indicates that the cost of equity increases if the expected 
inflation increases. Thus, the results indicate that IFRS has an overall effect of reduction 
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on the cost of equity in the post-IFRS adoption period, which is consistent to the 
hypothesis H8. 
The next section focuses on whether IFRS is still effective in reducing firms’ cost 
of equity after controlling for firm-level reporting incentives. 
 
6.9.2 The impact of IFRS after controlling for firm-level reporting incentives on 
the cost of equity  
According to the results in table 28, this study turns to examine whether 
mandatory adoption of IFRS helps to reduce firms’ cost of equity after controlling for 
firm-level reporting incentives based on equation (39), which regress the average of the 
cost of equity (measured by 𝐾𝐸1234𝑖,𝑡 and 𝐾𝐸34𝑖,𝑡) on 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡, firm-level reporting 
incentives (𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡, 𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡) as well as the other control variables. These 
































Table 29. Impact of mandatory adoption of IFRS on the cost of equity after controlling for firm-
level reporting incentives 
𝐾𝐸1234𝑖,𝑡 𝑜𝑟 𝐾𝐸34𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑅𝐹𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽8𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑑+9𝑁𝐴𝐼𝐶𝑆𝑖
12
𝑑=1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑐+21𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑌𝑖
5
𝑐=1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑦𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
Independent Variables Pred.  Sign Dependent Variables 
𝐾𝐸1234𝑖,𝑡 𝐾𝐸1234𝑖,𝑡 𝐾𝐸34𝑖,𝑡 𝐾𝐸34𝑖,𝑡 
      
𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡 - -0.0171 -0.0960** -0.0341* -0.126** 
  (-1.285) (-2.037) (-1.800) (-2.185) 
𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐴𝑖,𝑡 +/- 0.673** -1.074 0.755** -1.265 
  (2.599) (-0.882) (2.602) (-0.895) 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 - -0.00538 -0.00658 -0.0292 -0.0302 
  (-0.285) (-0.348) (-1.220) (-1.262) 
𝑅𝐹𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 0.0717 -0.0327 -0.120 -0.239 
  (0.389) (-0.172) (-0.533) (-1.029) 
𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 0.0795 0.116 0.203 0.241 
  (0.516) (0.775) (0.917) (1.097) 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 - 0.00380* 0.00335 0.00319 0.00271 
  (1.823) (1.521) (1.164) (0.991) 
𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡 - -0.0181 -0.0194 0.0703 0.0743 
  (-0.383) (-0.413) (0.813) (0.861) 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 - 0.203 0.186 -0.191 -0.208 
  (0.794) (0.714) (-0.693) (-0.743) 
𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡 - -0.0136** -0.00979 -0.0411*** -0.0368*** 
  (-1.990) (-1.539) (-4.347) (-3.856) 
𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐴𝑖,𝑡 +  1.665  1.929 
   (1.656)  (1.646) 
Fixed Effects      
YEAR  YES YES YES YES 
NAICS  YES YES YES YES 
COUNTRY  YES YES YES YES 
Constant  0.176 0.238 0.395** 0.464** 
  (1.304) (1.662) (2.297) (2.597) 
      
Adjusted R-squared  0.092 0.099 0.093 0.097 
Observations  328 328 350 350 
Number of Firms 89 89 94 94 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Similar to the results of the overall impact of IFRS on the cost of equity, table 29 
shows that 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is negatively associated in the regressions on 𝐾𝐸1234𝑖,𝑡 and 𝐾𝐸34𝑖,𝑡, 
except in the first regression. The second and fourth column, which include the interactive 
variable 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐴𝑖,𝑡, indicate that for both models 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is still significantly negative 
at 5%, which illustrates that IFRS can contribute to reduce the cost of equity. It is worth 
noting that as the clean surplus accounting relation may not hold in the pre-adoption 
period, both regressions on 𝐾𝐸34𝑖,𝑡 report the coefficient of 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is negative and 
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significant. These indicate that IFRS can still be beneficial in reducing the cost of equity 
even controlling for firms’ incentives, which confirms H8. It is worth noting that this 
result is valid, in particular, taking into consideration the institutional settings of Latin 
American countries where the enforcement of accounting standards and investor 
protection mechanisms are weak and without significant changes in the pre- and post-
IFRS adoption period. Table 29 shows that the coefficient on 𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡 is significantly 
negative for almost all regressions at 5% and 1%. This illustrates that firms listed on 
foreign stock exchanges present a lower cost of equity in comparison to the others. This 
fact may arise due to increased comparability of accounting standards. As these firms are 
listed on overseas stock exchanges, investors can easily compare and rely more on their 
financial statements, which would imply lower premium to invest in these companies in 
comparison to other Latin American firms that only list on domestic stock exchanges. 
The coefficients on 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 are insignificant, which indicate that firms audited 
by big 4 auditors or with greater performance do not present a statistically different cost 
of equity. In other words, investors do not necessarily imply that the amount of 
information disclosed by these firms is sufficient for them to demand a lower premium to 
invest in these firms.  
6.9.3  Overall effect of the IFRS adoption on the cost of debt (H9) 
Table 30 reports the results of estimating equation (40), which regress the cost of 









Table 30. Impact of mandatory adoption of IFRS on cost of debt 
𝐾𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑅𝐹𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑁𝐼𝐵𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶𝑂𝑉𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽9𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐼𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐶𝑈𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑑+10𝑁𝐴𝐼𝐶𝑆𝑖
12
𝑑=1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑐+22𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑌𝑖
5
𝑐=1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑦𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
Independent Variables Pred. Sign 𝐾𝐷𝑖,𝑡 
   
𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡 - -0.0355*** 
  (-2.623) 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 - -0.0138 
  (-1.640) 
𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 - -0.00550 
  (-1.029) 
𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 0.0558 
  (0.516) 
𝑅𝐹𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 0.652*** 
  (5.950) 
𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑁𝐼𝐵𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 0.00638 
  (1.213) 
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶𝑂𝑉𝑖,𝑡 - -0.00586*** 
  (-5.161) 
𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡 - 0.00207 
  (0.185) 
𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐼𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖,𝑡 - -0.0276 
  (-0.665) 
𝐶𝑈𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 0.0135** 
  (2.351) 
Fixed Effects   
COUNTRY  YES 
NAICS  YES 
YEAR  YES 
   
Constant  0.0847 
  (0.661) 
  
Adjusted R-squared 0.130 
Observations  2,232 
Number of Firms  279 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
This result indicates that the coefficient of 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is negatively significant. In 
particular, the coefficient is significant at 1% for the regression with all sample firms. The 
results illustrate that the adoption of IFRS can benefit Latin American firms in reducing 
their cost of debt. These results are consistent to H9. With regard to the control variables, 
the coefficient on 𝑅𝐹𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is positive and significant at 1%, which indicate that the cost of 
debt is higher if the risk-free rates increases. This is consistent to the prediction and the 
rationale of the lender in agreeing the interest rate with the firm. Additionally, 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶𝑂𝑉𝑖,𝑡 
is significantly negative, which indicates that if a company has higher capacity of 
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payment with regard to the debt, lenders would reduce the interest rates for these firms, 
as these firms are less risky. Moreover, 𝐶𝑈𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑖,𝑡 is positive and significant, which 
indicates that firms with greater current liabilities in relation to current assets may disclose 
more information in order to achieve lower debt costs (Florou and Kosi, 2015). These 
firms with greater liabilities must disclose more information to get access to loans, which 
would also imply lower debt costs. 
 
6.10 Conclusion 
This chapter provides evidence regarding whether mandatory adoption of IFRS 
can contribute to a reduction on the cost of equity and debt in Latin American countries 
whose institutional settings of enforcement and investor protection are weak. As Chapter 
3 shows that there is no significant change in the enforcement of accounting standards 
and investor protection mechanisms between the pre- and post-IFRS adoption period in 
these countries; this situation allows this study to focus on the impact of mandatory 
adoption of IFRS and firm-level reporting incentives exclusively. In contrast to previous 
literature, the results reported on this thesis of the cost of equity are based solely on data 
provided by the analysts, and this study also achieves similar results by calculating the 
cost of equity using the long-term growth rate to forecast the four-year through five-year 
ahead earnings forecasts if they are not available. Table 31 shows the summary of the 
results according to the models adopted. 
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Firstly, the results confirm that mandatory adoption of IFRS can contribute to a 
reduction on the cost of equity in Latin American countries. Secondly, firm-level 
reporting incentives can affect the cost of equity to a certain degree. That is, the joint 
effect of IFRS adoption and firm-level incentives can reduce the cost of equity. Thirdly, 
mandatory adoption of IFRS can contribute to a reduction on the cost of debt of Latin 
American firms. 
The significant contributions of this study are, firstly, according to the economic 
condition and firms’ strong incentives of adopting IFRS, the Latin American countries 
with weak institutional settings can still present a reduction on the cost of equity due to 
the mandatory adoption of IFRS. Secondly, this study contributes to IASB and the 
regulators of Latin American countries. The results confirm the positive impact of the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS as well as the governments’ policies regarding the 
















Chapter 7: Conclusion 
7.1 Introduction 
This Chapter provides a brief synopsis of the main findings and conclusion of the 
thesis, as well as illustrating the implications, limitations and recommendations for future 
research. This study deals with six measures of accounting quality and economic 
consequences: earnings management, value relevance, accounting conservatism, 
analysts’ information environment, cost of equity, and cost of debt in Latin America. This 
thesis starts by discussing the theoretical framework on Chapter 2, which is based on the 
theory of agency, positive accounting theory, equity valuation theory as well as the works 
of Ball et al. (2003) and Nobes (2006). Chapter 3 then presents the background of Latin 
American countries and the factors that may affect the adoption of IFRS, and investigates 
through a questionnaire whether there were any changes in the institutional setting around 
the years of mandatory IFRS adoption. After presenting these foundations and supports 
for this thesis, this thesis starts by investigating the impact of IFRS adoption on 
accounting quality (earnings management, accounting conservatism, and value relevance) 
in Latin America, which is presented in Chapter 4. The second study (Chapter 5) 
investigates whether IFRS improved the analysts’ information environment in Latin 
America. The third study (Chapter 6) investigates whether IFRS affected the cost of 
equity and on the cost of debt in Latin America.  
This Chapter is structured as follows: Section 7.2 discusses the main conclusions. 
Section 7.3 presents the implications of this study. Section 7.4 illustrates the limitations 




7.2 Conclusions  
The findings of this study extend our knowledge with regard to the mandatory 
adoption of IFRS, the factors affecting the adoption of IFRS in emerging economies, and 
show that IFRS can still be beneficial for countries with weak enforcement of accounting 
standards and weak investor protection mechanisms. Thus, unlike developed countries 
where the degree of enforcement is higher than in emerging countries, these results 
suggest that IFRS can improve the accounting quality of Latin American firms. This is 
also more apparent as the institutional setting has not improved significantly in the years 
around the mandatory adoption of IFRS as illustrated in Chapter 3.  
In summary, the results indicate that IFRS does indeed improve the accounting 
quality of Latin American firms. The big gap between previous domestic standards, which 
were suited for attending taxation and other government needs in comparison to IFRS, 
which is market oriented and focused on better informing market users, is a key reason 
which explains this result. Moreover, following the financial crisis, strongly performing 
firms need to attract foreign investments in order to support firms’ growth. This is an 
incentive to adopt IFRS and increase accounting quality in order to attract investments. 
This argument is supported by the findings based on firm-level factors of Chapter 4. 
Additionally, the improvement on accounting quality is also supported by consistent 
findings of an improvement on the analysts’ information environment, reflected also in 
higher precision stemming from public information, which is derived under IFRS, as well 
as a reduction on firms’ cost of equity and debt. Analysts have benefited from the new 
information environment under IFRS and this has implications for their forecast accuracy 
and their forecast dispersion. Moreover, this also benefits investors in assessing whether 
or not to invest in Latin American firms. As the cost of equity and the cost of debt reduced, 
this illustrates that not only investors but also debt holders likely perceive more 
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transparent and reliable information stemming from the financial statements, which is in 
line with the regulators’ expectation and the premium required to invest in or lend to these 
companies is reduced. In conclusion, the adoption of IFRS, as well as firm-level factors, 
which represent firms’ incentives to a certain degree, are key in deriving an improvement 
in accounting quality. Overall the effects of IFRS are more pronounced for the external 
users such as analysts, investors and debt holders, this is also consistent with the purpose 
of IFRS that is designed to suit more the external users of accounting. As such, an overall 
improvement is perceived and IFRS has proven to benefit more Latin American firms in 
comparison to previous domestic accounting standards. 
 
7.3 Implications 
Overall, according to the economic and financial condition, Latin American 
countries with weak institutional settings can still benefit from the mandatory adoption 
of IFRS. This is different from previous studies that emphasize strict enforcement regimes 
and strong investor protection mechanisms as the conditions for adopting IFRS 
successfully. As the time span of past studies is relatively short, the benefits of mandatory 
IFRS adoption could take more time to appear. Therefore, this study supports the 
beneficial aspects of the adoption of IFRS in helping Latin American firms in securing 
higher accounting quality, which in turn implies greater analysts’ forecasts accuracy, 
lower costs of equity and debt. Besides helping the growth of Latin American firms, the 
results also suggest that IFRS contributed by strengthening and developing the capital 
markets. This evidence contributes to the IASB, which called for research in emerging 
markets and required evidence to support the adoption by other countries. It also has 
several implications for the regulators of Latin American countries, as this confirms the 
positive impact of the mandatory adoption of IFRS as well as the governments’ policies 
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regarding the implementation of these standards. The evaluation on the auditors’ reports 
also provides compelling evidence by showing the most common cases of irregularities 
and could be helpful for these governments should they wish to increase the penalties and 
financial consequences for firms caught by these irregularities. For investors, it could be 
beneficial for forming portfolios and achieving higher yields as they compare the 
performance of these firms with other international firms. Following the economic and 
political crisis that these countries have faced, in recent years, lower inflation rates and 
higher growth rates alongside the increase in the reliability of financial statements of 
public companies may attract more investments. For debt holders, banks and other 
lenders, the results illustrate that the cost of debt declines in the post-IFRS period, which 
suggest that lenders would be more confident in providing funding for Latin American 
firms. The increase in the funding and lower rates can help Latin American firms to grow 
and to develop their capital markets, with more external users demanding information of 
high-quality in order to continue their funding operations. Finally, the results of this study 
support the beneficial outcome of the IFRS adoption, which is a reference point for the 
IASB in supporting the adoption of IFRS for other developing countries. 
 
7.4 Limitations of the thesis 
i) The main limitation of this study relates to data availability. In particular, the data of 
analysts’ forecasts that is used on the analyses of the analysts’ information environment 
and on the analyses of the cost of equity. Data availability in developing countries such 
as Latin American countries is very limited, which affected the scope of this study, as I 
could not include more countries in the sample. In order to overcome this limitation, this 
study included data available from several sources, and tested the hypotheses in different 
types of databases: DataStream and WorldScope, Capital IQ, Economática, I/B/E/S detail 




ii) Calculations of the cost of equity are subject to advantages and disadvantages for each 
method. Thus, previous studies (Daske et al., 2008; Li, 2010) used the average of the cost 
of equity according to several methods. Following previous research, this thesis employs 
the average of four methods comparing the results with the average of two methods that 
do not rely on the clean surplus assumption as it may not hold in the period before the 
IFRS adoption. 
 
iii) The concept of accounting quality is broad and may rely on other factors that this 
thesis does not focus on such as disclosure; that is, the extent to which firms disclose the 
requirements of IFRS fully. The measures adopted in this thesis are related to the faithful 
representation of firms’ economic performance, which is broadly accepted by 
international regulators, investors, and academics, as an important feature of high-quality 
accounting (Ahmed et al., 2013b). In order to overcome this issue, this study includes 6 
measures of accounting quality and economic consequences in order to provide a broad 
view of the impact of IFRS adoption. Moreover, this study also collected qualitative data 
with regard to the institutional setting and auditors’ reports, which gives insight with 
regard to the compliance of the accounting standards across firms with different level-
factors, as well as it enhances the robustness of the analyses. 
 
iv) The standards and the process of convergence to IFRS are ongoing. As the IASB 
issues corrections or adjustments to the existing standards, each country has a different 
timing in approving and issuing the new legislation. This thesis cannot exclude the fact 
that the standards adopted during the sampling period for each country may still differ 
slightly due to the different time in its implementation. This limitation however, is not 
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sufficient to overrule the fact that the standards can still be fully compliant to IFRS (IFRS, 
2017).  
  
7.5 Recommendations for future research 
 This study proposes the following recommendations for future research: 
i) A new avenue for research is to investigate the impact of IFRS in Latin American on 
the cost of debt with regard to the type of debt (public or private) of the firm. After the 
adoption of IFRS the cost of debt could have reduced more for firms that rely on public 
debt as the quality of their financial statements increased. On the other hand, the cost of 
debt of firms that rely on private sources may have reduced less in comparison to those 
firms that rely on public sources. This is because firms relying on private sources of 
funding may have less incentives to improve disclosure. 
 
ii) Other studies examining the impact of IFRS on real earnings management in Latin 
America could further contribute to the international evidence. 
 
iii) The liquidity and the amount of foreign direct investments could also be examined in 
the post-IFRS period for Latin American firms. According to an improvement in the 
accounting quality brought via IFRS, the liquidity of Latin American markets and the 




Appendix 1: Questionnaire 
This is a questionnaire regarding the enforcement of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), shareholder protection and legislation in Latin 
American countries43. 
Please answer the following questions Reference 
ENFORCEMENT Adapted From 
1) Did the security market regulator or other body monitor financial reporting of public companies in 200944?  
Brown et al. (2014) 2) Has this situation changed since the mandatory IFRS adoption in 2010? If yes, please specify, and provide a 
particular month and year when the change happened. For example, the regulator was not responsible for this role 
before IFRS, however after the mandatory adoption of IFRS the regulator became responsible for it, or the regulator 
appointed a consultant to do this work. 
3) If there is a regulator monitoring the compliance behaviour of a firm after mandatory adoption of IFRS, how 
many firms did not comply with IFRS in the post mandatory adoption period (for example in 2011 and 2012)? Hope (2003)-Rule of Law 
4) What are the consequences for firms' noncompliance behaviours with the financial reporting and auditing 
requirements (e.g., fines, loss of limited liability status, loss of licenses, prison sentences for managers, claims for 
reparation by shareholders or others)? 
World Bank (2008) 5) Which legislation outlines/presents the consequences (e.g., in the Acts or Codes, in a civil code, criminal code, 
capital markets legislation, stock exchange listing rules, etc.)? 
6) Have there been any changes at the above legislation(s) concerning the consequences of noncompliance since 
IFRS adoption? If yes, please specify. 
7) Has the regulator taken judicial action against a firm for a non-compliant financial statement? If yes, how many 
times during each individual year between 2009 and 2012? If not, please specify the reason. Hope (2003)-Rule of Law 
                                                 
43 The questionnaire was issued in Portuguese and Spanish, according to the local language in the target countries. 




8) Has there been any increase in the number of staff employed by the regulator or monitoring body in order to 
enhance the enforcement of IFRS? If yes, could you specify a particular month and year when the hires took place? Brown et al. (2014) 
INVESTOR PROTECTION 
  
Please answer the following questions related to shareholder protection. 
9) What kind of voting mechanism does your country adopt? How does it work (for example, the shareholder's 
number of votes is equal to his number of shares, or there is a distinction between shares, or shareholders that have 
older shares have higher number of votes)? 
La Porta et al. (1998) and Hope 
(2003) - Shareholder Protection 
10) Is a shareholder able to vote through the mail? 
11) In order to be eligible to vote, does a shareholder need to deposit his shares in the company prior to a 
shareholder meeting, ensuring that the shares temporarily cannot be sold? 
12) Is there any legal regulation allowing the minority shareholders to challenge the directors' decision in the court? 
If yes, please specify. 
13) What is the minimum percentage of share capital needed in order to call for an extraordinary shareholder 
meeting? 
14) Is there any regulation regarding the minimum mandatory dividend percentage to be distributed to 
shareholders? If yes, please specify. 
15) Have there been any changes on the outlined voting and protection mechanisms after IFRS adoption? If yes, 
please specify which changes were made and the particular month and year they took place. 
16) Has the level of shareholder protection been improved since mandatory IFRS adoption? If yes, please specify 
how it has improved and provide the particular month and year that the improvement was made. 
17) How many insider trading events were caught by the regulator in each individual year between 2009 and 2012? 
Hope (2003) - Insider Trading 
Laws 




19) Have these insiders been convicted? If yes, how many were convicted in each individual year between 2009 and 
2012? 
LEGISLATION   
20) Regarding the mandatory adoption of IFRS, please provide the name(s) of the related laws, decrees, circulars, 
















Appendix 2: Results of the questionnaire 
 
QUESTIONS COUNTRIES 
ENFORCEMENT ARGENTINA BRAZIL CHILE MEXICO PERU 
1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2) No No No No No 
3) None Please refer to footnote 1 
Many firms, but an 
exact statistic was not 
provided 
NA 
3 firms and 1 auditor's 
firm for providing 




Fines and charges, 
however 
shareholders need to 
prosecute managers 
in order to claim for 
refunds and/or for 
the manager to go to 
prison 
Fines, charges, 
manager can be 
temporary suspended 





Law N. 26.832. 
(Legislación y 
normas de Mercado 
de Capitales) 
Law N. 6.385/76, art. 
11 
Law N. 3538. (Ley 
Orgánica de la 
Superintendencia de 
Valores y Seguros) 
Law of Stock 
Markets/05 (Ley del 
Mercado de 
Valores/2005) 
Norm. CONASEV N° 
0055-2001 
6) No No No No No 
7) NA Please refer to footnote 2 
None, only before the 
IFRS adoption and the 
number of firms has 
not been informed 
NA Only 1 in 2010, prior to the IFRS adoption 
8) No 
In January 2012, there 
was an increment of 3 
staff members, but they 
were relocated to other 
roles in due course  
No NA 1 in July 2014 
 
INVESTOR 
PROTECTION ARGENTINA BRAZIL CHILE MEXICO PERU 
9) One-Share-One-Vote One-Share-One-Vote One-Share-One-Vote One-Share-One-Vote One-Share-One-Vote 
10) No No Yes No Yes 





Yes, Law of 




Yes, Law N. 6.404/76, 
art 159 defines 5% of 
minimum share capital 
Art. 133 of Law of 




Yes, Law of Stock 
Markets (Ley de 
Mercado de Valores), 
art. 36 establishes that 
5% of shares are 
required to start a 
prosecution against the 
director 
Yes, Law of Societies 
(Ley General de 
Sociedades) N. 
26887/97, art 219. 
However, it does not 
define a minimum 
percentage of share 
capital 
13) 
60% in a first call, 
and 30% in a second 
call 
10% 10% 
Unless defined in the 
statute, it is required 
75% of the 
shareholders 
20% according to art. 
117 of Law of Societies 
(Ley General de 
Sociedades - Ley N. 
26887/97) 
14) No Yes. Law N. 6404/76 establishes 25% 
Yes. Art 79 of Law of 
Public Societies 
defines 30%  
Yes, 5%. According to 
Art. 113, 2nd paragraph 
of General Law of 
Societies (Ley General 
de Sociedades 
Mercantiles) and art. 
117, 6th paragraph of 
Law of Stock Markets 
(Ley de Mercado de 
Valores) 
Yes, 50% if 20% of the 
shareholders demand for 
it 
15) No No No No No 
16) No No No No No 





No. Because it is not a 
responsibility of the 
regulator. It is a duty of 
the Public Ministry of 
Brazil. 
No. Because it is not a 
responsibility of the 
regulator. 
NA NA 
19) NA Please refer to footnote 4 NA NA NA 
 
LEGISLATION ARGENTINA BRAZIL CHILE MEXICO PERU 
20) Law N. 17811/68 and Norm 562 
Laws N. 6404/76, 
11938/07 and 11941/09 
Norms 384, 427, 438, 
456, 457 and 485. In 
2009, norms 544 and 
549, for funds and 
banking institutions. 
Finally, norm 653 of 
2010 for insurance 
companies. 
Law of Stock 
Markets/05 (Ley del 
Mercado de 
Valores/2005, art. 104, 
fracción III, inciso a), 
first and second 
paragraphs  
Norm CONASEV N° 
102-2010-
EF/94.01.1(See 
appendix A of the norm) 
- Norm Nº 304 -2010-
EF/94.06.3 (See 
appendix B of the norm) 
NA: Not available; 
Footnote 1: 2010: 2, 2011: 3, 2012: 2, 2013: 4, 2014: 18, 2015: 12; 
   
Footnote 2: 2010: 2, 2011: 3, 2012: 2, 2013: 4, 2014: 18, 2015: 12;    
Footnote 3: 2009: 4, 2010: 9, 2011: 3, 2012: 8, 2013: 15;    







Appendix 3: Summary of literature review  
Section 1. Literature review (Chapter 4) 
Panel A. Studies that focused on broad topics of accounting quality  





Devalle et al. 
(2010) 
Investigated the value 
relevance of accounting 
data after IFRS adoption. 
3,721 firms of 5 
countries from 
2002-2007. 
Earnings smoothing, Value 
relevance and timely 
recognition of losses. 
The authors found mixed accounting 
quality results. The authors argue that they 
did not find evidence that supports the goal 






recognition of losses and 
value relevance after 
mandatory IFRS 
adoption.  
254 Greek firms 
from 2004 to 2006. 
Earnings smoothing, Value 
relevance and timely 
recognition of losses. 
Firms presented reduced level of earnings 
management, higher value relevance and 
higher timeliness of losses after first year 
of mandatory adoption. On the year of the 
mandate, the accounting quality was 





Investigated the impact of 
mandatory IFRS adoption 
on banking industry. 
90 E.U banks from 
2000 to 2007. 
Earnings management, and 
timely loss recognition. 
Banks with highly ownership dispersion 
keep higher levels of loan loss provisions 
and as a result smooth income even after 
IFRS. Moreover, the timely loss 
recognition is reduced after IFRS adoption. 
Authors criticise the IFRS standards that 





Ahmed et al. 
(2013b) 
Investigated whether the 
quality of accounting 
increased after mandatory 
IFRS adoption. 
3,262 firms from 
20 countries from 
2002-2004 and 
2006-2007. 
Earnings management and 
timely recognition of losses 
through Barth et al. (2008) 
and Basu (1997). 
Higher earnings management and lower 
timely recognition of losses for firms in 
strong enforcement countries, and no 
improvement on weak enforcement 
countries. IFRS does not improve 




Investigated whether the 
adoption of IFRS 
increases the accounting 
quality per se. 
177 firms in 
Germany from 
1993-2006. 
Several models to 
investigate Earnings 
management, timeliness 
and value relevance (follow 
the approach of Barth et al. 
2008). 
Accounting quality does not improve for 
mandatory adopters. Firms' incentives to 
adopt IFRS are the ones which drive the 
improvement on the quality of accounting. 
 
Panel B. Studies that focused on accounting conservatism 
André et al. 
(2015) 
Investigated the level of 
conditional conservatism 




16 countries during 
2002-2007. 
Conditional conservatism 
through the model of Khan 
and Watts (2009) and 
others. 
There is evidence of a decline of the degree 
of conditional conservatism. This is 
stronger in strong enforcement countries. 
This situation is enhanced with firms that 











Panel C. Studies that focused on earnings management  








there was a significant 







and the UK from 
2005 to 2006. 
Earnings Management 
through the properties of 
earnings studies 
(Burgstahler and Dichev, 
1997). 
There is an increase in earnings 
management in France. Moreover, there is 
no evidence of a decrease in the earnings 
management in the UK and in Australia. 
Zéghal et al. 
(2011) 
Investigated whether the 
level of earnings 
management decreased in 
France after IFRS 
adoption. 
353 French firms 
from 2003-2006. 
Earnings Management 
based on the method of 
Kothari et al. (2005). 
There is a decrease in earnings 
management after mandatory IFRS 
adoption. 
Houqe et al. 
(2012) 
Investigated the relation 
between earnings 






46 countries from 
2000-2007. 
Earnings Management 
through the model of 
DeFond and Park (2001). 
Companies from strong investor protection 
countries that were mandated to adopt 







Investigated the level of 
earnings management 




22 countries in 
2005. 
Accruals aggressiveness 
following Dechow et al. 
(1995), and real earnings 
management following 
Roychowdhury (2006). 
IFRS had no significant impact on the level 
of earnings management. 
Capkun et al. 
(2016) 
Investigated whether the 
adoption of IFRS 
increases earnings 
smoothing. 




Earnings management and 
timely recognition of losses 
through the metrics of 
Barth et al. (2008). 
The level of earnings smoothing is greater 
after IFRS adoption for both mandatory 
and voluntary adopters. 
 
Panel D. Studies that focused on Value Relevance  
Callao et al. 
(2007) 
Investigated 
comparability and value 









There are changes in comparability of 
accounting figures and financial ratios. 
Moreover, there is no improvement on the 
value relevance after IFRS adoption. The 





Gjerde et al. 
(2008) 
Investigated if there is 
higher value relevance on 
the conversion from 










Accounting numbers under IFRS are less 
value relevant than under previous 
standards. Nevertheless, as intangible 
assets are more capitalized under IFRS, 
there is evidence of higher value relevance 
with companies that have higher 
intangibles. They argue that the reason is 
because capitalizing intangible assets is 
more value-relevant than expensing them 





Investigated if there is 
higher value relevance on 
the mandatory IFRS 
reconciliation disclosure 
compared with UK 
GAAP. 
297 UK firms from 
LSE350. 
Value Relevance and 
Timeliness of accounting. 
The authors found that share-based 
payments, goodwill amortization and 
deferred tax are value relevant to investor 
in the market. The value relevance 
increased under the disclosure of IFRS 
compared to previous standard. This 
confirms IASB goal of enhancing the 







perception about IFRS in 
Europe. 




Market reaction to 16 
events(news) related with 
IFRS. 
Investors react positively with events that 
enhance the probability of adoption of 
IFRS in common law countries. 
Nevertheless, this trend does not happen in 
code law countries. Authors argue that 





Investigated the value 




Polish firms from 
1997 to 2008. 
Unexpected and simple 
return model to measure 
Value Relevance. 
Although there is a positive relation 
between accounting numbers and market 
returns, there is no significant improvement 
on the value relevance after mandatory 
IFRS adoption. 
Aharony et al. 
(2010) 
Investigated the value 
relevance of 3 items 
between local GAAP and 
mandatory IFRS 
adoption. 




The adoption of mandatory IFRS has 
increased the value relevance of goodwill, 
research and development expense, and 
revaluation of property, plant and 
equipment. This confirms that IFRS indeed 






al. (2012)  
Assessed whether IFRS 
has increased the value 
relevance of book value 
and net income in Greece. 
210 Greek firms 
from 2001 to 2008. Value relevance.  
Investors perceive value on the disclosure 
of specific IAS norms; however, there is no 
improvement on the overall value 
relevance after IFRS adoption. Authors 
highlight the fact that markets with 
different characteristics such as Greece can 
indeed perceive different outcomes of 
mandatory IFRS adoption. 
Barth et al. 
(2014)  
Investigated whether the 
net income reconciliation 
of mandatory IFRS is 
value relevant. 
1201 firms from 15 
countries during 
2003 to 2005. 
Value relevance. 
Both differences of book value of equity 
and net income are positively associated 
with share price. IFRS is indeed more 
useful for investors. 
     





IFRS increased value 
relevance of accounting 
numbers. 
856 year-firms 
from Poland from 
1997 to 2008. 
Value Relevance. 
There is a positive and significant relation 
between earnings and returns, but they do 
not find an improvement in its strength 
over time.  
Liu et al. 
(2011) 
Investigated the 
accounting quality after 
mandatory IFRS 
adoption. 
870 Chinese firms 
from 2005 to 2008. 
Earnings Management, 
value relevance through the 
metrics of Barth et al. 
(1998) and timely 
recognition of losses 
through the model of Basu 
(1997). 
Reduced earnings management, higher 
value relevance but no improvement in 




He et al. (2012) 
Investigated whether fair 
value adjustments under 





2005 to 2008. 
Earnings Smoothing 
through fair value 
adjustments. 
Firms do smooth earnings through fair 
value adjustments under IFRS. 
Cang et al. 
(2014) 
Investigated whether 






2003 to 2009. 
Analyst coverage and 
Earnings management. 
 IFRS creates new earnings management 
opportunities. 
    
 
  
Panel F. Literature Review in Latin America 
Santos and 
Calixto (2010) 
Investigated the level of 
disclosure of 
reconciliation notes 
between IFRS and 
BRGAAP. 
318 Brazilian firms 
in the first phase of 
the adoption 
(2008). 
Disclosure. Compliance to the standards was found to be very low. 
Becerra (2010) 
To investigate the 
compliance and 
implementation issues in 






Many companies had problems with tax 
and legal issues involving the 
implementation of the standards. 
Macedo et al. 
(2013)  
Investigated whether 
IFRS increased value 
relevance of accounting 
numbers. 
433 Brazilian firms 
between 1997 and 
2009. 









95 Chilean Firms 
between 1999 and 
2010. 
Conditional conservatism 





IFRS increased value 
relevance of accounting 
numbers. 
246 Brazilian firms 
between 1999 and 
first quarter of 
2013. 
Value Relevance. 
Controversial findings, the results are 
conflicting depending on the metrics 
adopted. 
Pelucio-Grecco 
et al. (2014) 
Investigated whether 
IFRS decreased the level 
of earnings management. 
317 Brazilian firms 
from 2006 to 2011. 
Earnings Management 
based on Dechow et al. 
(1995) and Kang and 
Sivaramakrishnan (1995). 
Controversial findings, the results are 





IFRS decreased the level 
of earnings management. 
133 Brazilian firms 
from 2005-2007 




based on the metrics of 
Barth et al. (1998). 
Earnings management increased, but 
authors' point out that this could vary 












2003 to 2014. 
Earnings Management, 
timely recognition of losses 
and value relevance. 
Companies with incentives improved their 
accounting quality, but other companies did 
not. 




Panel G. Other key studies quoted in the thesis but focused on voluntary adoption of IFRS  
Barth et al. 
(2008) 
Investigated whether 
voluntary adoption of 
IFRS increases the overall 
quality of accounting. 
361 firms in 21 
countries with 
voluntary adopters 
of IFRS and control 
groups. 
Several equations to 
investigate Earnings 
management, timeliness 
and value relevance. 
Firms that adopted IFRS voluntarily 
presented less earnings management, 
higher value relevance and higher 
timeliness of losses in comparison with 
















Section 2. Literature review (Chapter 5) 
Panel A. Studies that investigated analysts' information environment under mandatory IFRS adoption 
Author (s) Research Objective Sample Metrics Main Findings 
Byard et al. 
(2011)  
Investigated the effect of mandatory IFRS 
adoption in Europe. 
1,168 mandatory adopters 
from 20 European 







IFRS improves the analysts’ 
information environment only 
when it is properly enforced. 
Tan et al. 
(2011) 
Measured whether the number of foreign 
and local analysts has increased and 
whether their earnings forecasts are 
improved after mandatory IFRS adoption. 
25 countries that 




The number of analysts 
following a firm increases for 
both local and foreign 
analysts following mandatory 
IFRS adoption. There is also 
an improvement on the 
earnings forecast accuracy for 
foreign analysts. 
Jiao et al. 
(2012) 
Investigated the effect of mandatory IFRS 
adoption on analysts' forecast accuracy. 
Around 700 firms for 
2004 and 2006 covering 




The forecasts are more 
accurate and less dispersed 
after IFRS adoption. 
Choi et al. 
(2013) 
Investigated the effect of mandatory IFRS 
adoption on analysts' forecast accuracy in 
the U.K. 





Analysts’ forecast accuracy 
has increased and dispersion 
has decreased. Moreover, the 
actual earnings were more 





Horton et al. 
(2013)  
Investigated which aspects of IFRS are 
related with improvements in analysts' 
forecast accuracy. 
8,124 firms from 41 




Overall, there is evidence that 
IFRS indeed is responsible 
for improvements in forecast 
accuracy due to increased 
comparability and higher 
informational benefits. 
Panaretou et 
al. (2013)  
Investigated whether the accounting for 
derivatives has enhanced transparency or it 
has increased earnings volatility on the 
U.K. market. 
Around 1,000 firm-year 





Firms that measure and report 
derivatives under IFRS 
present significantly lower 
analysts’ forecast error and 
dispersion compared to the 
others. 
Houqe et al. 
(2014)  
Focused on the impact of IFRS on the 
analysts’ forecast accuracy in weak investor 
protection countries (France, Germany, and 
Sweden). 
Around 200 companies 




Both analysts’ forecast error 
and dispersion are reduced 
following mandatory 
adoption. 
Preiato et al. 
(2015) 
 Investigated analysts’ forecast accuracy 
and dispersion under IFRS controlling for 
various proxies of enforcement. 
10,769 firm-year 
observations of 39 
countries covering 
mandatory, voluntary and 
non-adopters of IFRS 




The authors did not find that 
IFRS per se is related with 
improvements on analysts’ 
forecast accuracy and 
dispersion. They argue that 
the enforcement is key issue 













Investigated the relationship between 
analysts’ forecast accuracy and the early 
stage of IFRS adoption. 
80 non-U.S. firms that 
adopted IAS voluntarily 
from 13 countries from 
1990 to 1993. 
Analysts' forecast 
accuracy. 
Earnings forecast accuracy 
increases after firms 
voluntarily adopt IAS. 
Bae et al. 
(2008) 
Investigated the relation of differences 
between local standards and IAS with 
analysts’ forecast accuracy on voluntary 
adopters of IAS. 
6,888 analysts for 6,169 




GAAP differences are 
positively related with 
analysts’ forecast error 
following IAS adoption. 
Hogdon et al. 
(2008) 
Investigated the relationship between 
analysts’ forecast accuracy and enhanced 
disclosure of IFRS. 
Annual reports of 89 
voluntary adopters of 
IFRS from 13 non-U.S. 





Analysts’ forecast error is 
negatively related with firm 
compliance to IFRS. 
Glaum et al. 
(2013)  
Investigated the relation between quality of 
disclosure and analysts’ forecast accuracy, 
and the role of IFRS. 






Forecast accuracy is 
improved under IFRS, and 
the quality of disclosure is 
significant but explains only a 
small portion of the 









Section 3. Literature review (Chapter 6) 
Panel A. Studies that focused on Cost of equity  
Author (s) Research Objective Sample Methodology and metrics Main Findings 
Daske et al. 
(2008) 
Investigated the impact of 
mandatory IFRS adoption 
over the world. 
8,726 firms from 
several countries. 
Share liquidity, cost of equity 
and Tobins’ Q. 
Market liquidity increases around 
the time of the introduction of 
IFRS. There is evidence of 
reduction of cost of equity and a 
rise in equity valuations before the 
mandatory adoption date. 
Nevertheless, the changes are 
more evident on countries with 
strong enforcement and 
transparency. 
Lee et al. 
(2008)  
Studied the impact of 
mandatory IFRS adoption 
on the cost of equity in 
Europe. 
 17 European countries 
from 1995 to 2006. 
Cost of equity - PEG and AEG 
model. 
The influence of IFRS on the cost 
of equity is weak, and that firm’s 
incentives and institutional factors 
are drivers of financial reporting. 
Li (2010) 
Investigated whether the 
cost of equity has decreased 
following mandatory IFRS 
adoption. 
18 countries covering 
6,456 firm-year 
observations from 
1995 to 2006.  
Cost of equity by the average 
of the industry ROE model of 
Gebhardt et al. (2001), the 
economy wide growth model 
of Claus and Thomas (2001), 
the unrestricted AEG of Gode 
and Mohanram (2003), and the 
restricted AEG of Easton 
(2004).  
Only countries with strong 
enforcement mechanisms present 
a significant reduction on the cost 




Eliwa et al. 
(2016) 
Investigated the interaction 
of the cost of equity and 
earnings quality. 
3,527 firm-year 
observations from the 
U.K. over 2005-2011. 
Earnings quality, and cost of 
equity calculated as the average 
of: the PEG and the modified 
PEG of Easton (2004), the 
model of Gode and Mohanram 
(2003) and the Ohlson and 
Juettner-Narouth (2005). 
There is a negative association 
between earnings quality and cost 
of equity. That is, higher earnings 
quality is associated with lower 
cost of equity. 
Houqe et al. 
(2016) 
Investigated whether the 
cost of equity has decreased 
following mandatory IFRS 
adoption. 
29 Companies from 
New Zealand. 
Cost of equity through the 
model of Easton (2004). 
There is a reduction on the cost of 




Investigate the impact of 
IFRS on the cost of equity. 
199,516 firm-year 
observations from 11 
European countries 
and 8 Asian countries 
from 2000-2014. 
Cost of equity by the average 
of the models of Gode and 
Mohanram (2003) and Easton 
(2004). 
There is a reduction on the cost of 
equity in the post-adoption period. 
 
Panel B. Evidence on Latin America 
Gatsios et al. 
(2016) 
Investigated the impact of 
IFRS adoption on the cost of 




from 2003 to 2014. 
Cost of equity through the 
CAPM model. 
No evidence of a reduction on the 
cost of equity. Authors point out 
that the effect of IFRS will take 







Panel C. Studies that focused on comparability 




 Evaluated the comparability 
aspect of mandatory IFRS 
analysing whether changes 
in stock prices from various 
countries affect analysts’ 
earnings forecast.  
Firms from 14 
European countries 
from 2000 to 2006. 
Comparability. The comparability of accounting information was enhanced. 
Cairns et al. 
(2011) 
Evaluated whether the 
accounting policy choices 
and fair value measurement 
produced comparable 
outcomes for assets and 
liabilities in the U.K and 
Australia after mandatory 
adoption.  
114 firms from each 
country from 2004-
2005. 
Comparability - T indices 
developed by Taplin (2004). 
There was an increase in the use 
of fair value measurement for 
financial instruments and share-
based payments, which led to 




Investigated whether the 
comparability has increased 
after the mandate. 
81,560 firm-year 
observations from 19 
European countries 
and Australia from 
1994 to 2006. 
Comparability - Coefficient of 
variation (CV) on 21 balance 
sheet, income and cash flow 
statement ratios (used as 
proxies). 
IFRS has reduced the diversity of 
financial reporting at an intra-
country and intra-industry level. 
DeFond et al. 
(2011)  
Investigated comparability 
by examining if cross-border 
investments have increased 
after IFRS adoption in 
countries with credible 
uniformity. 
5,460 firm-year 
observations in 14 E.U. 
countries from 2003 to 
2004 and from 2006 to 
2007. 
Comparability. 
Firms from countries with less 
earnings management (more 
credible) that experienced higher 
increases in uniformity had an 





Young (2012)  
Investigated the 
comparability after 
mandatory IFRS adoption 
using 3 metrics. 
2,562 firms from 17 
European countries 
from 2002 to 2007. 
Comparability - Similarity of 
information and accounting 
functions, and degree of 
information transfer. 
Accounting earnings are more 
comparable among firms within 
the same industry and country. 
However, no improvement was 
found when comparing 
accounting information across 
countries. 
Barth et al. 
(2012) 
Investigated whether the 
information is more 
comparable after IFRS 
adoption. 
U.S. firms and firms 
from 26 countries that 
adopted IFRS from 
1995-2006. 
Comparability and value 
relevance. 
IFRS increased the comparability 
of net income and book value of 
equity. 
Landsman et 
al. (2012)  
Examined whether the 
information content of 
earnings announcements 




16 countries that 
adopted IFRS and 11 
countries that did not. 
Comparability - Abnormal 
trading value and return 
volatility. 
Higher increase in these two 
factors on countries that adopted 
IFRS compared to those which 
did not. 
Brochet et al. 
(2013) 
 Investigated the degree of 
comparability after 
mandatory IFRS adoption. 
663 firms from the 
U.K. market from 2003 
to 2006. 
Comparability - Relationship 
between the change in 
abnormal returns following 
insiders’ equity market 
purchases of their own firms’ 
shares and IFRS adoption. 
Insiders’ purchases of shares face 
statistically lower abnormal 
returns after mandatory IFRS 
adoption which is consistent with 
enhanced comparability and lower 
information asymmetry. 
Wang (2014)  
Investigated the market 
reaction of local and foreign 




industry leaders from 
2001 to 2008. 
Comparability 
Abnormal price reactions to 
earnings announcements are 
higher for firms using the same 
standards rather than different 
standards, which are consistent 







Investigated the role of 
firms’ incentives on 
comparability after 
mandatory IFRS adoption. 
61,544 firm-year 
observations from 29 
countries (14 IFRS 
adopters and 15 non-
IFRS adopters) from 
2001 to 2008. 
Comparability - New model to 
investigate the issue by 
following Ball and Shivakumar 
(2005). 
The improvement on 
comparability is small. 
 
Panel D. Other key studies that investigated cost of equity and voluntary IFRS adoption 
Daske (2006) 
Investigated whether the 
cost of equity was reduced 
for voluntary adopters of 
IFRS. 
735 German 
companies from 1993 
to 2002. 
Cost of equity - RIV model, the 
GLS, (2001); the ETSS, 
(2002), the AEG, the GM, 
(2003); and Easton (2004). 
No evidence of a reduction on the 
cost of equity for German firms 
that apply IAS. 
Daske et al. 
(2013) 
Studied the firm-level 
incentives of voluntary IFRS 
adopters and its impacts on 
the cost of equity. 
Voluntary adopters of 
30 countries from 1990 
to 2005. 
Cost of equity - Mean of four 
models suggested by Claus and 
Thomas (2001), Gebhardt, et 
al. (2001), Easton (2004), and 
Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth 
(2005). 
Overall, firms do not present an 
increase in liquidity and a 
reduction on the cost of equity. 
Nevertheless, only firms that 
committed to adopt IFRS 
presented an increase in market 
liquidity and a decline in the cost 
of equity. 
Kim et al. 
(2014) 
Focused on the impact of 
voluntary adoption of IFRS 
on the cost of equity. 
21,608 firm-years from 
34 countries from 1998 
to 2004. 
Cost of equity - PEG model of 
Easton (2004). 
The implied cost of equity is 
significantly lower for voluntary 
IFRS adopters. Nonetheless, the 
cost of equity reduces more for 
firms with weak institutional 






Panel E. Studies that focused on credit markets and cost of debt 
Author (s) Research Objective Sample Metrics Main Findings 
Wu and 
Zhang (2014)  
Evaluated what was the 
effect of IFRS adoption 
on the credit rating of 
firms.  
883 voluntary and 1,917 
mandatory adopters 
from 1990 to 2007. 
Capital market effects - Debt 
Market - Moody’s credit rating. 
Voluntary adopters presented a 
significant increase in the sensitivity 
of credit ratings in relating to the 
accounting factor (combination of 
ROA, leverage, and interest 
coverage). 




adoption had an impact 
on pricing of credit 
risk. 
105 firms from 12 
countries. 
Capital market effects - Credit 
risk. 
IFRS did not cause an impact on the 
credit risk’s informative capacity. 
Moscariello 
et al. (2014) 
 Investigated the 
impact of IFRS on the 
cost of debt. 
88 U.K. and 74 Italian 
listed companies from 
2002 to 2008. 
Capital market effects - Cost of 
Debt. 
The authors do not find any 
improvement on accounting 
relevance on the UK consistent with 
standards being very close to 
previous UK GAAP. 
Florou and 
Kosi (2015)  
Focus on debt markets 
and examine debt 
financing consequences 
of IFRS adoption.  
Private loan agreements 
and public bond issued 
from 35 countries from 
2000 to 2007. 
Debt Markets - Cost of Debt. 
The cost of bonds under IFRS 
reduces by 36.6% compared to non-
adopters. Moreover, debt-financing 








Investigate the impact 
of IFRS on the cost of 
debt. 
199,516 firm-year 
observations from 11 
European countries and 
8 Asian countries from 
2000-2014. 










Appendix 4: Definition of variables  
Section 1. Definition of variables (Chapter 4) 
Test variables 
𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑃𝑖,𝑡 Quarterly net income divided by end-of-quarter number of shares outstanding and scaled 
by stock price at the beginning of the quarter. 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 Quarterly stock return = (price in end-of-quarter t – price in end-of-quarter t-1)/ price in 
end-of-quarter t-1.  
𝐷𝑖,𝑡 Dummy is set as 1 if R <0, otherwise as 0. 
𝐷𝑖,𝑡𝑅𝑖,𝑡 Product of 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 and 𝐷𝑖,𝑡. 
𝑃𝑖,𝑡+2 Quarterly stock price of two quarters ahead. 
𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 Quarterly book value of equity scaled by end-of-quarter number of shares outstanding. 
𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 Quarterly net income scaled by end-of-quarter number of shares outstanding. 
𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 Quarterly operating cash flow scaled by end-of-quarter total assets. 
∆𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 = (Quarterly operating cash flow in quarter t –quarterly operating cash flow in quarter t-
1)/total assets in quarter t-1. 
𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡 Quarterly net income scaled by end-of-quarter total assets. 
∆𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡 
= (Quarterly net income in quarter t –quarterly net income in quarter t-1)/total assets in 
quarter t-1. 
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡 =NI–CF. 
𝑆𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑖,𝑡 An indicator that equals 1 for observations with quarterly earnings scaled by the end-of-
quarter total assets is between 0 and 0.01, otherwise 0. 
𝐿𝑁𝐸𝐺𝑖,𝑡 An indicator that equals 1 for observations with quarterly earnings scaled by end-of-quarter 
total assets is less than –0.20, otherwise 0. 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 The inverse of the quarterly natural logarithm of total assets. 
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 Quarterly gross property, plant and equipment deflated by end-of-quarter total assets. 
Similar results are derived using the denominator as average of quarterly total assets. 
𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑉𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = ΔRev–ΔRec, where ΔRev is the change in quarterly revenue scaled by total assets in 
quarter t-1. ΔRec is the change in quarterly account receivable deflated by total assets in 
quarter t-1. Similar results are derived scaling ΔRev and ΔRec using average of quarterly 
total assets. 
AZ Altman Z-score (Altman, E. (1983)). 
Control variables 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 Quarterly natural logarithm of market value of equity at the end of quarter t. 
𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 The ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity at the end of quarter t. 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 The ratio of end-of-quarter total liabilities divided by end-of-quarter book value of equity. 
𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡 Percentage change in quarterly sales. 
𝑀𝑉𝐼𝑆𝑈𝑖,𝑡 Percentage change in quarterly common stock. 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑖,𝑡 Percentage change in quarterly total liabilities. 
𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡 Quarterly sales scaled by end-of-quarter total assets. 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 Annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at each quarter. 
𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡 An indicator equals 1 if the auditor is one of the big multinational accounting firms, e.g. 
Ernst & Young (E&Y), Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler (KPMG), 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), Deloitte Touche (D&T) or Arthur Anderson, otherwise 0. 
𝑋𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡 An indicator that equals 1 if the firm is listed on any U.S. stock exchanges, otherwise 0. 
𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡 Number of foreign exchange listings. 
Codes of Hofstede’s culture dimension downloaded from http://geert-hofstede.com/cultural-
dimensions.html: 
𝑃𝑊𝑖  Power distance.  
𝐼𝑖  Individualism.  
𝑀𝑖 Masculinity.  
𝑈𝑖 Uncertainty avoidance.  
𝐿𝑖 Long-term orientation.  





Section 2. Definition of variables (Chapter 5) 
Test variables 
𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝑡  The absolute value of the mean of the forecast of earnings per share minus actual 
earnings per share divided by stock price at t-1 for current-year forecasts. 
𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝑡+1 The absolute value of the mean of the forecast of earnings per share minus actual 
earnings per share divided by stock price at t-1 for one-year ahead forecasts. 
𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡
𝑡  The natural logarithm of the number of analysts who generate current-year forecasts. 
𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡
𝑡+1 The natural logarithm of the number of analysts who generate one-year ahead forecasts. 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝑡  The standard deviation of forecasts of earnings per share divided by the absolute mean of current-year earnings forecasts. 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝑡+1 The standard deviation of forecasts of earnings per share divided by the absolute value of the mean of one-year-ahead earnings forecasts. 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝐹𝐸𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝑡  The standard deviation of forecasts of target price per share divided by the absolute mean of current-year target price forecasts. 
𝑃𝑈𝐵𝐿𝐼𝐶𝑖,𝑡 Standardized values of PUBLIC. 
𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑡 Standardized values of PRIVATE. 
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑆𝑖,𝑡 The ratio that equals to PUBLIC divided by PUBLIC plus PRIVATE. 
  
Incentives variables 
𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡 An indicator equals 1 if the auditor is one of the big multinational accounting 
firms, e.g. Ernst & Young (E&Y), Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler (KPMG), 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), Deloitte Touche (D&T) or Arthur Anderson, 
otherwise 0. 
𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 The ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity at the end of year t. 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 The ratio of end-of-year total liabilities divided by end-of-year assets. 
𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡 Number of foreign exchange listings. 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 The ratio of end-of-year net profit divided by end-of-year assets. 
  
Control variables  
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 Natural logarithm of market value of equity at the end of year t. 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 Stock return at t-1. 
𝐸𝑃𝑆∆𝑖,𝑡 The change in earnings per share between t and t-1 scaled by stock price at t-1. 
𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡
𝑡  The natural logarithm of the number of analysts who generate current-year forecasts. 
𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡
𝑡+1 The natural logarithm of the number of analysts who generate one-year-ahead forecasts. 
𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝑡  The natural logarithm of the number of analysts who generate current-year target price forecasts. 
𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐻𝑂𝑅𝐼𝑍𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡
𝑡  Log of 1 plus the average number of days between each analysts’ forecast, and earnings announcement date for year t. 
𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐻𝑂𝑅𝐼𝑍𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡
𝑡+1 Log of 1 plus the average number of days between each analysts’ forecast, and 
earnings announcement date for year t+1. 
𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐻𝑂𝑅𝐼𝑍𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝑡  Log of 1 plus the average number of days between each analysts’ forecast of 









Section 3a. Definition of variables (Chapter 6 - Cost of Equity) 
Test variables 
𝐾𝐸1234𝑖,𝑡 The mean of the cost of equity calculated according to Claus and Thomas (2001), 
Gebhardt et al. (2001), Gode and Mohanram (2003), and Easton (2004). 
𝐾𝐸34𝑖,𝑡 The mean of the cost of equity calculated according to Gode and Mohanram 
(2003), and Easton (2004). 
Incentives variables 
𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡 An indicator equals 1 if the auditor is one of the big multinational accounting 
firms, e.g. Ernst & Young (E&Y), Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler (KPMG), 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), Deloitte Touche (D&T) or Arthur Anderson, 
otherwise 0. 
𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡 Number of foreign exchange listings. 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 The ratio of end-of-year net profit divided by end-of-year assets. 
  
Control variables  
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 Natural logarithm of market value of equity at the end of year t. 
𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐴𝑖,𝑡 Country-year one-year-ahead inflation provided by Datastream. 
𝑅𝐹𝑅𝑖,𝑡 Country-year risk-free rate calculated using the yields of local treasury bills or 
central bank papers provided by Datastream. 
𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 The annual standard deviation of monthly stock returns at year-end. 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 The ratio of end-of-year total liabilities divided by end-of-year assets. 
 
Section 3b. Definition of variables (Chapter 6 – Cost of debt) 
Test variables 
𝐾𝐷𝑖,𝑡 Net interest expense in year t to the average interest-bearing overall debt (short-
term and long-term) outstanding during years t and t-1. 
Control variables  
𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐴𝑖,𝑡 Country-year one-year-ahead inflation provided by Datastream. 
𝑅𝐹𝑅𝑖,𝑡 Country-year risk-free rate calculated using the yields of local treasury bills or 
central bank papers provided by Datastream. 
𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑁𝐼𝐵𝐸𝑖,𝑡 Log of the standard deviation of net income before extraordinary items in the prior 
five-year period. 
𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 The ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity at the end of year t. 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 Natural logarithm of total assets. 
𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡 Natural logarithm of net sales. 
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶𝑂𝑉𝑖,𝑡 Operating income divided by interest expense. 
𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐼𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖,𝑡 The percentage of property, plant and equipment in relation to total assets. 
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